Dallah Albaraka/ Flight Operations

Date: December 5, 2007 Ref: Docket No. FAA-2007-0089 Dear Sirs: Thank you for this opportunity to provide comment regarding the referenced proposed AD. I represent an operator of a B727 aircraft which would be affected by the proposed AD. Our concerns with the proposed AD are as follows: 1. The FAA?s determination of cost of compliance is greatly underestimated. The assessment does not take into the consideration the following facts: ? The deactivation of the auxiliary tanks will have a significant detrimental impact on the long range capabilities of each aircraft. This will directly result in greater operational costs for each operator as they will be required to find alternate modes of travel, incur additional takeoff and landings, or acquire other aircraft with the necessary range. These costs associated with each of these options are not reflected within the FAA assessment. ? The deactivation of the auxiliary tank significantly decreases the value of each aircraft. As an example, our B727 without the long range capability provided by the tanks is rendered useless for our operation. Our attempt to market the aircraft to other operators has been unsuccessful due to the potential affect of the proposed AD. The cost of the compliance in our case is the full value of the aircraft or millions of dollars. 2. As an operator of a US registered aircraft affected by the proposed rule, we received no FAA notification of the proposed AD and discovered its existence only recently. Given the significant economic impact stated above, this same lack of notification by the FAA to all operators of U.S. registered aircraft affected by the proposed AD would demonstrate that the outreach provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act were not properly exercised. The fact that there are no other comments posted on the Docket from the other operators of the 148 affected aircraft is also indication of the lack of notification. 3. The original tank installation was approved by the FAA with Rogerson Aircraft Corporation as the current STC holder. The inability of the FAA to make a SFAR 88 finding of compliance due a lack of service information from Rogerson should not be made a liability of the operators. We highly recommend that initiation of the proposed AD is suspended until such time that the FAA is able to resolve this communication issue with Rogerson and a finding of compliance can be made. 4. The proposed AD describes a modification to allow continued use of the tanks, yet again burdens the operator with developing an STC as an AMOC to the proposed deactivation. Again, as the only viable option to operators requiring the extended range provided by the tanks, the FAA should coordinate development of the STC with Rogerson and reinitiate the AD with the STC modification as the primary compliance method. 5. Our final concern is the proposed timeline for compliance. The proposed December 2008 deadline is insufficient for an operator who, due to the proposed deactivation, must budget and acquire alternate means to conduct its air operation. Again, for us, the proposed deactivation will require divesting our existing aircraft and acquiring a new aircraft with a range that meets our operational needs. We will not be able to do this between the time the AD is finalized and December 2008. 6. The proposed AD states ?Once an operator has deactivated the tank as required by this AD, the operator might wish to remove the tank. This would require a separate design approval, if an approved tank removal procedure does not exist.? No operator would deactivate the tanks from continued use and still retain the payload detriment of hundreds of pounds of empty tanks. The tanks would be removed. The cost of removal and disposal of the tanks as potential hazmat containers should be reflected in the cost of compliance. In addition, the cost of developing and obtaining a ?separate design approval? since the FAA is burdening the operator should also be included in the cost of compliance. 7. The proposed AD does not give consideration to the various STC configurations for the auxiliary tank installation and the corresponding levels of safety provided by each. For example, the STC configuration installed in our aircraft does not have any boost pumps internal to the aux tanks. 8. The proposed AD also does not give consideration to the varying levels of utilization by each operator. 9. The proposed AD does not provide any consideration for increasing the frequency of tank system inspections as a means to extend the date for deactivation or modification. Periodic verification of the system condition and operation would address all aspects identified as safety concerns within the proposed AD. 10. The proposed AD describes safety concerns associated with ?dry running? of fuel pumps. These concerns were addressed for the B727 aircraft by simple operational limitations (placarding, AFM revision) that were within AD 2005-13-40. The limitations ensured the fuel pumps were not operated when the tanks were empty. Other aircraft models could be addressed similarly as opposed to deactivation. Again, thank you for this opportunity to comment. We appreciate and look forward to your consideration.