2011/07/14-Comment (6) of Brian Yip on FR Doc # 2011-10163

Document ID: NRC-2011-0018-0021
Document Type: Public Submission
Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Received Date: July 14 2011, at 12:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time
Date Posted: July 28 2011, at 12:00 AM Eastern Standard Time
Comment Start Date: April 27 2011, at 12:00 AM Eastern Standard Time
Comment Due Date: August 2 2011, at 11:59 PM Eastern Standard Time
Tracking Number: 80ec2dc5
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Several of the 1-hour reportable events in proposed 10 CFR Part 73 Appendix G make reference to an individual's malevolent intent (e.g., attempted introduction of contraband by a person with malevolent intent into a PA, VA, MAA, or CAA). A licensee’s evaluation of malevolent intent should not be a factor in determining the reportability of an event. First, it is unlikely that a licensee would be able to make a determination as to an individual's intent within an hour of their attempt to introduce contraband. Additionally, just as the agency has stated that only the NRC, the intelligence community, and law enforcement can determine whether a threat is credible (76 FR 6208, February 3, 2011), the NRC should not rely upon licensees alone to determine whether an individual had malevolent intent. Within the NRC, the staff will generally not make a determination about an individual's willfulness without an determination by the Office of Investigations. It would be inconsistent with this position to provide licensees an opportunity to determine an individual's intent (willfulness), and impractical to provide that such a determination could be made within an hour. Furthermore, because the event, if not malevolent, is only required to be logged if determined to be a decrease in security plan effectiveness (76 FR 6245), NRC would at most become aware of it through an annual review of the logs, if at all. Therefore, although willful attempted unauthorized introduction of contraband into a PA is now a federal crime, the reportability regulations place the agency’s ability to investigate such potential crimes on whether licensees first determine the crime was committed, and report it. All attempts to introduce contraband should be reported to allow the agency to independently assess the threat, regardless of the licensee’s determination of intent.

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