[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 43 (Thursday, March 5, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 10949-10955]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-5712]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251]
Florida Power and Light Company; (Turkey Point Units 3 and 4);
Exemption
I
Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) is the holder of
Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41, which authorize
operation of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 (the facility) at a steady-
state reactor power level not in excess of 2300 megawatts thermal per
unit. The facility is a pressurized-water reactor located at the
licensee's site in Dade County, Florida. The licenses provide, among
other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations,
and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or
NRC) now or hereafter in effect.
II
In exemptions dated March 27, 1984, and August 12, 1987, the staff
approved the use of 1-hour rated fire barriers in lieu of 3-hour
barriers in certain outdoor areas at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. In
addition, the staff found that, for certain outdoor areas not protected
by automatic fire detection and suppression systems, separation of
cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant
trains by a horizontal distance of 20 feet free of intervening
combustibles provided an acceptable level of fire safety.
Based on the results of the industry's Thermo-Lag fire endurance
testing program, the licensee concluded that the outdoor Thermo-Lag
fire barrier designs cannot achieve a 1-hour fire resistive rating but
can achieve a 30-minute fire resistive rating when exposed to a test
fire that follows the ASTM E-119 standard time-temperature curve.
Because of these test results, the licensee in a letter dated June 15,
1994, requested an exemption to use 30-minute fire barriers for outdoor
applications in lieu of the 1-hour fire barriers previously approved;
however, the exemption request was withdrawn by letter dated June 28,
1996.
In a letter dated December 12, 1996, the licensee submitted an
exemption request (evaluated herein) for outdoor
[[Page 10950]]
areas, excluding the turbine building area. The licensee requested that
the NRC approve the use of 25-minute raceway fire barriers for these
outdoor applications in lieu of the 1-hour fire barriers which were
previously approved (refer to SEs dated March 27, 1984, and August 12,
1987). This request was based on the following: (1) The fire loading
and potential fire severities are low; (2) there are minimal ignition
sources; (3) transient ignition sources and combustibles are controlled
in these zones; and (4) manual fire fighting equipment is readily
accessible to the zones.
10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a requires:
Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety
circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour
rating. Structural steel forming a part of or supporting such fire
barriers shall be protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to
that required of the barrier.
The underlying purpose of this rule is to provide reasonable
assurance that one safe shutdown train and associated circuits used to
achieve and maintain safe shutdown are free of fire damage.
In its December 12, 1996, exemption request, as supplemented by
letters dated July 31 and October 31, 1997, the licensee requested an
exemption for outdoor fire zones, excluding the turbine area,
permitting the use of the following in lieu of Section III.G.2.a
requirements:
(1) Separation of cables and equipment and associated nonsafety
circuits of redundant trains west of the Open Turbine Building
Structure column line A by a 1-hour rated fire barrier until a
horizontal distance of 20 feet is attained. Water suppression systems
are provided for the major combustible sources, however no suppression
or detection is provided for the raceways. This request is applicable
to fire zones 81; and 86 West of the A-line.
(2) Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety
circuits of redundant trains by a 25-minute rated fire barrier until a
horizontal distance of 20 feet is attained. No suppression or detection
is provided. This request is applicable to fire zones 47 and 54; 86
North of column line 22 and East of the A-line; 79, 84, 88 and 89 East
of the Jc-line; and 106R, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 131 and
143.
(3) Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety
circuits of redundant trains by a 25-minute rated fire barrier until a
horizontal distance of 10 feet is attained in Roof Top locations. No
suppression or detection is provided. This request is applicable to
fire zones 106R, 114, 115, 118 and 143.
(4) Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety
circuits of redundant trains by a radiant energy shield having an
equivalent 30-minute fire rating until a horizontal distance of 20 feet
is attained. A radiant energy shield is a line of sight barrier between
redundant equipment and/or components. The radiant energy shield may be
combustible. No suppression or detection is provided. This request is
applicable to fire zones 47 and 54; 86 North of column line 22 and East
of the A-line; 79, 84, 88 and 89 East of the Jc-line; and 106R, 113,
114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 131 and 143.
(5) The existing separation of approximately 12 feet on center for
the Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pumps combined with fire detection
and a dual-header partial-coverage suppression system for the pumps.
This request is applicable to fire zones 47 and 54.
(6) The existing separation of approximately 14 feet on center for
the Intake Cooling Water (ICW) Pumps and associated conduits, with fire
detection for the pumps. No suppression is provided. This request is
applicable to fire zones 119 and 120.
(7) The use of a partial height (10 feet high) fire barrier between
the Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator(EDG) ``A'' and ``B'' radiator
rooms. No suppression or detection is provided. This request is
applicable to fire zone 131.
III
In summary, according to the licensee's submittal, the exemption is
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health
and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security.
In addition, the licensee asserts that special circumstances as set
forth in 10 CFR 50.12, paragraphs (a)(2)(ii) and (a)(2)(iii) are
present, i.e., (1) Application of the regulation in the particular
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule since the alternative actions proposed by the licensee will assure
that a fire in the power plant will not disable the capability to
safely shut down the plant, and (2) compliance with the regulation
would result in costs significantly in excess of those contemplated
when the regulation was adopted, since it was not foreseen that the
fire barriers would have to be upgraded.
IV
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's supporting information
for its exemption request and conducted a site visit.
During its site visit the staff performed the following actions
during walkdowns of the outdoor areas:
Reviewed the general area and assessed fire protection
features (manual and automatic).
Reviewed the location of the fire brigade equipment.
Reviewed fire brigade accessibility to the area.
Observed fire hazards and fire loadings associated with
the area.
Observed the material conditions of the plant and of the
fire protection equipment.
Observed the adequacy of administrative controls (noted
any transient combustibles).
Reviewed the adequacy of the fire rating of the raceway
fire barriers in the area.
Based on the plant open/outdoor configuration of the fire zones
noted below, the impact a fire may have on the plant and its ability to
shut down in the event of a fire tends to be localized to the zone of
concern. During its site evaluation the staff observed that the hot
fire gases and smoke would be directly vented to the atmosphere.
Therefore, components required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown
would not be subjected to convective heat. In outdoor areas a ceiling
jet and hot gas layer would not develop, unlike enclosed compartments.
Fire Zone 47--Unit 4 Component Cooling Water Pump Room and Fire Zone
54--Unit 3 Component Cooling Water Pump Room
Fire zone 47, the Unit 4 component cooling water pump room, is
located outdoors near the southeast corner of auxiliary building
elevation 18'-0''. This fire zone is separated from other auxiliary
building fire areas by 3-hour fire rated walls. This zone does not have
a ceiling and is open to the atmosphere. Fire zone 54, the Unit 3
component cooling water pump room, is located outdoors near the
northeast corner of auxiliary building elevation 18'-0''. This fire
zone is open to the atmosphere and is separated from other auxiliary
building fire areas by 3-hour fire barriers.
The major safe-shutdown-related equipment in these zones are the
CCW pumps (three pumps) and heat exchangers. The pumps are arranged in
an ``L'' configuration and are spaced approximately 12 feet on center.
The
[[Page 10951]]
power cables for each pump are routed in embedded conduit with the
exception of a short length from the embedded conduit to the motor
terminal box which is flexible steel conduit. The local control
stations for these pumps are more than 20 feet apart. The conduits and
their post-fire safe shutdown functions (identified in the Appendix)
are protected by an electrical raceway fire barrier system which has a
minimum fire resistive rating of 25 minutes.1
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\1\ As specified by the licensee's exemption request, the fire
resistive rating of 25-minute electrical raceway fire barrier system
applications (e.g., fire barrier application for various conduit
diameters, lateral bends, radial bends, junction boxes, conduit bank
enclosures) will be bounded by tests and will be representative of
the tested configurations. The fire endurance and hose stream
testing will also be done in accordance with Generic Letter 86-10,
Supplement 1, and will have met the acceptance criteria.
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These CCW pumps and cabling lack the required 20 feet of spacial
separation as specified in Appendix R III.G.a.2.b. The NRC approved
this configuration in an exemption dated March 27, 1984, on the basis
that the licensee had installed redundant open-head deluge fire
control-suppression systems activated by ultraviolet (UV) fire
detectors; however, this area was resubmitted for review since cabling
with less than 20 feet of separation is protected by a 25-minute rated
fire barrier. The in-situ fire load in this area is low, consisting of
two horizontal cable trays installed approximately 10 feet above the
floor and 1 gallon of lubricating oil in each pump. Manual hose
stations and portable fire extinguishers are accessible. If a fire
occurred in either of these fire zones, it is anticipated that the UV
fire detectors would react and activate the deluge fire suppression
system. Since the suppression system would provide fast total coverage
of the CCW pumps, there is reasonable assurance that a fire affecting
one pump would be confined to that pump. The 12 feet of separation
between the pumps provides adequate passive protection to assure that
one train of CCW pumps would remain free of fire damage. In addition,
since these fire zones are outdoor areas with no significant equipment
or component obstructions, there is reasonable assurance that the
required post-fire safe shutdown functions protected by the 25-minute
electrical raceway fire barrier system would remain free of fire damage
until the deluge system activated and controlled the fire. The staff
has determined that licensee's proposal provides adequate protection,
will not pose an undue risk to public health and safety, and that the
underlying purpose of the rule is satisfied. Therefore, the staff finds
the licensee's proposed exemption for these areas to be acceptable.
Fire Zone 106R--Control Room Air Conditioner Condensing Units on the
Control Building
Fire Zone 106R is the control building roof. The major safe
shutdown equipment on the roof are the cable spreading room and
computer room chillers and the control room air conditioning
evaporative units. The control building roof is of concrete
construction and is covered with a composite, built-up roof. The staff
requested the licensee to evaluate the combustibility of this roof
design and consider the potential effect of a fire on the combustible
(Thermo-Lag) raceway fire barriers and the components they protect. The
licensee determined that this roof consists of (1) A Koroseal vapor
barrier; (2) Flintkote roof insulation; (3) Lexsuco adhesive; (4) eight
layers of Ruberiod asphalt felt; and (5) clean, dry, opaque \1/4\'' to
\5/8\'' gravel. The licensee determined that this roof is the original
roof; its fire classification is indeterminate. Because of the
uncertainty as to the combustibility and fire classification of the
control building roof, the licensee's proposed exemption which would
permit it to separate cables and equipment and associated nonsafety
circuits of redundant trains by a 25-minute rated fire barrier until a
horizontal distance of 10 feet is attained is not acceptable.
Roof and Fire Zone 118--Control and Auxiliary Building Roof
Fire zone 118 is the control and auxiliary building roof. The
auxiliary building roof construction is concrete without an asphalt
roof membrane. There are minimal in-situ combustibles in this fire zone
and intervening combustibles between redundant safe shutdown functions
is not a concern. In addition, this roof is inside the radiation
control area of the facility. The only transient combustible materials
admitted are those used in maintenance or work activity within this
area and controlled by the licensee's administrative controls.
Therefore, transient combustibles are not a concern.
Located in fire zone 118 are redundant safe shutdown trains of DC
equipment/inverter room heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC)
(Component Nos. E16D, E16E, E16F), electrical equipment room HVAC
(Component Nos. E232/V76, E16E/E16F), cable spreading room HVAC (S74A/
S75A, S74B/S75B), and the auxiliary building exhaust fan (V8A, V8B). In
addition, the cabling and raceway associated with this equipment are
routed in this fire zone. The conduits and the associated post-fire
safe shutdown functions (identified in the appendix) are separated from
the redundant train in this fire zone by a 25-minute rated fire barrier
until a horizontal distance of 10 feet is attained. All other post-fire
safe shutdown equipment (e.g., components, power and control circuits,
and power distribution circuits) located in this fire zone are
separated from their redundant equipment by a horizontal distance of
greater than 10 feet. In addition, the space between the equipment is
free of fixed combustibles. Since this fire zone is outdoors and the
in-situ fire load is minimal, there is reasonable assurance that any
fire would be small and that the required post-fire safe shutdown
equipment protected by the 25-minute electrical raceway fire barrier
system would remain free of fire damage until the fire burned itself
out or was detected by plant personnel and adequately controlled and
suppressed by the plant fire brigade. The staff has determined that
licensee's proposal provides adequate protection, will not pose an
undue risk to public health and safety, and that the underlying purpose
of the rule is satisfied. Therefore, the staff finds the licensee's
proposed exemption for this area to be acceptable.
Fire Zone 113--Unit 4 Feedwater Platform and Fire Zone 116--Unit 3
Feedwater Platform
Fire zones 113 and 116 are the feedwater platforms for Units 3 and
4, respectively. These platforms are located in the outdoor area on
elevation 38'-0''. The major safe shutdown equipment located in each of
these fire zones is two trains of auxiliary feedwater control valves
and the auxiliary building supply fans. The train A valves (three
valves) are located above the platform, on elevation 42'-0'' and the
train B valves (three valves) are on elevation 30'-7''. They are
separated by a \1/4\-inch thick steel checker-plate platform. In
addition, these areas contain the associated feedwater and auxiliary
feedwater systems that penetrate the reactor containment building. The
area is bounded on two sides, north and west, by concrete walls. The
east side is bounded by the respective Unit 3 or 4 reactor containment
building. The south side is open to the atmosphere and the ceiling is
concrete. The redundant post-fire safe shutdown trains located in these
areas are not protected by an automatic suppression system. However,
these fire
[[Page 10952]]
zones are protected by UV fire detection capabilities, manual hose
stations, and portable fire extinguishers.
Where there are intervening combustibles between redundant safe
shutdown trains or the required post-fire safe shutdown circuits or
equipment (e.g., components, power and control circuits, and power
distribution circuits) are not separated from its redundant equipment
by a minimum of 20 feet, the equipment is protected by an electrical
raceway fire barrier system with a 25-minute fire resistive rating. The
raceway protected by electrical raceway fire barrier systems are
identified in the Appendix. These fire zones are outdoor areas and the
in-situ fire load is low. Therefore, there is reasonable assurance that
if a fire occurred the required post-fire safe shutdown equipment
protected by the 25-minute electrical raceway fire barrier system would
remain free of fire damage until the fire was automatically detected
and then controlled and suppressed by the plant fire brigade. The staff
has determined that licensee's proposal provides adequate protection,
will not pose an undue risk to public health and safety, and that the
underlying purpose of the rule is satisfied. Therefore, the staff finds
the licensee's proposed exemption for this area to be acceptable.
Fire Zone 115--Unit 3 Main Steam Platform and Fire Zone 114--Unit 4
Main Steam Platform
These two outside areas are located at the 53'-6'' elevation. The
major safe shutdown equipment in these fire zones consist of the main
steam isolation valves, main steam isolation valve bypass valves, and
the atmospheric dump valves. The redundant main steam isolation, bypass
valves, and atmospheric dump valves are separated from each other by
approximately 28 feet center to center. The redundant trains located in
these areas are not protected by fixed fire suppression or automatic
fire detection systems. Portable fire extinguishers and standpipes with
the appropriate hose stations are available and accessible.
These areas are open to the atmosphere and do not have a ceiling.
Redundant cables are separated horizontally by over 20 feet free off
intervening combustibles and are routed in steel conduit. Where there
are intervening combustibles or the required post-fire safe shutdown
equipment (e.g., components, power and control circuits, and power
distribution circuits) is not separated from its redundant equipment by
a minimum of 20 feet, the equipment is protected by a electrical
raceway fire barrier system with a 25-minute fire resistive rating. The
raceway protected by electrical raceway fire barrier systems are
identified in the Appendix. Since these fire zones are outdoor areas
and the in-situ fire load is low, there is reasonable assurance that if
a fire occurred, it would be small and the required post-fire safe
shutdown equipment protected by the 25-minute fire barrier system would
remain free of fire damage until the fire burned itself out or was
detected by plant personnel and controlled and suppressed by the plant
fire brigade. The staff has determined that licensee's proposal
provides adequate protection, will not pose an undue risk to public
health and safety, and that the underlying purpose of the rule is
satisfied. Therefore, the staff finds the licensee's proposed exemption
for this area to be acceptable.
Fire Zone 119--Unit 4 Intake Structure and Fire Zone 120--Unit 3 Intake
Structure
The Unit 3 and 4 intake structures are contiguous and are
designated fire zone 119 (Unit 4) and fire zone 120 (Unit 3) to
differentiate between the units. These fire zones are outdoors and are
not bounded by walls or a ceiling. The in-situ combustible in these
fire zones is a small amount of lubricating oil contained in the motor
housings. The fire protection features provided for these zones are
manual fire hose stations and portable fire extinguishers. These fire
zones are protected by automatic UV fire detectors.
Where there are intervening combustibles between redundant shutdown
trains or the required post-fire safe shutdown equipment (e.g.,
components, power and control circuits, and power distribution
circuits) is not separated from its redundant equipment by a minimum of
20 feet, the equipment is protected by an electrical raceway fire
barrier system with a 25-minute fire resistive rating. The raceway
protected by electrical raceway fire barrier systems are identified in
the Appendix. Since these fire zones are outdoor areas and the in-situ
fire load is low, there is reasonable assurance that if a fire
occurred, the required post-fire safe shutdown equipment protected by
the 25-minute fire barrier system would remain free of fire damage and
that the fire would be automatically detected and adequately controlled
and suppressed by the plant fire brigade. The staff has determined that
licensee's proposal provides adequate protection, will not pose an
undue risk to public health and safety, and that the underlying purpose
of the rule is satisfied. Therefore, the staff finds the licensee's
proposed exemption for this area to be acceptable.
Fire Zone 143--Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator Roof
The major safe shutdown equipment on the Unit 3 emergency diesel
generator building roof consists of the emergency diesel generator
exhaust silencers. The roof construction is concrete without an asphalt
roof membrane. There are no in-situ combustibles located in this fire
zone; therefore, intervening combustibles between redundant safe
shutdown equipment is not a concern.
All post-fire safe shutdown equipment (e.g., components, power and
control circuits, and power distribution circuits) located in this fire
zone is separated from its redundant equipment by a horizontal distance
of greater than 10 feet. The space between the equipment is free of
fixed combustibles. Therefore, the licensee is relying on spacial
separation in lieu of physical protection (e.g., raceway fire barriers)
and has determined that the use of raceway fire barriers to assure that
one train of required safe shutdown equipment remains free of fire
damage is not required in this fire zone to provide reasonable
assurance the equipment would be available. Since this fire zone is
outdoors and there are no in-situ combustibles, there is reasonable
assurance that any fire in this area would be small and that the
required 10-foot separation of redundant safe shutdown trains would
maintain one train free of fire damage until the fire burned itself out
or was detected by plant personnel and controlled and suppressed by the
plant fire brigade. The staff has determined that licensee's proposal
provides adequate protection, will not pose an undue risk to public
health and safety, and that the underlying purpose of the rule is
satisfied. Therefore, the staff finds the licensee's proposed exemption
for this area to be acceptable.
Generic Application of Alternative Physical and Spacial Separation
Fire Protection Schemes
The licensee requested that the staff approve an exemption to use
any of the following generic protection schemes in lieu of installing
the 3-hour fire barriers required by Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a, in
any outdoor fire zone (excluding the turbine building):
Separation of cables and equipment and associated
nonsafety circuits of redundant trains west of the open turbine
building structure column line A by 1-hour rated fire barriers until a
horizontal distance of 20 feet is attained.
[[Page 10953]]
Separation of cables and equipment and associated
nonsafety circuits of redundant trains by 25-minute rated fire barriers
until a horizontal distance of 20 feet is attained.
For roof top fire zones, separation of cables and
equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains by 25-
minute rated fire barriers until a horizontal distance of 10 feet is
attained.
Separation of cables and equipment and associated
nonsafety circuits of redundant trains by a radiant energy heat shield
having an equivalent 30-minute fire rating until a horizontal distance
of 20 feet is attained.
By letter dated October 31, 1997, the licensee submitted its
technical bases for these protection schemes. In certain cases, the
staff may find these schemes an acceptable alternative to the specific
requirements of Section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. However,
in responding to the staff's request for additional information of June
16, 1997, and to the request made during the meeting between the NRC
staff and the licensee on July 7, 1997, the licensee did not submit an
analysis for each fire zone which identifies the post-fire safe
shutdown equipment (e.g., components, power and control circuits, and
power distribution circuits) in the zone, their relative safe shutdown
importance, how the equipment is protected, including detailed
evaluations of the fire hazards and the potential worst-case fires that
may occur. Therefore, the staff cannot evaluate the generic
acceptability of these schemes or whether the application of a specific
protection scheme would provide reasonable assurance that one train of
safe shutdown equipment (e.g., components, power and control circuits,
and power distribution circuits) would be free of fire damage. Without
a plant-specific fire-zone-by-fire-zone fire hazards analysis to
support the use of these protection schemes on a case-by-case basis,
the staff cannot assess the acceptability of these plant configurations
and their ability to provide an adequate level of fire safety
consistent with the underlying purpose of Section III.G of Appendix R
to 10 CFR Part 50. However, additional information was recently
submitted by the licensee and these remaining zones are being evaluated
separately.
Conclusions
On the basis of its evaluation and review that included a site
walkdown of the fire zones, the staff concludes the following:
For fire zone 47 (Unit 4 CCW) and fire zone 54 (Unit 3 CCW room),
the use of a 25-minute fire rated electrical raceway fire barrier
system in lieu of a 1-hour fire barrier system as required by Section
III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50 provides an adequate level of
fire safety, poses no undue risk to public health and safety, meets the
underlying purpose of the rule and is, therefore, acceptable.
For fire zone 113 (Unit 4 feedwater platform), fire zone 116 (Unit
3 feedwater platform), fire zone 119 (Unit 4 intake structure), and
fire zone 120 (Unit 3 intake structure), the use of 25-minute fire
barriers to separate cables and equipment andassociated nonsafety
circuits of redundant trains until a horizontal distance of 20 feet
free of intervening combustibles is attained provides an adequate level
of fire safety, poses no undue risk to public health and safety, meets
the underlying purpose of the rule and is, therefore, acceptable.
For fire zone 115 (Unit 3 main steam platform) and fire zone 114
(Unit 4 main steam platform), the use of 25-minute fire barriers to
separate cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of
redundant trains until a horizontal distance of 20 feet free of
intervening combustibles is attained provides an adequate level of fire
safety, poses no undue risk to public health and safety, meets the
underlying purpose of the rule and is, therefore, acceptable.
For fire zone 143 (Unit 3 emergency diesel generator roof) and fire
zone 118 (control and auxiliary building roof), the use of 25-minute
fire barriers to separate cables and equipment and associated nonsafety
circuits of redundant trains until a horizontal distance of 10 feet
free of intervening combustibles is attained provides an adequate level
of fire safety, poses no undue risk to public health and safety, meets
the underlying purpose of the rule and is, therefore, acceptable.
For fire zone 106R, based on the uncertain combustibility and
indeterminate fire classification of the built-up asphalt roof design,
with respect to the use of 25-minute fire barriers to separate cables
and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains
until a horizontal distance of 10 feet free of intervening combustibles
is attained, the staff cannot determine if an adequate level of fire
safety would be provided and the exemption request is, therefore,
unacceptable. The licensee's request for exemption for this fire zone
is denied.
Without a specific analysis for each fire zone which identifies the
post-fire safe shutdown equipment (e.g., components, power and control
circuits, and power distribution circuits) in the zone, their relative
safe shutdown importance, and how the equipment is protected (including
detailed evaluations of the fire hazards and the potential worst-case
fires that may occur), the staff cannot evaluate the acceptability of
the generic protection schemes or whether the application of a specific
protection scheme provides the reasonable assurance needed to satisfy
the underlying purpose of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR part
50. Therefore, the staff finds the generic applicability of these
protection schemes to outdoor areas unacceptable at this time. However,
additional information was recently submitted by the licensee and these
remaining zones are being evaluated separately.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that
granting this Exemption for fire zones 47, 54, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118,
119, 120, and 143 will not have a significant effect on the quality of
the human environment (63 FR 8695).
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common
defense and security. In addition, special circumstances are present in
that application of the regulation in these particular circumstances is
not necessary to achieve underlying purpose of the rule which is to
provide reasonable assurance that one safe shutdown train and its
associated circuits used to achieve and maintain safe shutdown are free
of fire damage. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Florida Power
and Light Company an exemption from the requirements of Section
III.G.2.a of Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50, as requested in the
submittal, for fire zones 47, 54, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120,
and 143. This exemption is effective upon issuance. The exemption for
fire zone 106R is denied. The exemption requested for the remaining
fire zones is being evaluated separately.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day of February 1998.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[[Page 10954]]
Post-fire Safe Shutdown Functions--Raceway/Cables and Components Requiring Fire Barrier Protection
[Turkey Point Units 3 and 4]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protected raceway
Fire zone System Component ID ID Cable function
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
O/D 47............ CCW 4P211B 4N1361 CCW pump control.
O/D 54............ CCW 3P211B 3N1372 CCW pump control.
O/D 113........... AFW CV-4-2816 4K369 AFW flow control valve
control.
4K323
CV-4-2817 4K379
4K265
4K612
CV-4-2818 4K614
4K389
CV-4-2831 4K1065
4K1244
PB4519
TB4835
4K1240
TB4835
4K1243
4K1407
4K1408
CV-4-2832 4K1240
4K1243
TB4835
4K1068
4K1244
PB4519
TB4835
4K1407
4K1409
CV-4-2833 4K1240
4K1243
TB4835
4K1066
4K1244
PB4519
O/D 113........... AFW CV-4-2833 TB4835 AFW flow control valve
control.
4K1407
4K1410
O/D 116........... AFW CV-3-2816 3K368 AFW flow control valve
control.
3K369
CV-3-2817 3K574
3K576
3K577
CV-3-2818 3K568
3K570
3K585
O/D 114........... MSS POV-4-2604B 4K1403 Main Steam isolation
valve control.
4K1514
4K1518
POV-4-2605B 4K1402
4K1515
4K1518
POV-4-2606B 4K1401
4K1517
4K1518
O/D 115........... MSS POV-3-2604B 3K1624 Main Steam isolation
valve control.
3K1841
3K1843
3K1845
PB3946
PB3947
POV-3-2605B 3K1624
3K1841
3K1843
3K1845
PB3946
PB3947
3K1623
3K1844
POV-3-2606B 3K1622
3K1841
3K1842
[[Page 10955]]
PB3946
O/D 118........... HVAC E16F 4J1195 DC/Inverter HVAC E16F
Power.
O/D 119........... ICW 4P9B 4R067 ICW Pump 4P-9B Power.
4R077
O/D 120........... ICW 3P9B 3R067 ICW Pump 3P-9B Power.
3R077
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[FR Doc. 98-5712 Filed 3-4-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
