[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 75 (Monday, April 20, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 19526-19529]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-10329]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-440; License No. NPF-58; EA 97-430]
Centerior Service Company, Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1;
Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty
I
Centerior Service Company (Licensee) is the holder of Operating
License No. NPF-58, issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or
Commission) on November 13, 1986. The license authorizes the Licensee
to operate the Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
[[Page 19527]]
Unit 1, in accordance with the conditions specified therein.
II
Three inspections of the Licensee's activities were conducted from
December 28, 1996, to August 27, 1997. The results of the inspections
indicated that the Licensee had not conducted its activities in full
compliance with NRC requirements. A written Notice of Violation and
Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice) was served upon the
Licensee by letter dated November 18, 1997. The Notice states the
nature of the violations, the provisions of the NRC's requirements that
the Licensee had violated, and the amount of the civil penalties
proposed for the violations.
First Energy on behalf of Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company
responded to the Notice on December 18, 1997. The NRC notes that
Centerior Service Company (Centerior) holds NRC License No. NPF-58
which authorizes the operation of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit
1. Therefore, this action is directed to Centerior (Licensee). In its
December 18, 1997 response, the Licensee admitted Violation A (EA 97-
047) discussed in the Notice and paid the $50,000 civil penalty.
Violation B (EA 96-542) did not require a response. In that same
letter, the Licensee denied Violation C, EA 97-430, and requested
remission of the proposed $50,000 civil penalty for that violation.
III
After consideration of the Licensee's response and the statements
of fact, explanation, and argument for remission contained therein, the
NRC staff has determined, as set forth in the Appendix to this Order,
that the violation occurred as modified below and that the penalty
proposed for Violation C designated in the Notice should be imposed.
The NRC accepts the licensee's explanation that the change of the
description of the ECCS surge tanks did not involve a potential
increase of the consequence of a design basis dose to the public. The
violation was accordingly modified by removing the sentence concerning
potential increase of the consequences of a design basis dose to the
public. However, the modification of the violation does not affect the
validity of the violation or the amount of the civil penalty.
IV
In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205,
it is hereby ordered that: The Licensee pay a civil penalty in the
amount of $50,000 within 30 days of the date of this Order, by check,
draft, money order, or electronic transfer, payable to the Treasurer of
the United States and mailed to Mr. James Lieberman, Director, Office
of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint
North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852.
V
The Licensee may request a hearing within 30 days of the date of
this Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to
extending the time to request a hearing. A request for extension of
time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Enforcement,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, and include
a statement of good cause for the extension. A request for a hearing
should be clearly marked as a ``Request for an Enforcement Hearing,''
and shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to
the Commission's Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555. Copies
also shall be sent to the Assistant General Counsel for Hearings and
Enforcement at the same address and to the Regional Administrator, NRC
Region III, 801 Warrenville Road, Suite 255, Lisle, IL 60532-4351.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will issue an Order
designating the time and place of the hearing. If the Licensee fails to
request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order, or if
written approval of an extension of time in which to request a hearing
has not been granted, the provisions of this Order shall be effective
without further proceedings. If payment has not been made by that time,
the matter may be referred to the Attorney General for collection.
In the event the Licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the
issues to be considered at such hearing shall be:
(a) Whether the Licensee was in violation of the Commission's
requirements as set forth in the Notice referenced in Section II above,
as amended in the Appendix to this Order, and
(b) Whether, on the basis of such violation, this Order should be
sustained.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 9th day of April 1998.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
James Lieberman,
Director, Office of Enforcement.
Appendix--Evaluation and Conclusion
On November 18, 1997, a Notice of Violation and Proposed
Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice) was issued for violations
identified during several NRC inspections at the Perry Nuclear Power
Plant, Unit 1. First Energy on behalf of Cleveland Electric
Illuminating Company responded to the Notice on December 18, 1997.
The NRC notes that Centerior Services Company (Centerior) holds NRC
License No. NPF-58 which authorizes the operation of the Perry
Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1. Therefore, this action is directed to
Centerior (licensee). In the December 18, 1997 response, the
licensee admitted Violation A (EA 97-047) discussed in the Notice
and paid the $50,000 civil penalty. Violation B (EA 96-542) did not
require a response. In that same letter, the licensee denied
Violation C, EA 97-430, and requested remission of the proposed
$50,000 civil penalty for that violation.
Restatement of Violation C (EA 97-430)
10 CFR 50.59 permits the licensee, in part, to make changes to
the facility and procedures as described in the safety analysis
report without prior Commission approval provided the changes do not
involve an unreviewed safety question. Records of these changes must
include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the
determination that the changes do not involve an unreviewed safety
question.
10 CFR 50.59 (a)(2)(I) states, in part, that a proposed change
shall be deemed to involve an unreviewed safety question if the
probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or
malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in
the safety analysis report may be increased.
Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 9.2.2.3,
``Emergency Closed Cooling System--Safety Evaluation'' states that
the emergency closed system cooling surge tanks are designed to
maintain a seven day supply of water with normal system leakage
without the need to provide makeup water.
Contrary to the above, Safety Evaluation No. 96-128 prepared by
the licensee on October 10, 1996, and approved on October 21, 1996,
evaluated a change in the design basis for the emergency closed
cooling system surge tanks. The licensee changed the sizing basis of
the surge tanks from a seven day supply as stated in USAR Section
9.2.2.3 to a 30-minute supply, and the licensee's analysis failed to
identify that the change was an unreviewed safety question.
Specifically, the safety evaluation did not adequately assess the
increased probability of a malfunction of equipment important to
safety associated with an increased potential for operator error as
operators replenished the surge tanks on a 30-minute post accident
basis instead of the previously evaluated period of seven days. The
safety evaluation also failed to recognize the increased
consequences of a design basis loss of coolant accident associated
with an increased projected dose to the operators as they
[[Page 19528]]
refilled the surge tanks on an increased frequency.
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).
Civil Penalty--$50,000.
Summary of Licensee's Response to Violation C (EA 97-430)
The licensee denied this violation as written. The licensee
provided three reasons to support the denial of the violation:
Summary of Licensee's Reason 1
The design of the plant, and the corresponding design bases for
the emergency closed cooling (ECC) system, were not changed by the
safety evaluation. The plant condition was identified as a non-
conforming condition, and activities were planned to restore the
system condition to the original licensing basis.
A determination of operability for the ECC system with increased
leakage concluded that it was acceptable to allow system leakage of
3.0 gallons per minute (gpm) for ECC Loop A and 3.5 gpm for Loop B.
In this degraded condition, the increased leakage would reduce the
seven day supply of water to a 30 minute supply and introduce the
need for local operator action to ensure sustained adequate net
positive suction head (NPSH) to the ECC pumps. The licensee
indicated that it may have been inappropriate to include the
operability evaluation in the Updated Final Safety Analysis (USAR);
however, it was done to preclude the need for preparing additional
degraded condition operability determinations in the future.
The licensee concluded that the revision to the USAR preserved
the original design considerations of a 7 day supply, and distinctly
identifies leakage in excess of 0.5 gallons per hour (gph) as a
degraded condition. The licensee indicated that its intention was to
correct the deficiency during ``refueling outage six'' which began
on September 12, 1997.
NRC Evaluation of Licensee's Reason 1
As originally stated in the USAR, the system was designed to
maintain a seven day supply with normal system leakage. This fact
was considered and reiterated in the NRC safety evaluation report.
The USAR change removed the ``design aspect'' of the seven day
supply and simply provided the mathematics for the 0.5 gph leak
rate. This was a change in the design criteria. Additionally, the
USAR now stated that under condition of degraded system leakage, it
would be acceptable to have leakage such that there would only be a
30 minute inventory available. This also represents a change to the
design basis of the facility.
Although the intention of the licensee was to repair the system,
the USAR change represented a continued acceptance of a degraded
condition.
Summary of Licensee's Reason 2
The change to the description of the ECC system surge tanks in
the USAR did not involve an unreviewed safety question (USQ) under
10 CFR 50.59 criteria because it did not involve a potential
increase in the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of
equipment important to safety.
The licensee indicated that an increase in the probability of
occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety was not
concluded on the basis that manual actions employed were such that
failure of an action would be equivalent to that of a single active
failure. When compared to the original evaluated design, the failure
of the operator action would result in the loss of one train of the
ECC system; a loss of no greater consequence than was previously
evaluated in the USAR.
The licensee also indicated that significant efforts put forth
to compensate for the additional actions and reduce the potential
for error formed the basis to conclude that no increase in
probability of equipment malfunction was introduced. The licensee
referenced Part 9900 of the NRC inspection manual guidance for 10
CFR 50.59, which states in part that the NRC has found compensating
effects, such as administrative controls, acceptable in offsetting
uncertainties and increases in probability of occurrence or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated or reductions in
margin of safety, provided the negative impact is negligible, and is
clearly outweighed by the compensatory actions. The licensee stated
``if these compensating factors can not be considered in determining
that there is no increase in probability, no additional operator
actions, for any normal or off-normal operating condition, could be
permitted without also concluding an increase in the probability of
a malfunction.''
NRC Evaluation of Licensee's Reason 2
Under the circumstances required to manually accomplish the ECC
surge tank refill, the NRC does not agree that the consequences of
operator error would be limited to a single active failure. The
licensee did take actions to mitigate potential operator errors;
however, in this case the NRC does not consider any mitigating
actions to clearly outweigh the increased probability of losing NPSH
to the ECC pumps. The increases in probabilities are described
below:
The reliance on an operator to refill the emergency
closed cooling surge tanks beginning at 30 minutes (with completion
occurring within the next 20 minutes) into a design basis accident
(DBA) introduced a common-mode failure mechanism at a critical time
in the accident sequence. While the USAR did rely on operators to
refill the tanks seven days after a DBA, the seven days provided a
period of time during which no operator action was required. After
seven days, the plant would be stabilized and a failure on the part
of an operator to properly refill the ECC surge tanks would still
allow some margin for recovery. At 30 minutes into a DBA, the plant
is significantly less stable and an interruption in operation or
loss of this system increases the potential for core damage. When
operator response time to perform a task is significantly decreased,
the probability of an error is also increased.
Due to the limited time into the accident sequence when
operator actions would be required to refill the ECC surge tanks,
there was also concern that personnel would not be available to
perform the activity. Although the actual number of operators on
site during routine activities might support the refill activity,
during an accident, these operators would be diverted into
addressing the more immediate action of responding to the accident
and might not be available to compensate for a system that was
designed to operate without operator action until the plant was
stabilized. Therefore, the potential lack of available personnel
early in the accident sequence to perform the ECC surge tank refill
increased the probability of not filling the ECC surge tanks within
the limited time frame.
Based on the licensee's dose estimates for single
entries into the ECC surge tank area of 4.4 rem, no single operator
would be able to accomplish the repetitive refill activity
sufficient to reduce the potential for error. It would appear that a
minimum of three operators would be required within the first 2.5
hours (due to the dose) which increased the potential for errors.
The actual and potential physical conditions of the
area adjacent to the ECC system surge tanks (e.g., no emergency
lighting, overfilling the surge tanks could cause slippery floor
conditions) could result in the operator being unable to refill the
tanks within the reduced response time.
In this case, the substitution of manual actions to replace the
design intention of the tanks, including significantly reducing
operator response time constitutes an unreviewed safety question
(USQ). This change should have been submitted to and approved by the
NRC before implementation.
Summary of Licensee's Reason 3
The change to the description of the ECC system surge tanks in
the USAR did not involve a USQ under 10 CFR 50.59 criteria because
it did not involve a potential increase of the consequences of a
design basis accident associated with increased projected dose to
the public due to operator refilling the surge tanks on an increased
frequency.
The licensee performed time and motion studies of the activities
needed to refill the ECC surge tanks and determined that for a
single entry, the maximum dose was estimated to be 4.4 rem. This
dose was bounded by the NUREG-0737 defined limit of 5 rem. The
expected dose projection was within the guidelines of USAR section
12.6.1.a, for post accident dose rates in areas designated as
``infrequent occupancy,'' and the activity could be performed at any
time throughout the accident without exceeding the 5 rem whole body
exposure limit.
An increase in the consequences of an accident previously
evaluated in the USAR was not concluded since doses to the public
were not increased above the current licensing limit and doses to
onsite personnel were not in excess of the limits as specified in
NUREG-0737 or the USAR.
The consequences as referenced in 10 CFR 50.59 pertain to the
health and safety of the public. Therefore, the proposed operator
action from the perspective of receiving the estimated dose, does
not cause a change in the consequences.
NRC Evaluation of Licensee's Reason 3
The NRC determined that an increase in dose consequences, as
used in 10 CFR 50.59,
[[Page 19529]]
refers to the consequences of a design basis accident, and not to
increased radiation dose to plant staff from in-plant recovery
actions. NRC agrees that the change in operator actions did not
involve a potential increase in consequences of a design basis
accident. The violation is revised as follows:
10 CFR 50.59 permits the licensee, in part, to make changes to
the facility and procedures as described in the safety analysis
report without prior Commission approval provided the changes do not
involve an unreviewed safety question. Records of these changes must
include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the
determination that the changes do not involve an unreviewed safety
question.
10 CFR 50.59 (a)(2)(I) states, in part, that a proposed change
shall be deemed to involve an unreviewed safety question if the
probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or
malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in
the safety analysis report may be increased.
Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 9.2.2.3
``Emergency Closed Cooling System--Safety evaluation'' states that
the emergency closed cooling system surge tanks are designed to
maintain a seven day supply of water with normal system leakage
without the need to provide makeup water.
Contrary to the above, Safety Evaluation No. 96-128 prepared by
the licensee on October 10, 1996, and approved on October 21, 1996,
evaluated a change in the design basis for the emergency closed
cooling system surge tanks. The licensee changed the sizing basis of
the surge tanks from a seven day supply as stated in USAR Section
9.2.2.3 to a 30-minute supply, and the licensee's analysis failed to
identify that the change was an unreviewed safety question.
Specifically, the safety evaluation did not adequately assess the
increased probability of a malfunction of equipment important to
safety associated with an increased potential for operator error as
operators replenished the surge tanks on a 30-minute post accident
basis instead of the previously evaluated period of seven days.
Summary of Licensee's Request for Remission of the Civil Penalty
The licensee requested full remission of the $50,000 civil
penalty.
NRC Evaluation of Licensee's Request for Remission of the Civil
Penalty
The licensee did not provide a separate justification (i.e., a
discussion of the civil penalty adjustment factors) to justify
remission of the civil penalty. Rather, the licensee's reasons for
denying the violation apparently are the licensee's justification
for requesting remission of the civil penalty.
NRC Conclusion
The licensee interpreted the NRC position concerning the
violation to be that the increases in both the consequences and
probability of an accident were the direct result of the increased
presence in the plant of operators who are fully trained and
qualified for the activities under consideration.
The NRC did not intend to suggest that the increased presence of
personnel in the plant would cause an increase in the consequences
and probability of an accident. Rather, the NRC was concerned with
the increased potential of failing to refill the ECC surge tanks
within an extremely limited time constraint, which was much shorter
than originally described to and accepted by the NRC. In summary,
the NRC's concern was that during the performance of the additional
operator actions to refill the ECC surge tanks, the potential for
errors was increased and could lead to the loss of the safety
related ECC system. Loss of the ECC system could result in losing
other safety related systems relied upon to mitigate the
consequences of an accident. Therefore, the manual operator action
proposed to compensate for the reduced ECC surge tank water supply
constituted a USQ.
The NRC has concluded that this violation occurred as modified
above, and that an adequate basis for withdrawing the violation,
reducing the severity level of the violation, or remitting the civil
penalty was not provided by the licensee. Consequently, the proposed
civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 should be imposed.
[FR Doc. 98-10329 Filed 4-17-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
