Comment on FR Doc # 2011-04527

*Please ignore my previous comment under 80bfcd5d. The wrong information was pasted into the comment box. The incorporation of a broad policy, reflecting the preference to use a 50/50 share line with a ceiling of 120%, is a mistake for Government acquisitions. Recently I received approval to use an FPI contract and was forced to use the Carter memo preference (50/50 & 10%). We proposed the use of a different share ration based upon the program situation, but were forced to adhere to the memo. Why should acquisition personnel even consider using FPO contract types if there is no flexibility to tailor the incentives to the effort? The studies mentioned in the IDA study titled “Can Profit Policy and Contract Incentives Improve Defense Contract Outcomes” make a strong case for the ineffectiveness of incentive contracts. Further restricting their use only compounds the problem. The inclusion of the Carter memo preferences in the DFARS is a mistake as currently acquisition leadership would translate this as a SHALL. Since when did Government acquisitions turn from developing contracts that tailor to the effort into every contract being the same. How can we justify that we are properly rewarding industry? The policy of a one fit all preference is really an attempt to fix the mistakes of 40 years ago from Navy shipbuilding and Aircraft development and production. If you want to correct the use of incentives mandate contracting officers to use a true pessimistic/optimistic weighted average and ensure that their cost curves do not mirror CPFF cost curves.