2019-24824. Order Relating to AW-Tronics LLC  

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    In the Matter of:

    AW-Tronics LLC, 7405 SW 79CT, Miami, FL 33143, et al.,


    The Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce (“BIS”), has notified AW-Tronics LLC, of Miami, Florida, (“AW-Tronics”) that it has initiated an administrative proceeding Start Printed Page 62503against it pursuant to Section 766.3 of the Export Administration Regulations (the “Regulations”),[1] through the issuance of a Charging Letter alleging that AW-Tronics, Ali Caby, Arash Caby, Marjan Caby, and Arrowtronic, LLC (“Arrowtronic”) (collectively, “Respondents”) violated the Regulations as follows:

    Charge 1 15 CFR 764.2(d)—Conspiracy

    Beginning as early as in or about September 2013, and continuing through in or about March 2014, Respondents conspired and acted in concert with others, known and unknown, to bring about one or more acts that constitute a violation of the Regulations. The purpose and object of the conspiracy was to unlawfully export goods from the United States through transshipment points to Syria, including to Syrian Arab Airlines (“Syrian Air”), the flag carrier airline of Syria and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (“SDGT”), and in doing so evade the prohibitions and licensing requirements of the Regulations and avoid detection by U.S. law enforcement.

    Pursuant to Section 746.9 of the Regulations, a license is required for the export or reexport to Syria of all items subject to the Regulations, except food and medicine classified as EAR99. Furthermore, pursuant to Section 744.12 of the Regulations, a license is required to export or reexport items subject to the Regulations to SDGTs. Syrian Air was designated as an SDGT on May 16, 2013 (see 78 FR 32304, May 29, 2013), under authority granted to the Department of the Treasury by Executive Order 13,224, and was at all times pertinent hereto (and remains) listed as an SDGT.

    At all pertinent times, AW-Tronics and Arrowtronic were active limited liability companies incorporated in the State of Florida. Documentary evidence and email correspondence shows that AW-Tronics personnel represented to various transaction parties that AW-Tronics and Arrowtronic (collectively, “AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic”) were the same company. Arash Caby was listed on Florida corporate records as a Managing Member of AW-Tronics at the time of the violations. From January 2014 until its most recent annual report in January 2017, Ali Caby was listed on Florida corporate records as the registered agent of AW-Tronics. AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic has maintained offices in Miami, Florida and Sofia, Bulgaria, as well as other locations.

    As part of the conspiracy, the co-conspirators used electronic mail (email) and other forms of communication to communicate with each other between the United States, Bulgaria, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Syria. Under their scheme, co-conspirators would purchase from U.S. suppliers or vendors items subject to the Regulations for export to Syrian Air in Syria, including aircraft parts and equipment, and would provide materially false or misleading documents and information to conceal the illegal exports. In furtherance of the conspiracy, they also would arrange for payment for the illegal exports to be made using third-party companies to transfer payments between the co-conspirators. Overall, between in or about September 2013 and in or about March 2014, Respondents engaged in multiple transactions with Syrian Air involving the export of aircraft parts and equipment subject to the Regulations from the Miami office of AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic to Syrian Air's transshipment point in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. These items were actually intended for, and some or all were ultimately delivered to, Syrian Air in Syria.

    During the conspiracy, Ali Caby managed the Bulgaria office of AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic, while Arash Caby managed its Miami office, and Marjan Caby was its internal auditor. In furtherance of the conspiracy, each of these respondents exchanged numerous emails with other AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic employees authorizing or otherwise discussing the above-described exports to Syrian Air. These email communications included, for example, instructions that were designed to prevent U.S. law enforcement from detecting the unlawful exports to Syria and to allow them to continue by changing the routing of exports from AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic's Miami, Florida office. In March 2014, United States Customs and Border Protection seized a shipment of micro switches that, according to Electronic Export Information (EEI) filed in the Automated Export System, was destined for Syrian Air in the UAE, when, in fact, the ultimate destination was Syria. On March 5, 2014, Marjan Caby sent an email to AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic logistics employees, copying Alex Caby, that explained, “We will . . . have packages stopped by the US Customs and Border Control [and] have a case file like this for the same client[,]” and provided instructions stating, “NOTHING WILL BE SHIPPED TO CLIENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM THE USA OFFICE. WE HAVE TO SEND TO BG [Bulgaria] THEN TO CLIENT.” (Emphasis in original). “SYRIA” was specifically listed as one country for which Respondents would use Bulgaria as a transshipment point. (Same).

    In so doing, Ali Caby, a/k/a Alex Caby, Arash Caby, a/k/a “Axel” Caby, Marjan Caby, AW-Tronics, LLC, and Arrowtronic, LLC violated Section 764.2(d) of the Regulations, for which they are jointly and severally liable.

    Whereas, BIS and AW-Tronics have entered into a Settlement Agreement pursuant to Section 766.18(b) of the Regulations, whereby they agreed to settle this matter in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth therein; and

    Whereas, I have approved of the terms of the Settlement Agreement;

    It is therefore ordered:

    First, for the period of six (6) years from the date of this Order AW-Tronics LLC, with a last known address of 7405 SW 79CT, Miami, FL 33143, and when acting for or on its behalf, its successors, assigns, director, officers, representatives, agents, or employees (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Denied Person”), may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as “item”) exported to or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the Regulations, or in any other activity subject to the Regulations, including, but not limited to:

    A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, license exception, or export control document;

    B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the Regulations; or

    C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the Regulations, or from any other activity subject to the Regulations.

    Second, no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following:

    A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of the Denied Person any item subject to the Regulations;

    B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by the Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other Start Printed Page 62504support activities related to a transaction whereby the Denied Person acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control;

    C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from the Denied Person of any item subject to the Regulations that has been exported from the United States;

    D. Obtain from the Denied Person in the United States any item subject to the Regulations with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States, or

    E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by the Denied Person, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by the Denied Person if such service involves the use of any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification or testing.

    Third, any licenses issued under the Regulations in which AW-Tronics has an interest as of the date of this Order shall be revoked by BIS.

    Fourth, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in Section 766.23 of the Regulations, any person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to the Denied Person by affiliation, ownership, control, or position of responsibility in the conduct of trade or related services may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.

    Fifth, AW-Tronics shall not take any action or make or permit to be made any public statement, directly or indirectly, denying the allegations in the Charging Letter or this Order.

    Sixth, the Charging Letter, the Settlement Agreement, and this Order shall be made available to the public.

    Seventh, this Order shall be served on AW-Tronics and shall be published in the Federal Register.

    This Order, which constitutes the final agency action in this matter related to AW-Tronics, is effective immediately.

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    Dated: October 30, 2019.

    Douglas R. Hassebrock,

    Director, Office of Export Enforcement, performing the non-exclusive functions and duties of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.

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    1.  The Regulations originally issued under the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, 50 U.S.C. 4601-4623 (Supp. III 2015) (“the EAA”), which lapsed on August 21, 2001. The President, through Executive Order 13,222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), which was extended by successive Presidential Notices, continued the Regulations in full force and effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq. (2012) (“IEEPA”). On August 13, 2018, the President signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852 (“ECRA”). While Section 1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the EAA (except for three sections which are inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides, in pertinent part, that all rules and regulations that were made or issued under the EAA, including as continued in effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in effect as of ECRA's date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked through action undertaken pursuant to the authority provided under ECRA. The Regulations are currently codified in the Code of Federal Regulations at 15 CFR parts 730-774 (2018). The charged violation occurred in 2013-2014. The Regulations governing the violation at issue are found in the 2013-2014 versions of the Code of Federal Regulations (15 CFR parts 730-774 (2013-2014)). The 2019 Regulations set forth the procedures that apply to this matter.

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    [FR Doc. 2019-24824 Filed 11-14-19; 8:45 am]

    BILLING CODE 3510-33-P

Document Information

Commerce Department
Industry and Security Bureau
Document Number:
62502-62504 (3 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Case No. 18-BIS-0002
PDF File: