[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 219 (Tuesday, November 15, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-28075]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: November 15, 1994]
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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
49 CFR Parts 821 and 826
Rules of Practice in Civil Penalty Proceedings
AGENCY: National Transportation Safety Board.
ACTION: Final rules.
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SUMMARY: The NTSB is adopting final rules to implement the FAA Civil
Penalty Administrative Assessment Act of 1992, signed into law on
August 26, 1992. This law transferred adjudication of appeals of civil
penalties assessed by the Federal Aviation Administrator against
pilots, flight engineers, mechanics, and repairmen from the FAA to the
NTSB. The Board is adopting, with only minor changes, rules it has
already adopted as an interim measure (58 FR 11379 (February 25,
1993)).
EFFECTIVE DATE: The final rules are effective on December 15, 1994.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Daniel D. Campbell, General Counsel,
(202) 382-6540.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Public Law No. 102-345 (here, the CP Act)
has expanded the Board's jurisdiction to review actions of the
Administrator. Section 901(a)(3) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
(49 U.S.C. App. 1471(a)(3))1 has been amended to provide that any
person acting in the capacity of a pilot, flight engineer, mechanic, or
repairman against whom an order assessing a civil penalty is issued by
the Administrator under this paragraph may appeal the order to the
National Transportation Safety Board, and the Board shall, after notice
and a hearing on the record in accordance with section 554 of title 5,
United States Code, affirm, modify, or reverse the order of the
Administrator. Thus, in addition to a docket of appeals involving
suspension, revocation, and medical qualification matters, we now also
hear appeals from the Administrator's orders imposing civil penalties
against individuals in the listed categories.
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\1\Newly recodified at 49 U.S.C. 46301(d)(5).
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We stated in our notice our belief that current rules of practice
in Parts 821 and 826 required few changes to accommodate this new
authority, and the changes we proposed simply reflected its scope.
Thus, we then proposed and now adopt the rules of practice in Parts 821
and 826 for usage in all civil penalty proceedings. Although we did not
offer specific rule changes relating to (1) the codification of new
rules of deference and (2) the provisions of Pub.L. No. 102-345 that
pertain to the modification of proposed sanctions, we invited comment
or proposals about them. We suggested that the changes regarding
deference seemed to require little departure from current practice. We
noted that the new provision regarding the modification of sanction
resulted in some tension with existing practice,2 but that it
might be difficult to anticipate by rule the types of questions that
could arise under these provisions. We also invited comment on
extending application of our stale complaint rule, 49 CFR 821.33, to
the civil penalty docket.
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\2\See discussion, infra.
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In response to our notice, comments were filed by the Aircraft
Owners and Pilots Association, the Air Line Pilots Association, the
Experimental Aircraft Association, the National Transportation Safety
Board Bar Association, the Regional Airline Association, as well as the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and five individuals. Two replies
were filed in opposition to portions of the FAA comment. For the
reasons that follow, we adopt the proposed rule, with one editorial
correction. We first address applicability of the stale complaint rule.
Stale Complaints
FAA's comments were principally aimed at the Board's noticed
intention to extend its stale complaint rule to the processing of civil
penalties. The NTSB and before it the Civil Aeronautics Board have long
required that aviation enforcement cases be initiated within 6 months
of the alleged violation by notice to the airman of the nature of the
charges contemplated.3 This provision is found at Sec. 821.33 of
the NTSB rules and includes exceptions where good cause is shown for
delay beyond 6 months,4 where notwithstanding delay there are
overriding public interest considerations,5 and a further
exception for the most serious cases where a complaint indicates that
the airman does not possess the qualifications required of licensed
pilots confirm.6 But exceptions aside, if an airman is not advised
of the reasons for a proposed enforcement action within 6 months of the
alleged violation, the FAA's complaint against the airman will be
dismissed. One statement of the traditional and still commanding
justification for the rule is found in Burdick et al., 34 C.A.B. 856, a
1961 case that considered matters strikingly similar to the issues
here:
\3\The stale complaint rule for suspension and revocation cases
dates back to 1942.
\4\Thus, for example, an apparently stale proceeding will
survive a motion to dismiss where the Administrator did not have
contemporaneous knowledge of the alleged violation (see, e.g.,
Administrator v. Slotten, 2 NTSB 2503 (1976)), so long as the matter
was given appropriate priority after finally coming to light (see
Administrator v. Zanlunghi, 3 NTSB 3696 (1981)).
\5\See Administrator v. Elston, NTSB Order No. EA-4151 (1994)
for types of cases to which the public interest exception might
apply. To date, however, the cases in which the public interest
exception has been discussed are quite rare, as it appears in
practice that an allegation of lack of qualification is typically
available and relied upon where serious misconduct is involved.
\6\See, e.g., Administrator v. Wingo, 4 NTSB 1304, 1305 (1984)
(``In order to avoid dismissal under the stale complaint rule, the
allegations in the complaint need only present an issue of lack of
qualifications.'' (Emphasis in original.)). As examples, lack of
qualification has been presumed for matters of deliberate
falsification of record requirements (see, e.g., Administrator v.
Walters, NTSB Order No. EA-3835 (1993)); and for proceedings based
on drug convictions (see, e.g., Administrator v. Kragness, NTSB
Order No. EA-3682 (1992)).
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We do not believe it is in the public interest to permit an
airman who has violated the regulations to continue to enjoy all the
rights and privileges of his certificate for an extended period of
time without remedial action. On the other hand, we consider it
unfair to an airman to have the threat of enforcement action held
over his head for a protracted period, or to have to defend himself
when, because of the passage of time, it is difficult to assemble
witnesses or where recollections of the incident have become hazy.
(34 C.A.B. 860.)7
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\7\See also Administrator v. Dill et al., NTSB Order No. EA-4099
(1994) (due diligence is necessary to protect individual airman and
to enhance aviation safety).
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All parties except the Administrator support the extension of the
stale complaint rule. The FAA is opposed from an institutional
perspective and on what it believes are practical grounds.
Institutionally, it argues that the establishment of a standard time
limit is a legislative function, pointing to the standard 5-year limit
for civil penalty actions established by statute in 28 USC 2462, and
also citing a separate provision of the CP Act which imposes a 2-year
statute of limitations for those civil penalty proceedings entrusted to
FAA for adjudication. FAA believes that the establishment of a
limitation period shorter than 5 years is the responsibility of the
regulating and prosecuting agency. In offering this argument, FAA
appears to make, without any elaboration, a distinction between the
quasi-legislative functions of a regulatory agency and the quasi-
judicial functions of the Safety Board acting as an appeals board in
aviation enforcement. On the practical level, FAA argues that its own
2-year rule was a balancing of its needs for sufficient time to
investigate, review and initiate a case, the interests of respondents
in timely notice, and the public interest in regulatory
compliance.8 FAA concedes that the NTSB, as adjudicator, has
inherent power to dismiss individual proceedings where delay has been
shown to prejudice an airman's defense; its objection is lodged to the
legislative nature of Sec. 821.33 and the presumption of prejudice it
incorporates.
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\8\While the 2-year limit is now a matter of statute law, FAA
refers to its balancing of these several factors in apparent
reference to a self-imposed, 2-year limitation that had been adopted
by the agency during the temporary civil penalty demonstration
program.
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Among the private sector commentors there is unanimous support for
the continuation of the 6-month stale complaint rule. Most commentors
argue that the 6-month rule has worked well, in part because it
contains several exceptions permitting the processing of those cases
that might pose serious threat to public safety or where FAA could not
have acted faster. AOPA notes that failure to adopt a 6-month rule will
result in an incongruous problem in which the selection of sanction
would dictate the allowable time for notice of action--the fear
apparently being that when FAA failed to act on a matter normally
reserved for suspension or revocation of a certificate, it would
instead substitute a money fine so that the case would not be time-
barred before the NTSB. Another commentor notes a related incongruity:
That since the Civil Penalty Assessment Act gave the NTSB the power to
conclude that a civil penalty assessment should instead be levied as a
certificate suspension or revocation, there might arise a case in which
an action brought as a civil penalty would result in a certificate
action, although suspension or revocation would have been time-barred
if initiated as such.
We remain persuaded that the Safety Board has the authority to
establish the Sec. 821.33 stale complaint rule and that its application
to our civil penalty docket is appropriate. As to FAA's arguments
regarding the respective institutional relationships of our agencies
and the consequent inappropriateness of ``legislation'' (rulemaking) to
govern timeliness, we think that these arguments which, if accepted as
correct, would apply with near equal force to the remainder of the
Board's enforcement docket, are not supported by a fair appraisal of
the institutional histories of our agencies. Indeed, very much the same
arguments were made and rejected by the Civil Aeronautics Board shortly
after the division between the enforcement and adjudication functions
that resulted from the enactment of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958.9 Thus, in the Burdick case, supra, FAA argued that:
\9\Enforcement and adjudication had been unified in a single
agency at times prior to 1958.
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* * * under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the Board has no
power to adopt a stale-complaint provision and to require the
Administrator to show good cause for delay in initiating enforcement
action. [The Administrator] states that the 1958 Act gave him the
function of deciding whether, and when, to institute enforcement
action and that the authority to commence such actions is no longer
delegated to him by the Board. Further he points out that the 1958
Act places no time limitation on the institution of a safety action
by the Administrator, that the Board has no jurisdiction prior to
the issuance of the Administrator's order * * *. Burdick, supra,
857-8.
To which the answer was given:
Even if the 1958 Act were viewed as creating a changed
relationship, it would not follow that the stale-complaint rule is
invalid. As indicated earlier, under section 609 it is the Board
which makes the ultimate determination as to the sanction in each
case which comes before it. Thus if in the Board's judgement the
sanction preliminarily imposed by the Administrator is not required
by safety and the public interest, the Board is free to impose such
sanction, if any, as it believes to be justified by its own
appraisal of the safety and other public interest considerations
involved. In this light, the stale complaint provision may be
regarded as a general announcement by the Board of its view of the
overall public interest to be applied in those cases in which it is
called upon to exercise its statutory powers. To this extent the
announcement as set forth in the Rules of Practice under the 1938
Act has represented a standard for decision by the Board and there
is no indication in the 1958 Act or its legislative history that
Congress intended to change that standard. Id., 858-9.
NTSB, as the successor agency to C.A.B. for enforcement cases,
finds itself in precisely the same institutional relationship with FAA
as did the 1961 Civil Aeronautics Board that decided Burdick, and we
think that their reasoning is persuasive. We do not believe the
enactment of the Civil Penalty Act effectuated any significant change
in the relationship between FAA and NTSB, and such changes that were
accomplished were done so explicitly. FAA had argued for a right of
appeal of NTSB cases, and one was enacted. Likewise, an explicit
statement of deference to FAA interpretations was adopted. We think
that such careful attention to detail by Congress undermines any
suggestion that sub silentio Congress also intended a limitation of the
Board's authority as exercised in Rule 821.33.
We note that on August 5, 1994, FAA published a notice of proposed
rulemaking detailing its own proposed rules for the processing of those
civil penalty proceedings which were retained for in-house adjudication
under the CP Act. (59 FR 40196.) In this notice, FAA makes the argument
that, because Congress specified a 2-year limitation for FAA
adjudications but refrained from any similar new legislative directive
for NTSB-adjudicated penalties, NTSB proceedings are governed by the 5-
year limitation of 28 USC 2462. Given the context in which the CP Act
arose, we think the suggestion that Congress intended to reinvigorate a
5-year limitation at the NTSB is quite implausible. For our part, we
view the statute of limitation provision in the Civil Penalty
Assessment Act as best understood as part of the basic compromise that
is at the heart of the 1992 legislation. As AOPA points out, Congress
was well aware of NTSB's stale complaint rule, in part because of the
complaints over the adoption of a longer, 2-year limitation by FAA for
its in-house civil penalty adjudication under the temporary
demonstration program. Due to widespread opposition to the FAA's
administration of this program, the 1992 enactment split the
adjudication of civil penalties between the NTSB and FAA. FAA was given
legislative authority to retain a 2-year limitation for the cases it
would handle--an implicit limitation against the agency's right to move
outward toward the 5-year limit of 28 USC 2462. And the transfer of
cases involving individual airmen and others to the NTSB is arguably an
equally clear, if still implicit, statement that these airmen were to
receive the perceived advantages of NTSB adjudication, including the
stale complaint rule.
As to the practical implications of the stale complaint rule, FAA
has offered no evidence or demonstration of harm having resulted from
the long-standing application of Rule 821.33 to certificate cases.
Given the availability of exceptions for good cause etc., perhaps this
is not surprising. We would also note that the nature of the caseload
reserved for civil penalties, if the FAA Sanction Guidelines Table is
thought to be instructive, will be, if anything, less complicated and
less critical than those certificate cases already subject to
Sec. 821.33 and for which no harm has been shown. Consequently, in the
absence of any factual showing of impracticability, we believe that the
stale complaint rule will function well for the civil penalty docket
and we will continue its use. Doing so avoids the need to address the
potential, pointed to by AOPA, for the selection of sanction type to
become a device for the avoidance of the stale complaint rule in
certificate action cases.
Deference and Sanction Modification
The CP Act provides that the Board, while not bound by any findings
of fact made by the Administrator, is bound by all ``validly adopted
interpretations of laws and regulations administered by the Federal
Aviation Administration (including written agency policy guidance
available to the public relating to sanctions to be imposed under this
subsection) unless the Board finds that any such interpretation is
arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law.'' Pub.
L. No. 102-345, Sec. 2(a), amending 49 U.S.C. 1471(a)(3), newly
recodified at 49 U.S.C. 46301(d)(5). The new law also provides that the
Board may, consistent with the foregoing, modify the type of sanctions
to be imposed by the Administrator. Thus, the Board may, in an
appropriate case, change a civil penalty to a suspension or change a
suspension or revocation to a civil penalty. For the purposes of this
rulemaking, these new provisions have been referred to as the deference
and sanction modification provisions. We noted in the NPR that comment
on these provisions was desirable, even though the possibility of the
adoption of specific rules was not great. For a number of reasons, we
continue to believe that rules are not feasible at this point. However,
the experience with these provisions through adjudication has already
addressed some of the issues raised in this docket.10
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\1\0As we are in accord with the view expressed in the comments
that, if law in this area is developed through adjudication rather
than rulemaking, the interests of the aviation community as a whole
might not always be fully represented, we have broadened our policy
regarding amicus participation (see, e.g., Administrator v. Oklahoma
Executive Jet Charter, Inc. & Curtis, NTSB Order EA-3928 (1993)),
and have proposed a general change in our rules of practice to
authorize amicus briefs in appropriate situations.
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Certain commentors argue that, to be a validly adopted
interpretation to which we must defer, an FAA position must have been
adopted through notice and comment rulemaking. Such a view requires the
belief that Congress intended a dramatic change in the administrative
process as normally understood, and we decline to infer any such
intention without the support of clear evidence. Traditional
administrative practice has permitted the development of agency policy
through a range of devices that fall short of formal rulemaking, and
the Board is given no specific authority to limit the Administrator's
discretion in this regard. On the other hand, the Board may, in the
exercise of its own statutory discretion, sculpt its decisions to
reflect the basic due process requirements of the public interest
standard under which our decisions are rendered.11
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\1\1See, e.g., Administrator v. Miller, NTSB Order EA-3581
(1992), holding that a ``validly adopted'' interpretation may be
announced by adjudication as well as rulemaking, but that sanction
may be denied due to insufficient notice to airmen. ALPA suggests
that we incorporate by rule Miller's declination of sanction. We
think this would be too mechanical, but we believe the approach
taken in Miller was correct and reaffirm it in principle.
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Perhaps the biggest concern that commentors expressed with less
formal means of interpretive development of enforcement policy is that,
under an expansive construction of the new language (``validly adopted
interpretations of laws and regulations administered by the Federal
Aviation Administration''), the Board would lose the very impartiality,
objectivity and independence the CP Act was enacted to provide to the
airmen covered by it. We think these fears overstate the nature of the
change, if any, imposed on the Board by the deference provisions. As we
noted to Congress during the considerations of these amendments, we do
not believe the amended language brings about any significant change in
the relationship between FAA and NTSB or to the kind and quality of
deference to the Administrator's interpretations that has been
traditionally accorded. The Board has long paid close heed to the FAA's
valid interpretations of its regulatory language,12 just as we
continue to reserve the right to discount those interpretations which
are arbitrary, unsupported, or which are the novel inventions of trial
counsel.13 We believe that this is, generally speaking, the role
intended for us by Congress, and our decisions continue to reflect this
approach.
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\1\2See Administrator v. Miller, supra.
\1\3In Administrator v. Krachun, NTSB Order No. EA-4002 (1993),
the Safety Board concluded that it was not bound to defer to a
hastily developed interpretation sustained only by argument of
counsel, particularly where the interpretation advanced was
unsupported by citation of practice, precedent, or documentation,
and where it entailed consequences for the aviation community
generally. See also Administrator v. Smith and Wright, NTSB Order
No. EA-4169 (1994); Administrator v. Nyren, NTSB Order No. EA-3930
(1993). These decisions, which decline to give deference to thinly
developed regulatory interpretations announced at trial, are
consistent with Congressional understanding of the deference
standard being imposed. See H.R. Rep. No. 671, 102d Cong. 2d Sess.
10 (1992) (NTSB is not simply to defer to litigation positions of
the FAA prosecutor).
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AOPA suggests that only interpretations made at the highest levels
within the FAA should be entitled to deference. While we cannot agree
with so broad a statement, we think the quality of the process through
which an interpretation is reached and the manner of its announcement
are considerations that will affect both the public interest and
aviation safety dimensions of our review. We did, consequently, invite
amicus comment in one case as to whether an interpretation that is
based only on expert testimony offered by the Administrator during the
hearing on his order of suspension is ``validly adopted'' in the sense
that it compels deference to the Administrator's view.14 We have
also noted that there are interpretive conclusions that approach the
sometimes illusive borderline between ``fact'' and ``law,'' and that we
are not bound by the former.15 Still, there are many methods for
the development of administrative policy that have not yet surfaced in
litigation, and it would be premature to speculate on the Board's
reaction to each, other than to reiterate that the Board is bound by
those interpretations reached through valid process, unless arbitrary,
capricious, or unsupported by law.
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\1\4Administrator v. Nyren, NTSB Order EA-3930 (1993). After we
sought additional briefing and suggested the possibility of oral
argument on the deference issue, the Administrator withdrew the
underlying order of suspension and hence no further argument was
heard.
\1\5See, e.g., Administrator v. Kapton, NTSB Order No. EA-4046
(1993), at note 9, p.7, stating that the Board is not bound by
conclusions of the Administrator that given behavior is careless
within the meaning of the provision prohibiting careless operation.
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As to deference specifically regarding choice of sanction, we
stated in the notice that the CP Act suggested some tension between the
Board's traditionally conservative approach and the new invitation to
modify sanction as appropriate, within such FAA guidelines as are shown
applicable. We noted that Administrator v. Muzquiz, 2 NTSB 1474 (1975),
which has long required clear and compelling evidence to amend the
Administrator's proposed sanction if all violations are affirmed, might
well be outdated. Such comment as was received on this issue offered no
usable suggestion for the adoption of a rule at this point, and we will
attempt none. Experience to date through adjudication has confirmed
that the aforementioned Muzquiz doctrine is of diminished importance,
and that NTSB administrative law judges (and the Board itself) may in
proper circumstances modify sanctions,16 and that in doing so
reliance on precedent will be typical,17 but not always possible
or required.18 The Board will continue its development of these
issues through adjudication, and consider the publication of formal
guidance at such time as firm and suitable principles emerge.
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\1\6Administrator v. Glassburn, NTSB Order No. EA-4211 (1994)
(where FAA Sanction Table permits a range of sanctions, ALJ may
rationally choose among them based on observation of the case).
\1\7See, e.g., Administrator v. Franck, NTSB Order No. EA-4166
(1994); Administrator v. Tweto, NTSB Order No. EA-4164 (1994).
\1\8Administrator v. Oklahoma Executive Jet Charter, Inc. &
Curtis, NTSB Order No. EA-3928 (1993). This is the first case in
which a certificate action (revocation) was modified to the
imposition of a civil penalty.
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Supplementary Matters
We have made only three changes in the interim rules. First, we
have removed the improper reference to section 602 of the Federal
Aviation Act in interim Sec. 826.3. Second, we have revised Sec. 821.2
to enlarge coverage, consistent with the FAA's proposal (see 59 FR
40196), by including a reference to persons acting in the capacity of
flight engineers, pilots, mechanics, or repairmen.19 Third, the
authority section updates statutory citations to reflect the recent
recodification in Pub. L. 103-272, as already modified in Aviation
Rules of Practice--General Revision.
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\1\9We note that the FAA's CP rulemaking proposals contain other
matters that could affect our jurisdiction. Should we need to
address them we will do so via adjudication or rulemaking, as most
appropriate.
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Two errors that the parties cited were errors of Federal Register
publication only. The word ``are'' was left out of the second sentence
of 826.3(a). It should have read ``These are adjudications * * *.'' The
Federal Register also mistakenly repeated two lines in the third
sentence of that same rule. The phrase ``suspend, or revoke * * *
proceedings to modify,'' improperly appears twice.20
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\2\0One commentor urges us to extend the scope of our new review
authority to dispatchers, noticing that they also are certificated
airmen. We decline to do so. The statute identifies the categories
of airmen that are covered and does not include dispatchers. See
H.R. Rep. 102-671, supra, at 20, where nine Congressmen indicated
their preference for extending coverage not only to dispatchers but
to air carriers, parachute riggers, and air traffic control tower
operators. Cf. FAA rulemaking proposal to include flight
instructors. 59 FR 40193.
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As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act, we certify that the
amended rules will not have a substantial impact on a significant
number of small entities. The rules are not major rules for the
purposes of Executive Order 12291. We also conclude that this action
will not significantly affect either the quality of the human
environment or the conservation of energy resources, nor will this
action impose any information collection requirements requiring
approval under the Paperwork Reduction Act.
List of Subjects
49 CFR Part 821
Administrative practice and procedure, Airmen, Aviation safety.
49 CFR Part 826
Claims, Equal access to justice, Lawyers.
Accordingly, the interim rule published on February 25, 1993 is
adopted as final, with the following changes:
PART 821--RULES OF PRACTICE IN AIR SAFETY PROCEEDINGS
1. The authority citation for Part 821 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: Title VI, Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended
(49 U.S.C. 40101 et seq.); Independent Safety Board Act of 1974,
Pub.L. 93-633, 88 Stat. 2166 (49 U.S.C. 1101, et seq.), and FAA
Civil Penalty Administrative Assessment Act of 1992, Pub.L. 102-345
(49 U.S.C. 46301), unless otherwise noted.
2. Section 821.2 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 821.2 Applicability and description of part.
The provisions of this part govern all air safety proceedings,
including proceedings involving airman medical certification, before a
law judge on petition for review of the denial of any airman
certificate or on appeal from any order of the Administrator amending,
modifying, suspending or revoking any certificate. The provisions of
this part also govern all proceedings on appeal from an order of the
Administrator imposing a civil penalty on a flight engineer, mechanic,
pilot, or repairman, or a person acting in that capacity, where the
underlying violation occurred on or after August 26, 1992, and all
proceedings on appeal to the Board from any order or decision of a law
judge.
PART 826--[AMENDED]
3. The authority citation for Part 826 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: Section 203(a)(1) Pub.L. 99-80, 99 Stat. 186 (5
U.S.C. 504).
4. Section 826.3(a) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 826.3 Proceedings covered.
(a) The Act applies to certain adversary adjudications conducted by
the Board. These are adjudications under 5 U.S.C. 554 in which the
position of the FAA is presented by an attorney or other representative
who enters an appearance and participates in the proceedings.
Proceedings to grant or renew certificates or documents, hereafter
referred to as ``licenses,'' are excluded, but proceedings to modify,
suspend, or revoke licenses or to impose a civil penalty on a flight
engineer, mechanic, pilot, or repairman (or person acting in that
capacity) are covered if they are otherwise ``adversary
adjudications.'' For the Board, the type of proceeding covered includes
(but may not be limited to) aviation enforcement cases appealed to the
Board under sections 501, 609, 611 and 901 of the Federal Aviation Act
(49 U.S.C. 44101 et seq., 44720-44711, 44715, 46301).
* * * * *
Issued in Washington, DC on this 8th day of November, 1994.
James Hall,
Acting Chairman.
[FR Doc. 94-28075 Filed 11-14-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7533-01-P
