Comment submitted by Citizens for Government Accountability

Comments on EPA-HQ-OAR-2006-0881; FRL-8240-5: Comment #1: On page 65489, II. Background, EPA stated that [The maximum radiation dose at the surface of a CH TRU waste container is 200 millirems per hour] and [Remote-handled (RH) TRU waste emits more radiation than CH TRU waste and must therefore be both handled and transported in shielded casks. Surface radiation levels of unshielded containers of remotehandled transuranic waste exceed 200 millirems per hour]. - EPA shall clearly define the CH and RH TRU wastes as they are defined in the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act: [contact-handled transuranic waste means transuranic waste with a surface dose rate not greater than 200 millirem per hour] and [remote-handled transuranic waste means transuranic waste with a surface dose rate of 200 millirem per hour or greater]. Comment #2: On page 65490, III Proposed Baseline Compliance Decisions, EPA stated that [EPA is proposing to approve CCP?s AK, DTC, and VE processes implemented at INL in the configuration observed during a June 2006 inspection and during two subsequent follow-up inspections (July & August), and as described in the inspection report A?98?42, II?A4?69]. - However, the VE process at INL-CCP shall not be approved for the reason of [CCP has terminated the use of VE process for this waste until further notice. If CCP decides to use VE in the future EPA inspection and approval is necessary] and the condition of approval specified in Table 1-Tiering of RH TRU WC Processes Implemented by INL-CCP. Docket NO: A-98-49, II-A4-69, EPA Baseline Inspection of CCP RH TRU WCP at INL Comment #3: Section 8.2, Radiological Characterization: EPA stated that [The scope of Baseline Inspection No. EPA-INL-CCP-RH-6.06-8 included the technical adequacy of the WC systems in use at INL-CCP to characterize RH TRU wastes. These systems were evaluated with respect to their ability to perform the following: - Identify and quantify the activities of the 10 WIPP-tracked radionuclides (Am-241, Cs-137, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-242, Sr-90, U-233, U- 234, and U-238) using a combination of AK and radiological characterization, including DTC and radionuclide scaling factors derived from modeling - Assign waste material parameters (WMPs) correctly using VE for RH retrievably-stored debris waste.] EPA went on to conclude that, on page 59, [EPA has determined that there is sufficient information and data available to demonstrate that the isotopic data used to verify the ORIGEN2.2 output were technically sound. Based on the objective evidence evaluated during the inspection, the data were generated by an analytical system with acceptable accuracy, precision, and bias to support its use in supporting the radionuclide scaling factors derived using ORIGEN2.2 for INL-CCP RH TRU wastes]. EPA found no findings and concerns related to DTC and scaling factor development as it stated that [The EPA inspection team did not identify any concerns or findings relative to DTC or the development of radionuclide scaling factors as part of the radiological characterization technique evaluated during this inspection. There are no open issues related to radiological characterization resulting from this inspection]. EPA finally proposed radiological characterization baseline approval of DTC and scaling factors for assigning 10 WIPP-tracked radionuclide values as it was described in Table 1-Tiering of RH TRU WC Processes Implemented by INL-CCP of 71 FR 65488. However, EPA was wrong in reaching this conclusion and in believing that the 10 WIPP-tracked radionuclide values met its inspection scope and were correct. EPA was wrong because: - it seems that the DTC and scaling factor determinations were too complex for EPA Inspection Team to comprehend. All EPA did was following INL- CCP?s logics and explanations without its own in-depth analysis or evaluation before deriving the conclusion. - it is regrettable that EPA failed to post the relevant reports of the DTC and scaling factor determination methods on its web pages (or this Docket) so the scientific community can independently examine their technical adequacy. - Most importantly, accurate determination and tracking of 10 WIPP- tracked radionuclide values heavily rely on the combination of DTC and Scaling Factors. However, EPA failed to recognize that the DTC methods used by INL- CCP was not valid. The key reason for this invalid DTC determination was that INL-CCP used 30-gallon waste drum for the development of DTC using MCNP5 modeling (see Figure 1 on page 37). The use of RH 30-gallon drum was a fetal mistake due to the majority of RH waste drums should be 55-gallon drums but not 30-gallon waste drums. In fact, the Attachment C of WCPIP, Revison 0D (EPA approved on March 26, 2004) specified the use of RH 55-gallon drums. Furthermore, the recently DOE approved CH/RH TRU Waste Acceptance Criteria for the WIPP did not authorize the use of 30-gallon drums as the RH waste containers. The same problem would also apply to ANL-CCP RH TRU Program. Comment #4: On page 41, EPA stated that [(5) RH TRU determination: It was not entirely clear at what point the formal determination regarding a waste container?s status would be made relative to the criteria for RH TRU] and [RH TRU containers must have a contact external dose equivalent rate in excess of 200 mrem/hr: The DCT measurements that were observed and are discussed in this section represent only the photon (gamma) contribution to a container?s external radiation field. There was a neutron-sensitive instrument (Rem Ball) in the same area as the RO-7 that could be used to provide the necessary information to support a complete determination regarding a waste container?s status relative to the 200 mrem/hr criterion. INL-CCP personnel stated that the Rem Ball was used to measure each waste container but the results were used primarily for health physics/ALARA purposes. However, the RH determination is typically made on the basis of the transportation package and is therefore not within the purview of this inspection]. - We suggest that [RH TRU containers must have a contact external dose equivalent rate in excess of 200 mrem/hr] be rewritten to [RH TRU containers must have a contact external dose equivalent rate of 200 mrem/hr or greater] to meet the definition of WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (see Comment #1). - The statement of [the RH determination is typically made on the basis of the transportation package and is therefore not within the purview of this inspection] was not correct. The RH TRU determination is solely based on the surface dose rate of its container (see Comment #1) and had nothing to do with the dose rate of transportation package or casks. Both CH and RH transportation casks have to meet a separate DOT regulation and is not within the purview of EPA inspection. On page 41, [CCP-TP-504 requires the container?s dose rate to be at least a factor of ten greater than background and the lowest reading possible on the RO-7 is 1 mR/hr. This means that the minimum measured dose rate at 1 meter that is required for the proper execution of CCP-TP-504 at the 200 mR/hr criterion is 10 mR/hr, based on a factor of 20 difference between the measured dose rate at 1 meter from the container relative to the reading on contact with the container]. - The determination of 200 mR/hr on contact dose rate equates to 10 mR/hr at 1 meter using a factor of 20 is not technically justified. - EPA needs to ensure the proper determination of RH TRU waste since the RH TRU and CH TRU wastes have different waste characterization methods. - Another issues regarding DTC method is that the RH waste was assumed to be uniformly distributed within the waste container for the MCNP modeling purpose. How is this assumption true for the real loaded RH waste of S3000, S4000, and S5000 waste matrix? Comment #5: On page 67, EPA stated that [Proposed VE Tiers: None. EPA is not proposing any tiers for the VE process EPA evaluated as the part of the baseline inspection. INL-CCP informed EPA that as of August 2006, it has discontinued the use of VE for the purpose of confirming AK for RH debris waste retrievably-stored at INL. At such time that INL-CCP resumes conducting VE for RH wastes, EPA must be notified and an EPA inspection and approval are necessary] and [The technical area of Real Time Radiography (RTR) was not evaluated during this inspection. If INL-CCP wishes to use RTR to characterize RH TRU wastes, EPA approval (separate from what is contained in this report) is required]. - It was cleared that the INL-CCP discontinued the use of VE and failed to demonstrate the use of RTR during EPA Inspection. EPA has also stated clearly any future implementation or use of VE or RTR would require EPA inspection and approval. The failures of INL-CCP to use VE/RTR would indicate that the INL-CCP RH TRU Program could not possibly be ready to ship the first RH TRU waste to the WIPP as these VE or RTR are required methods as described in Table III.C.1-Overview or CH TRU and RH TRU Characterization Program from the Enclosure 3 of EPA Approval Letter of RH TRU WCPIP (3-26- 04). - It is also alarming that INL-CCP and DOE has ignored the above limitations and went ahead to seek certification of VE/RTR programs from New Mexico Environment Department in November. EPA shall not forfeit its authority and obligation to ensure these RH programs comply with EPA requirements and regulations for the protection of the public and the environment. The first shipment of RH TRU Waste from INL is scheduled in early 2007 and EPA has to make sure all program elements under its authority are ready and approved before the first shipment can begin. General concerns: - The failure of INL-CCP to receive approval was due to that the VE was performed by an unqualified personnel for the task. EPA needs to ensure a credible and effective corrective action in addressing this matter, as this is a persisting problem of CCP coupling with the recent news of [Suspension of CH shipment from INL due to its failure to detect prohibited items from the CH waste containers using VE/RTR]. - DOE has to strengthen its oversight and technical capabilities in dealing with RH TRU Programs and supervising the work performed by its contractors. Without capable CH or RH TRU Certification Managers (as they are vacant for a long period of time) in serving its Field Office, it is not surprising that these problems went on unnoticed. - EPA also needs to strengthen its capability in detecting the hidden problems during its inspections and to ensure all EPA requirements and regulations are met. Submitted by Citizens for Government Accountability