[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 219 (Tuesday, November 14, 1995)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 57193-57197]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-27300]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 63
[CC Docket No. 91-273; FCC 95-417]
Notification of Common Carriers of Service Disruptions
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This Order on Reconsideration (Order) amends the Commission's
rules regarding the reporting of telephone network outages in
accordance with requests for reconsideration filed in response to the
Second Report and Order. Previously the rules required carriers to
report, inter alia, fire-related incidents impacting 1000 or more of a
carrier's lines and outages affecting major airports and 911
facilities. Under the previous rule, outages affecting 911 were to be
reported if they disrupted 25% or more of the lines to a Public Service
Answering Point (PSAP) and outages affecting major airports were to be
reported if they were ``likely to be of media interest.'' The present
Order alters these aspects of the outage reporting rule.
For 911 outages, the Order replaces the requirement that carriers
report all outages that disrupt more than 25% of the lines to any PSAP.
The old requirement was difficult to apply. The new rules simplify the
system.
Reports will hereafter be required in the following situations: If,
for 24 hours or more, one or more PSAPs cannot be reached by 911
callers, and each such isolated PSAP serves fewer than 30,000 access
lines, an initial report of the outage is due within 120 minutes of the
carrier's first knowledge of such an outage; if, for at least 30
minutes, an E911 Tandem fails to relay 911 calls to one or more PSAPs,
an initial report is due within 120 minutes, regardless of the number
of access lines served by that tandem; if, for at least 30 minutes, an
end office serving 50,000 or more access lines fails to relay 911
calls, or one or more PSAPs serving in the aggregate 50,000 or more
access lines cannot be reached by 911 callers, an initial report is due
within 120 minutes; or if, for at least 30 minutes, an end office
serving from 30,000 to 50,000 access lines is cut off from 911 service,
or one or more PSAPs serving in the aggregate 30,000 to 50,000 access
lines cannot be reached by 911 callers, an initial report is due within
3 days. Final reports of all these outages are due within 30 days.
The Order also eliminates the requirement that carriers report any
outage affecting a major airport that is ``likely to be of media
interest.'' This rule was too subjective. The new rule requires that
carriers report any outage affecting a major airport that ``has
received any media attention of which the carrier's reporting personnel
are aware.''
The Order denies the request of Pacific Bell that the Commission
clarify that the obligation to report fire-related incidents does not
apply to telephone poles and aerial cables that are consumed in fires.
This requirement has not proved burdensome to carriers and will supply
the Commission with valuable information.
EFFECTIVE DATE: April 12, 1996.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Robert E. Kimball, (202) 418-2339, Network Services Division, Common
Carrier Bureau.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Order
in CC Docket No 91-273, FCC 95-417, adopted October 4, 1995, and
released October 30, 1995. The item is available for inspection and
copying during normal hours in the Commission's FCC Reference Center
(room 230), 1919 M St., NW., Washington, D.C., or a copy may be
purchased from the duplicating contractor, International Transcription
Service, Inc. (202) 857-3800, 2100 M Street NW., Suite 140, Washington,
D.C. 20037. The Order will be published in the FCC Record.
OMB Review
Implementation of this collection of information will be subject to
approval by the Office of Management and Budget.
Title: Amendment of Part 63 of the Commission's Rules to Provide
for Notification by Common Carriers of Service Disruptions (Section
63.100): Order on Reconsideration.
OMB Number: 3060-0484.
Expiration Date: 6/30/96.
Action: Revised collections.
Respondents: Business or other for profit.
Frequency of Response: On occasion. Initial report due 120 minutes
or 3 days after incident depending on number of potentially affected
customers and nature of disruption. Final report due twenty-eight or
thirty days after initial report, depending on nature of disruption.
Estimated Annual Burden: For the entire reporting requirement
inclusive of the amendments, the estimated burden remains the same as
that approved by the OMB for the Second Report and Order, 59 FR 40264,
August 8, 1994. 200 responses; 5 hours each; 1000 hours total. The
information to be furnished is generally gathered by carriers during
outages and will be less than is presently being provided, so the
requirement is not burdensome.
Paperwork Reduction: Public reporting burden for this collection of
information is estimated to average 5 hours per response, including the
time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources,
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing
the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden
estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing the burden, to the Federal
Communications Commission, Records Management Division, Room 234,
Paperwork Reduction Project (3060-0484), Washington, D.C. and to the
Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (3060-
0484), Washington, D.C. 20503.
Needs and Uses: Section 63.100 of the Commission's Rules, 47 CFR
Sec. 63.100, is amended to provide for the collection of information
which we believe is essential to our mission of ensuring that the
public is protected from major disruptions to telephone services. The
amendments modify 47 CFR Section 63.100 to require that local exchange
or interexchange common carriers or competitive access providers that
[[Page 57194]]
operate either transmission or switching facilities and provide access
service or interstate or international telecommunications service
report outages that affect 30,000 or more customers or that affect
special facilities and report fire-related incidents impacting 1000 or
more lines. With such reports the FCC can monitor and take effective
action to ensure network reliability. The present amendments provide
for the replacement of the requirement that carriers report 911 outages
that disrupt 25% or more of the lines serving any PSAP with a less
burdensome requirement that will, nevertheless, supply the Commission
with all necessary 911 outage information. The present amendment also
replaces the requirement that carriers report outages affecting major
airports that are likely to attract media attention with a less
burdensome requirement that will supply the Commission with all
necessary information on major outages affecting airports.
Analysis of Proceeding
In requiring carriers to report 911 outages that disrupt more than
25% of the lines serving any PSAP, the previous rules were supposed to
simplify the criteria under which carriers had voluntarily reported
special facilities outages prior to the Second Report and Order (59 FR
40264, August 8, 1994). A subcommittee of the Network Reliability
Council, a Federal Advisory Committee providing reporting
recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission, suggested
that carriers report, inter alia, any ``outage of a loop facility
containing 75% or more of the lines to the PSAP.'' Prior to the Second
Report and Order, confusion among carriers submitting voluntary reports
seemed to result from the multiplicity of other 911 reporting criteria
suggested by the subcommittee, especially the criteria involving tandem
or tandem-affecting failures. During the two years of voluntary
reporting under the subcommittee's suggestions, the Commission received
no indication that carriers were having difficulty determining the
percentage of lines affected. By applying a lower percentage standard--
25%--and eliminating all other 911 reporting criteria, the Second
Report and Order attempted to clarify the 911 reporting standards,
obtain the same amount of data, better measure the relative impact of
911 outages and motivate carriers to take greater cognizance of those
routes that serve 911 PSAPs. In the present Order, however, commenters
have demonstrated that determinations of the exact percentage of lines
affecting a particular PSAP involve greater difficulties than had been
anticipated.
On the basis of the comments submitted in this proceeding and
comparisons of 911 outage reports received before and after the Second
Report and Order went into effect, the present Orders concludes that
the 911 outage reporting requirements adopted in the Second Report and
Order have produced a far greater number of 911 reports and a far
greater reporting burden for some carriers than anticipated. In the
five months following September 7, 1994, the effective date of the
Second Report and Order, the Commission received 64 reports of outages
affecting 911 services. In the five months prior to the September 7,
1994 effective date, carriers using the TRG Guideline standards
reported only seven 911-affecting outages. Non-911 outages reported
since September 7, 1994 have not significantly increased. Commission
analyses of 911 reports do not reveal any common causes of 911 outages
relating to network vulnerability that account for this increase.
Some 911 reports received since the effective date of the Second
Report and Order appear to be the result of carriers preferring to err
on the side of over-inclusiveness where they are unable to determine
accurately the percentage of lines serving PSAPs that may have been
affected by an outage. Numerous initial reports, not included in the
totals above, have been withdrawn when carriers were subsequently able
to determine with greater accuracy the effects of the outages reported.
The most pronounced reason, however, for the increased 911 outage
reporting is that carriers in less populated areas serve a very large
number of small, dispersed PSAPs. Eleven of the sixty-four 911 outages
reported since September 7, 1994 occurred in a single state where there
are approximately 560 PSAPs. Approximately 80% of these PSAPs are
manned by only one or two operators. Twenty of the sixty-four 911
outages were reported by a single carrier serving an area encompassing
over 700 PSAPs. Nearly 600 of these PSAPs are served by fewer than
three voice connections, including connections maintained solely to
provide redundancy. Failure of a single line to any PSAP served by no
more than three lines will generate an outage report under the
standards set forth in the Second Report and Order even if the failed
line is provided solely for redundancy. In these circumstances the
``outage'' will have no effect at all on PSAP operators or customers.
Half of the 911 outages reported under these standards have been
reported by the two carriers (including those carriers' subsidiaries)
serving the largest number of predominantly rural areas.
The Order finds that, because of the disproportionate number of
very small rural PSAPs, the criteria for reporting 911 outages are
unnecessarily broad to achieve the rule's intended purpose. The effect
of the rule is to require the greatest amount of reporting for those
PSAPs serving the fewest number of lines. This was not the object of
the rule. It is clear from the NRC's E911 Focus Group Report that
outages affecting 911 service were believed to be especially important
because each 911 system was thought to represent a uniquely vulnerable
point in the telecommunications network. An E911 PSAP was viewed as a
gateway through which the whole variety of possible requests for
emergency help would converge, be rapidly evaluated, and connected with
the nearest and most appropriate public safety services. The rapid
nationwide deployment of these increasingly complex and concentrated
systems justified federal interest in discovering any common threats to
their reliability. In rural areas where PSAPs are numerous and very
small, where, for example the PSAP is a telephone in the local fire
department, such convergence and vulnerability is more limited. The
large number of 911 outage reports proceeding from these areas does not
provide the Commission with significant, new information or promote the
stated objectives of 911 outage reporting in the Second Report and
Order.
Burdensome federal reporting requirements may also increase the
costs of 911 service reliability. Under the present reporting standard,
for example, providing a redundant line to a PSAP will increase the
probability that additional outages will have to be reported. The costs
of such reporting could increase the costs of the line. Since the
reliability of 911 service in rural areas will often depend on whether
local governments can afford to deploy redundant lines, the federal
reporting requirements could make it less likely that reliability will
be increased in this way. The particular expenses carriers incur as
providers of 911 service capabilities should not be inflated by a
requirement that they monitor, analyze, tabulate, and report 911
outages that are numerous, not because of any real threat to
reliability, but only because the PSAPs in certain areas are, by
necessity, small, separate and widely dispersed. The cost of providing
911 service reliability should
[[Page 57195]]
not be augmented by unnecessary federal reporting requirements.
The problem of unnecessary 911 outage reporting can be fairly
resolved without ignoring outages that affect smaller PSAPs. No
statistical base of comparison will be sacrificed if a longer reporting
threshold is established for outages that isolate the smaller PSAPs
likely to be found outside major urban areas. A duration of 30 minutes
or more for an outage in a rural area will not necessarily have the
same significance for purposes of analyses as an outage of 30 or more
minutes in an urban area. Restoration times for small installations
over widely dispersed areas are likely to be longer due to their
remoteness from vendors and from the more sophisticated equipment or
technical help often needed to diagnose and to restore service. An
outage lasting just 30 minutes in a rural area, for example, is likely
to proceed from different causes and involve simpler solutions than an
outage lasting the same amount of time in an urban area. A longer
reporting threshold for smaller PSAPs will, however, alleviate the
disproportionate burden the present 911 requirements impose on carriers
serving such PSAPs. This order, therefore, amends Section 63.100(a)(4)
of our rules, altering the duration threshold for reporting smaller
outage affecting PSAPs.
The amendments herein adopted replace the percentage standard,
which has proven confusing and difficult to apply, by redefining 911
reportable outages as those that lead to isolation of one or more
PSAP(s) for 24 hours or more, if the isolated PSAP(s) collectively
serve fewer than 30,000 access lines and no alternate routing has been
invoked. The amendments define 911 outages requiring a report as those
for which loss of call processing capabilities in the E911 tandem(s)
continues for 30 minutes or more, regardless of the number of customers
affected, if no alternate routing has been invoked. The amendments
require reporting of both these types of 911 outages within 2 hours of
the carrier's first knowledge that the outage is reportable. This will
resolve the problems of reporting outages affecting smaller PSAPs while
enabling the Commission to continue monitoring such outages at a more
reasonable level.
Previously, the rules allowed use of the blocked calls standard to
determine whether the numerical thresholds had been reached for LEC
tandem outages. In the case of 911 outages, however, it is more
practical to require reporting of larger 911 outages according to the
number of access lines served by the affected PSAP, regardless of the
number of blocked calls. Carriers have had considerable difficulty
determining the number of blocked 911 calls during outages. 911 outages
are also less likely to be predictable on the basis of historical time-
of-day traffic loads, the alternative method of determining blocked
calls provided for in the Second Report and Order. The number of access
lines, on the other hand, is easily determined and will ensure maximum
coverage of larger 911 outages. The amendments herein require reporting
of larger 911 outages according to the number of access lines served by
the affected PSAP, regardless of the number of blocked calls.
To make as accessible and clear as possible the 911 outage
reporting requirements under both the special facilities subsection and
the numerical thresholds subsection of section 63.100 of the
Commission's Rules, the amendments change the definition of ``special
facilities'' to remove reference to 911 in that paragraph and
consolidate all 911 reporting rules in a separate new subsection, 47
CFR 63.100(h). To make application of this new subsection as specific
as possible, the amendments complete the definition of reportable 911
outages in section 63.100(a)(4) by including outages for which there
is: (1) isolation of one or more PSAP(s) for 30 or more minutes, if the
isolated PSAP(s) collectively serve(s) 30,000 or more access lines and
no alternate routing has been invoked; or (2) isolation of an end
office switch or host/remote cluster from 911 services for 30 minutes
or more, if these installations collectively serve 30,000 or more
access lines and no alternate routing has been invoked. For 911
outages, only those that fall within these two categories or those
described in the paragraph above will be reportable under the
amendments.
Under the previous rule, the time periods for initially reporting
outages at the 50,000 and 30,000 potentially-affected-customers
thresholds are 2 hours and 3 days, respectively. To avoid confusion,
the amendments herein establish parallel reporting periods for 911
outages affecting 50,000 and 30,000 customers respectively. Whether
these thresholds have been reached will be determined by the number of
access lines served by the isolated 911 installations. The amendments
set a 3 day deadline for filing initial reports of outages isolating
911 installations serving 30,000 to 50,000 lines and 2 hours for those
serving 50,000 or more access lines.
Finally, the amendments change the information requirements by
eliminating the sentence, ``Carriers must indicate, when 911 is one of
those services, whether more than 25% of the lines to any PSAP were
disrupted and there was no automatic rerouting to an alternate PSAP.''
Any known effect on 911 services attributable to any outage reportable
under other criteria is to be described under the information
requirement that carriers specify the ``types of services affected.''
The amendments make this clear.
In establishing an exemption for reporting 911 outages in
situations where there is automatic rerouting to an alternate PSAP, the
Second Report and Order attempted to avoid the reporting of 911 outages
that had no real impact on 911 customers. The phrase ``automatic
rerouting to an alternate PSAP,'' however, has resulted in some
confusion and overreporting. Therefore, the present Order eliminates
that phrase and, instead, requires 911 outage reports only where
rerouting to the same or an alternate PSAP location did not occur. This
will make it clear that an outage is reportable if there is a rerouting
capability that is not used, but not reportable when calls are
successfully rerouted.
Since the Second Report and Order went into effect on September 7,
1994, few outages affecting major airports have been reported. None has
been reported because of the likelihood that it would attract media
interest. Commenters have shown that attempting to estimate the
newsworthiness of an outage, along with the other reporting and
restoration efforts at hand, is an unreasonable task to impose on
telecommunications technicians. The Commission's role as a source of
information to which the public can turn when concerned about matters
involving telecommunications, however, the Commission needs to know if
an outage affecting a major airport does, in fact, receive media
attention. The Order amends Section 63.100(a)(6) of the Commission's
rules, therefore, to require the reporting of any outage affecting a
major airport that ``has received any media attention of which the
carrier's reporting personnel are aware.''
The reporting requirement triggered when an outage arises because
of a fire can give us and the industry valuable information about such
vulnerabilities, particularly if alternative technologies, such as
underground cable, could significantly improve reliability. For these
reasons, the Order declines, at this time, to modify the reporting
requirement for fire-related incidents.
Ordering Clauses
Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 1, 4(i), and 201 of the
Communications Act
[[Page 57196]]
of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154 and 201, Section 63.100 of the
Commission's Rules, 47 CFR 63.100, IS AMENDED as set forth below,
effective April 12, 1996.
It is Further Ordered, that, the Secretary shall cause a summary of
this Order to be published in the Federal Register which shall include
a statement describing how members of the public may obtain the
complete text of this Commission decision. The Secretary shall also
provide a copy of this Order to each state utility commission.
List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 63
Communications common carriers, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Service disruptions.
Federal Communications Commission.
William F. Caton,
Acting Secretary.
Rule Changes
Part 63 of Chapter I of Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations
is amended as follows:
PART 63--EXTENSION OF LINES AND DISCONTINUANCE, REDUCTION, OUTAGE
AND IMPAIRMENT OF SERVICE BY COMMON CARRIERS; AND GRANTS OF
RECOGNIZED PRIVATE OPERATING AGENCY STATUS
1. The authority citation for part 63 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 201-205, 218, 403 and
533, unless otherwise noted.
2. Section 63.100 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)(3), (a)(4),
and (a)(6); in paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) by removing the
sentence ``Carriers must indicate, when specifying the types of service
affected by any reportable outage, when 911 is one of those services,
whether more than 25% of the lines to any PSAP were disrupted and there
was no automatic rerouting to an alternate PSAP.'' and adding in its
place ``When specifying the types of services affected by any
reportable outage, carriers must indicate when 911 service was
disrupted and rerouting to alternative answering locations was not
implemented.''; and adding paragraph (h) to read as follows:
Sec. 63.100 Notification of service outage.
(a) * * *
(3) Special offices and facilities are defined as major airports,
major military installations, key government facilities, and nuclear
power plants. 911 special facilities are addressed separately in
paragraph (a)(4) of this section.
(4) An outage which potentially affects a 911 special facility is
defined as a significant service degradation, switch or transport,
where rerouting to the same or an alternative answering location was
not implemented, and involves one or more of the following situations:
(i) Isolation of one or more Public Service Answering Points
(PSAPs) for 24 hours or more, if the isolated PSAPs collectively serve
less than 30,000 or more access lines, based on the carrier's database
of lines served by each PSAP; or
(ii) Loss of call processing capabilities in the E911 tandem(s),
for 30 minutes or more, regardless of the number of customers affected;
or
(iii) Isolation of one or more PSAP(s), for 30 or more minutes, if
the isolated PSAPs collectively serve 30,000 or more access lines,
based on the carrier's database of lines served by each PSAP; or
(iv) Isolation of an end office switch or host/remote cluster, for
30 minutes or more, if the switches collectively serve, 30,000 or more
access lines.
* * * * *
(6) An outage which ``potentially affects'' a major airport is
defined as an outage that disrupts 50% or more of the air traffic
control links or other FAA communications links to any major airport,
any outage that has caused an Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC)
or major airport to lose it radar, any ARTCC or major airport outage
that has received any media attention of which the carrier's reporting
personnel are aware, any outage that causes a loss of both primary and
backup facilities at any ARTCC or major airport, and any outage to an
ARTCC or major airport that is deemed important by the FAA as indicated
by FAA inquiry to the carrier management personnel.
* * * * *
(h)(1) Any local exchange or interexchange common carrier or
competitive access provider that operates transmission or switching
facilities and provides access services or interstate or international
telecommunications services, the experiences an outage on any
facilities that it owns, operates or leases that potentially affects
911 services must notify the Commission within the applicable period
shown in the chart in this paragraph (h)(1) if such outage meets one of
the following conditions, as defined in paragraph (a)(4) of this
section:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Condition Lines affected Duration Period
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Loss of E911 Tandem capability...... No limit............... 30 minutes or more.... 120 minutes.
Isolation of PSAP(s)................ Under 30,000 access 24 hours or more...... 120 minutes.
lines served.
Isolation of PSAP(s)................ 50,000 or more access 30 minutes or more.... 120 minutes.
lines served.
Isolation of PSAP(s)................ 30,000 to 50,000 access 30 minutes or more.... 3 days.
lines served.
Isolation of EO switch, host/remotes 50,000 or more access 30 minutes or more.... 120 minutes.
from 911. lines served.
Isolation of EO switch, host/remotes 30,000 to 50,000 access 30 minutes or more.... 3 days.
from 911. lines served.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Satellite carriers and cellular carriers are exempted from the
reporting requirement in this paragraph (h). Notification must be
served on the Commission's Monitoring Watch Officer, on duty 24 hours a
day in the FCC headquarters building in Washington, D.C., or on a
secondary basis it may be served on the Commission's Watch Officer on
duty at the FCC's facility at Grand Island, Nebraska. The notification
must be by facsimile or other record means delivered within the
notification period indicated above from the time of the carrier's
first knowledge that the service outage ``potentially affects a 911
special facility'' as described in paragraph (a)(4) of this section and
summarized in the chart in paragraph (h)(1) of this section and the
service outage has continued for the duration indicated in paragraph
(a)(4) of this section and summarized in the chart in paragraph (h)(1)
of this section. Notification shall identify a contact person who can
provide further information, the telephone number at which the contact
person can be reached, and the information known at the time
notification is made about the service outage including: the date and
estimated time (local time at the location of the outage) of
commencement of the outage; the geographic area affected; the estimated
number of customers affected; the types of services affected; the
duration of the outage, i.e. time elapsed from the estimated
commencement of the outage
[[Page 57197]]
until restoration of full service; the estimated number of blocked
calls during the outage; the apparent or known cause of the incident,
including the name and type of equipment involved and the specific part
of the network affected; methods used to restore service; and the steps
taken to prevent recurrences of the outage. The report shall be
captioned Initial Service Disruption Report. Lack of any of the
information in this paragraph (h)(2) shall not delay the filing of this
report. Not later than thirty days after the outage, the carrier shall
file with the Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, a Final Service Disruption
Report providing all available information on the service outage,
including any information not contained in its Initial Service
Disruption Report and detailing specifically the root cause of the
outage and listing and evaluating the effectiveness and application in
the immediate case of any best practices or industry standards
identified by the Network Reliability Council to eliminate or
ameliorate outages of the reported type.
[FR Doc. 95-27300 Filed 11-13-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-M
