[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 82 (Thursday, April 29, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 23129-23131]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-10687]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Indiana Michigan Power Company
[Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316]
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility
Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration
Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering
issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-58 and
Facility Operating License No. DPR-74 issued to Indiana Michigan Power
Company (the licensee) for operation of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear
Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 located in Berrien County, Michigan.
The proposed license amendment would revise Technical Specification
section 3/4.8.1.2, ``Electrical Power Systems, Shutdown,'' and its
associated bases to provide a one-time extension of the 18-month
surveillance interval for specific surveillance requirements for Units
1 and 2. This surveillance will be performed prior to the first entry
into Mode 4 subsequent to receipt of the requested T/S amendment. In
addition, for Unit 2 only, a minor administrative change is included to
delete a reference to T/S 4.0.8, which is no longer applicable. For
Unit 1 only, an editorial change is made to add the word ``or'' to
action statement 3.8.1.2.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the Change Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability of
Occurrence or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated?
A discussion of each of the applicable accidents follows.
Fuel Handling Accident
The only time a fuel handling accident could occur is during the
handling of a fuel assembly. The design of fuel handling equipment
is such that an interruption of A.C. power would not cause a fuel
element to be inadvertently dropped. Therefore, an interruption or
loss of A.C. power does not significantly increase the probability
of a fuel handling accident.
At present, fission product activities in the fuel assembly
pellet-to-cladding gaps are greatly reduced. The fuel handling
accident analysis considers the thyroid dose at the site boundary
and in the low population zone. This dose is dominated by the
isotope iodine 131, which also decays more slowly than the other
iodine contributors to the dose. The activity of iodine 131
decreases by one-half every 8.05 days. The current shutdown period
of approximately 18 months represents over 70 half-lives. Activity
of a radioactive material is generally considered to be negligible
after 7 half-lives (a reduction in activity of \1/128\). By
contrast, the accident analysis assumes an iodine reduction of less
than \1/10\ (from activated charcoal filtration) in the fuel
handling building, and no reduction in the containment, prior to
release. Therefore, the consequences of a fuel handling accident are
clearly bounded by the existing safety analysis without taking
credit for any iodine removal by charcoal filtration. The greatly
reduced fission product activity at the current time provides
assurance that the consequences of this event are bounded by the
existing analysis. Therefore, the consequences are not significantly
increased.
Accidental Release of Radioactive Liquids
The inadvertent release of radioactive liquid wastes to the
environment was evaluated for the waste evaporator condensate and
monitor tanks, condensate storage tank, primary water storage tank,
[[Page 23130]]
refueling water storage tank (RWST), the auxiliary building storage
tanks and the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) holdup
tanks. It was concluded, in the UFSAR Chapter 14 evaluation, that
loss of liquid from these tanks to the environment is not a credible
accident. This conclusion does not depend on operating mode , hence,
further evaluation of this event is not required.
Waste Gas Release
Radioactive gases are introduced into the reactor coolant by the
escape of fission products if defects exist in the fuel cladding.
The processing of the reactor coolant by auxiliary systems results
in the accumulation of radioactive gases in various tanks. The two
main sources of any significant gaseous radioactivity that could
occur would be the volume control tank (VCT) and the gas decay
tanks. It is assumed that a tank ruptures by an unspecified
mechanism after the reactor has been operating for one core cycle
with 1% defects in the fuel cladding. There is no identified
mechanism by which an interruption or loss of power could result in
a tank rupture. Therefore, it is concluded that the probability of
occurrence of a tank rupture would not be significantly increased by
an interruption or loss of A.C. power. The greatly reduced fission
product activities at the current time provides assurance that the
consequences of this event are bounded by the current analysis and
would, therefore, not be significantly increased.
Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA) Withdrawal From a
Subcritical Condition
This event can only occur with the reactor trip breakers closed
and the control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs) energized. With the
exception of testing or special maintenance, the rod drive motor
generator set remains tagged out until Mode 3 and this alone would
preclude rod movement. If the conditions for rod withdrawal are met,
two operable source range instruments and two reactor trip channels
and trip breakers must be operable. An interruption or loss of power
would preclude CRDM movement and release the control rods. The
source range instruments would remain available. Therefore, it is
concluded that the probability of occurrence of an uncontrolled RCCA
withdrawal would not be significantly increased by an interruption
or loss of A.C. power in Modes 5 or 6. Acceptable consequences for
this event rely on precluding its occurrence.
Uncontrolled Boron Dilution
This event requires a malfunction of the CVCS. The CVCS is
designed to limit, even under various postulated failure modes, the
potential rate of dilution to a value which provides the operator
sufficient time to correct the situation in a safe and orderly
manner. The rate of addition of unborated water makeup to the
reactor coolant system is limited by the capacity of the primary
water pumps. The maximum addition rate in this case is 225 gpm with
both primary water pumps running. An interruption or loss of A.C.
power would preclude pump operation and accidental dilution. The
RWST is not a credible dilution source as recognized by a footnote
to T/S 3/4.8.1.2. Therefore, the possibility of an uncontrolled
boron dilution is not significantly increased. Acceptable
consequences for this event rely on precluding its occurrence and by
detection with the source range nuclear instrumentation required by
the T/S in Modes 5 and 6.
The proposed revision involves deferral of certain surveillance
requirements when shut down but does not reduce the required
operable power sources of the Limiting Condition for Operation
(LCO), does not increase the allowed outage time of any required
operable power supplies and does not reduce the requirement to know
that the deferred SRs [surveillance requirements] could be met at
all times. Deferral of the testing does not by itself increase the
potential that the testing would not be met and the previously
evaluated accidents described above do not rely on automatic
starting or loading of the single operable EDG [emergency diesel
generator] permitted in Modes 5 and 6. The monthly EDG starts, fuel
level checks, and fuel transfer pump checks will continue to be
performed to provide adequate confidence that the required EDG will
be available if needed. Therefore, it is concluded that the required
A.C. sources will remain available and the previously evaluated
consequences will not be increased.
The proposed administrative change for unit 2 deletes a
reference to T/S 4.0.8 that is no longer applicable and, thus, does
not increase the probability or consequences of an accident. The
editorial change to unit 1 corrects a typographical error. The
correction is not intended to change the meaning.
Therefore, based on the above discussion, it is concluded that
the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the Change Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of
Accident From Any Accident Previously Evaluated?
The proposed changes do not involve operation of the required
electrical power sources in a manner or configuration different than
those previously recognized or evaluated. No new failure mechanisms
of the A.C. power supplies are introduced by extension of the
subject surveillance intervals.
The proposed administrative change for unit 2 deletes a
reference to T/S 4.0.8 that is no longer applicable and, thus, does
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.
The editorial change to unit 1 corrects a typographical error. The
correction is not intended to change the meaning. Therefore, it is
concluded that the proposed changes do not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
3. Does the Change Involve a Significant Reduction in a Margin of
Safety?
The required operable power supplies have not been reduced.
Deferral of the specified SRs does not by itself introduce a failure
mechanism, and past performance of the SRs has demonstrated
reliability in passing the deferred surveillances. Therefore, the
availability of power supplies assumed for accident mitigation is
not significantly reduced and previous margins of safety are
maintained.
The proposed administrative change for unit 2 deletes a
reference to T/S 4.0.8 that is no longer applicable and thus, does
not increase the probability or consequences of an accident. The
editorial change to unit 1 corrects a typographical error. The
correction is not intended to change the meaning. Therefore, these
changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of
safety.
In summary, based upon the above evaluation, I&M has concluded
that these changes involve no significant hazards consideration.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92 are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final
determination will consider all public and State comments received.
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this
action will occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of
written comments received
[[Page 23131]]
may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building,
2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to
intervene is discussed below.
By May 26, 1999, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with
respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating
license and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW, Washington, DC, and at the local public
document room located at the Maud Preston Palenske Memorial Library,
500 Market Street, St. Joseph, MI 49085. If a request for a hearing or
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of
hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy
the specificity requirements described above.
Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be
permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place
before the issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Jeremy J. Euto, Esquire, 500 Circle
Drive, Buchanan, MI 49107, attorney for the licensee.
Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(I)-(v) and 2.714(d).
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment dated December 3, 1998, which is available
for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the
Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local
public document room located at the Maud Preston Palenske Memorial
Library, 500 Market Street, St. Joseph, MI 49085.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 22nd day of April 1999.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John F. Stang, Sr.,
Project Manager, Section 1, Project Directorate III, Division of
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-10687 Filed 4-28-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
