2011/05/06-Comment (5) of Rep. Robert E. Andrews on FR Doc # 2011-10163

Dear Ms. Bladey: I write in strong support of Draft Rule, NRC-2011-0018, ‘‘Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications.’’ Theft or sabotage of nuclear material is a serious threat, and all steps must be taken to ensure that this material is properly protected. By promulgating regulations that allow security guards at nuclear facilities to carry heavy weaponry, NRC can make our country safer. At present, contract security personnel at NRC licensees are not permitted to carry the same weaponry as contract guards at similar DOE facilities throughout our government-owned nuclear complex. This lack of adequate weaponry represents a potential vulnerability to our homeland security. Although the potential consequence of a terrorist act varies by the type and quantity of nuclear material present, the recent accident at the Fukushima Daiichi site demonstrates the calamitous impact of malfunction, natural or deliberate, even with commercial nuclear operations. Ensuring that security personnel at all nuclear facilities have access to adequate weaponry is an important step in preventing a terrorist attack. I also write to encourage further rulemaking on the use of deadly force by NRC licensees, especially at facilities where a weapons-grade quantities and types ("Category I'") of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) is present. While DOE protective forces are authorized under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to use deadly force to protect Category I SNM, the authority of NRC licensee security forces to protect this nuclear material is ambiguous under current regulation. I support clarification within the federal code, with the NRC licensees being given the explicit authority to exercise deadly force to protect Category I SNM. For further information, please contact Jonathan Golden (jonathan.golden@mail.house.gov) on my staff. Sincerely, Robert E. Andrews Member of Congress