Comment Submitted by George R. Estel

Overall, the rule is a positive step forward in securing our nation's rail industry from acts of terrorism, particularly with respect to the movement of toxic or flammable chemicals. Comment regarding selection of chemicals - The choice to utilize a list of chemicals previously identified for their toxicity or explosivity (49 CFR 1580.100 (b)) is logical but needs to be coordinated with efforts by DHS to finalize 6 CFR Part 27 (Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards) where a list of chemicals has yet to be identified. Comment to requiring Rail Security Coordinators to provide to TSA, upon request, location and other shipping information on rail cars containing 49 CFR 1580.100 (b) listed chemicals (Section 1580.101) - This is an extremely important component in developing an effective strategy to deter and/or mitigate attempts on such rail shipments. TSA should, as part of the greater effort by DHS to share information, include state homeland security and emergency management offices in the receipt of such information. Comment to reporting significant security concerns (Section 1580.105) - State fusion centers created to gather and evaluate intelligence and other information in an effort to detect potential acts of terrorism need to be included in the sharing of such intelligence / information. With the assistance of local law enforcment resources information obtained as a result of this section can be quickly evaluated and determined if credible. Comment to chain of custody and control requirements (Section 1580.107) - As proposed, only those consignees of 49 CFR 1580.100 (b) materials within HTUA would be required to conduct a thourough security review upon transfer of the shipment to their custody. Such secuirty reviews should be conducted by all consignees who receive such shipments. The example used to demonstrate the potential destructive nature of hazardous materials rail shipments in the preamble of the proposed rule took place in a community not considered a HTUA and supports the arguement that all consignees should be required to conduct a security review with the transfer of custody. Comment on FR Doc # 07-00191