[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 146 (Monday, August 1, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-18638]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: August 1, 1994]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 73
RIN 3150-AE81
Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power
Plants
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Action: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its
physical protection regulations for operating nuclear power reactors.
The amendments modify the design basis threat for radiological sabotage
to include use of a land vehicle by adversaries for transporting
personnel and their hand-carried equipment to the proximity of vital
areas and to include a land vehicle bomb. The amendments also require
reactor licensees to install vehicle control measures, including
vehicle barrier systems, to protect against the malevolent use of a
land vehicle. The Commission believes this action is prudent based on
an evaluation of an intrusion incident at the Three Mile Island (TMI)
nuclear power station and a bombing of the World Trade Center. The
objective of this final rule is to enhance reactor safety by protecting
against the use of a vehicle to gain unauthorized proximity to vital
areas. Further, the amendments will enhance reactor safety by
protecting vital equipment from damage by detonation of a large
explosive charge at the point of vehicle denial.
EFFECTIVE DATE: August 31, 1994.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Phillip F. McKee, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC,
telephone (301) 504-2933.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On November 4, 1993 (58 FR 58804), the Commission published a
proposed rule in the Federal Register for public comment that presented
amendments to the physical protection requirements for operating
commercial nuclear power reactors. The amendments proposed to modify
the design basis threat for radiological sabotage to include use of a
land vehicle by adversaries for transporting personnel, hand-carried
equipment, and/or explosives. A total of 35 letters of public comment
were received from respondents representing more than 160 individual
comments. Comments received in association with a public meeting
conducted by the NRC on May 10, 1993, on this same topic have also been
analyzed as part of this final rulemaking. An additional 11 comments
were received as a result of the meeting, representing an additional 38
individual comments. Written comments received from the Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) and public comments made at a
February 10, 1994, meeting of the ACRS are also addressed under the
following analysis. Copies of the public comments received on this
proposed rule are available for inspection and copying for a fee at the
NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW (Lower Level), Washington,
DC.
Public Comment Analysis
General
Public comment on the rule was received from 25 licensees that
operate commercial nuclear power reactors; two industry groups, the
Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) and the Nuclear
Utility Backfitting and Reform Group (NUBARG); two public citizens and
one citizen's group, Ohio Citizen's for Responsible Energy; two
advocacy groups, the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) and the Committee
to Bridge the Gap; one State nuclear safety agency; and two vendors.
Additional comments were received as a result of an NRC-sponsored
public meeting of May 10, 1993. Comments were received from eight
private citizens (the letter from one enclosed a petition signed by 40
individuals); two utilities; and one public interest group, Ohio
Citizens for Responsible Energy. The proposed rule indicated that
comments regarding malevolent use of vehicles submitted in association
with the meeting would be treated under this final rule and that
duplicate comments need not be submitted. Many of these respondents
recommended strengthening the design basis threat to cover the maximum
credible threat and increasing the number of security force members at
power reactor sites as the best method to counter a terrorist vehicle
bomb attack. The aforementioned petition, submitted to the Chairman of
the NRC, indicated, among other things, that Congress should strengthen
safeguards at nuclear facilities and should legislate the use of
Federal guards at NRC-licensed sites. Comments received from 2
utilities that operate commercial nuclear power reactors either
indicated support for the then-developing NUMARC comments or were
similar to comments received on the proposed rule.
A variety of general comments were received on the proposed rule
and supporting documentation. Several strongly supported the rulemaking
as proposed and expressed the view that rulemaking on this topic was
the proper, proactive approach. A number of comments strongly supported
a belief that vehicle intrusion and vehicle bomb threats exist. These
comments refer to the Three Mile Island intrusion event and the World
Trade Center bombing event as evidence of these threats. The NCI
commented that the rule was long overdue. Some of those that supported
the rule offered more detailed comments proposing further expansion of
the design basis threat and placing more rigid controls on licensee
actions to implement the rule.
NUMARC provided detailed comments on behalf of the industry.
Fourteen utilities confirmed their support or agreement with NUMARC's
comments. NUMARC commented that industry believes that it is important
to deter unauthorized land vehicle penetration challenges to a
licensee's protected area and that industry recognizes that facilities
must be able to shut down safely in the unlikely event of the
detonation of an explosive device outside the protected area. NUMARC
considers these actions to be prudent for the protection of its
employees, investment, and public confidence. NUMARC commented that
because the NRC (as expressed in the proposed rule) and NUMARC agree in
principle, the issue should be addressed in an integrated manner using
a reasonable and realistic approach without imposing unnecessary
conservatism. The details of NUMARC's comments identified areas where
they considered the proposed rule took too conservative an approach.
NUMARC also expressed general concerns about the backfit justification
for the rule and the schedule for implementation.
NUBARG, whose members include 15 nuclear utilities, provided
comments that generally challenge the backfitting and regulatory
analyses based on their concerns that the analyses did not provide a
sufficient quantified basis for finding the requisite ``substantial
increase'' in safety under the NRC's backfitting rule. Two of the
comment letters provided by utilities confirmed their support or
agreement with NUBARG's comments.
Several comments expressed the view that the proposed rule could
not be substantiated based on the current threat. As support for this
position, comments referred to conclusions reached by the NRC in denial
of a 1991 petition for rulemaking to require licensees to protect
against truck bombs. Other comments indicated that two isolated events
(the Three Mile Island intrusion event and World Trade Center bombing)
did not justify rulemaking, particularly in light of the fact that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), by their account, does not
support the position that the threat of malevolent use of vehicles has
increased and the NRC position is that no actual vehicle bomb threat
against power reactors exists.
Several comments opposed the proposed rule because they considered
that it did not provide a substantial increase in protection of public
health and safety or common defense and security at a justifiable cost.
Other comments indicated that the rule was extreme and unnecessarily
burdensome with little if any safety benefit and that contingency plans
for vehicle bombs currently in place adequately addressed the threat of
malevolent use of vehicles.
The NRC staff presented the proposed rulemaking package to the
Security Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
(ACRS) on November 3, 1993, and the full committee on November 4, 1993.
The full committee was briefed on December 10, 1993, in a closed
session, by the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards. Following these briefings, ACRS's December 10, 1993 letter
to the Chairman raised concerns about the rulemaking, particularly the
justification for the rule, the lack of a quantitative risk assessment
to support it, and the expedited nature of the rulemaking. A minority
of four members of the ACRS expressed a view that the proposed rule
represents a prudent and effective step toward enhancing public health
and safety. On February 10, 1994, the ACRS heard presentations on the
rulemaking from the NUMARC, the NCI, one public citizen, and the NRC
staff members. On April 7, 1994, the staff briefed the ACRS in a closed
session regarding additional, quantitative evaluations that supported
this rulemaking. Issues raised by the ACRS in their December 10, 1993,
letter are encompassed by issues raised by the public and are addressed
in the following responses.
Like the ACRS, NUMARC, NUBARG, and numerous utilities expressed
concern that the safety benefit was not adequately justified or
quantified. They challenged the validity of the regulatory and backfit
analyses because of lack of quantification of the threat. They
contended that the analyses contain no quantified risk data or safety
goal evaluation to support the conclusion that the proposed regulations
result in a substantial increase in public health and safety. Another
comment, while acknowledging the potential difficulty in quantification
of the threat, stated that the analyses were no more than
``conclusionary'' and fall short of demonstrating the requisite
substantial increase in radiological safety.
The Commission notes that the use of probabilistic risk assessment
(PRA) as a tool for estimating risk is sound when based on results from
demonstrable, repeatable events and test data--for example,
establishing the probability of failure and the mean time to failure
for aircraft wing root structures due to metal fatigue or for valve
failures due to water hammer or corrosion, etc. The NRC has examined
the use of PRA to predict sabotage as an initiating event and concluded
that to do so would not be credible or valid because terrorist attacks,
by their very nature, may not be quantified. Past attempts to apply PRA
techniques to acts of sabotage have resulted in similar findings. For
example, in 1978, NUREG/CR-0400, the ``Risk Assessment Review Group
Report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission'' stated, ``it was
recognized that the probability of sabotage of a nuclear power plant
cannot be estimated with any confidence.'' For this same reason,
according to this report, consideration of risk of sabotage was
deliberately omitted in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).
In the ``Policy Statement on Safety Goals for the Operation of
Nuclear Power Plants'' published on March 14, 1983 (48 FR 10772), the
Commission stated:
The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear
materials is not presently included in the safety goal. At present
there is no basis on which to provide a measure of the risk of these
matters. It is the Commission's intention that everything that is
needed shall be done to keep such risks at their present, very low,
level; and it is our expectation that efforts on this point will
continue to be successful. With these exceptions it is our intent
that the risk from all various initiating mechanisms be taken into
account to the best of the capability of the current evaluation
techniques.
In the 1983 Indian Point licensing hearings, the NRC staff
testified that PRA is unable to predict the probability of sabotage as
an initiating event. Also, in a June 11, 1991, petition to institute an
individual plant examination program for threats beyond the design
basis, the NCI stated a position similar to the NRC's by recognizing
that PRA-type methods cannot be used to analyze for core damage
frequency since one cannot quantify the likelihood of a terrorist
attack.
The Commission continues to believe that arbitrary selection of
numbers to ``quantify'' threat probability without demonstrable,
actual, supporting event data would yield misleading results at best.
Knowledgeable terrorism analysts recognize the danger and are unwilling
to quantify the risk. Over the past several years, a number of National
Intelligence Estimates have been produced addressing the likelihood of
nuclear terrorism. The analyses and conclusions are not presented in
terms of quantified probability but recognize the unpredictable nature
of terrorist activity in terms of likelihood. The NRC continues to
believe that, although in many cases considerations of probabilities
can provide insights into the relative risk of an event, in some cases
it is not possible, with current knowledge and methods, to usefully
quantify the probability of a specific vulnerability threat.
The NRC notes that, although not quantified, its regulatory
analysis recognizes the importance of the perception of the likelihood
of an attempt to create radiological sabotage in assessing whether to
redefine adequate protection. The NRC's assessment that there is no
indication of an actual vehicle threat against the domestic commercial
nuclear industry was an important consideration in concluding that
neither the Three Mile Island intrusion nor the World Trade Center
bombing demonstrated a need to redefine adequate protection.
The NRC does not agree that quantifying the probability of an
actual attack is necessary to a judgment of a substantial increase in
overall protection of the public health and safety (a less stringent
test of the justification for a rule change). Inherent in the NRC's
current regulations is a policy decision that the threat, although not
quantified, is likely in a range that warrants protection against a
violent external assault as a matter of prudence.
The potential threat posed by malevolent use of vehicles as part of
a violent external assault and the need to protect against it have been
the subject of detailed consideration and reconsideration by the
Commission for more than fifteen years. The original requirements for
physical security at power reactor sites proposed in the mid-1970s
included a requirement for barriers to prevent ready access to vital
areas by ground vehicles. The Commission decided not to include the
requirement at that time.
The Commission reexamined the vehicle issue in great detail in the
1980s. In 1986, the Commission concluded that, even though perimeter
chain link fences would not prevent vehicle intrusion, the requirement
for prompt response by guards armed with shoulder-fired weapons would
limit actions of intruders. In reconsidering the risk from use of a
vehicle to gain proximity to vital areas, the NRC's regulatory analysis
does not suggest that the likelihood of a violent external assault has
increased. Rather, the staff focussed its regulatory analysis on
whether a vehicle could provide an advantage to an adversary with the
characteristics of the design basis threat.
The NRC assessed lessons learned from the TMI intrusion and
concluded that a vehicle could provide advantages to an adversary not
previously considered. In SECY-86-101, ``Design Basis Threat--Options
for Consideration,'' March 31, 1986, the NRC concluded that, even
though perimeter chain link fences would not prevent vehicle intrusion,
the requirement for prompt response by guards armed with shoulder-fired
weapons would limit actions of intruders. Accordingly, in 1986, the NRC
concluded that the installation of vehicle barriers might not
constitute a substantial overall increase in the protection of public
health and safety. More recently, the NRC has analyzed the capability
of existing licensee security measures to protect against a violent
external assault that includes a vehicle as a mode of transportation.
These new analyses support the NRC's conclusions in the regulatory
analysis for the proposed rulemaking. The NRC believes that the vehicle
intrusion issue alone warrants the installation of vehicle barriers at
nuclear power plants.
In the 1980s, the NRC also consulted with other Federal agencies,
including the National Security Council, regarding the use of vehicle
bombs in the Middle East and their possible impact on the domestic
threat situation. In June 1988, the NRC decided that it would not be
necessary to change the design basis threat for radiological sabotage
(10 CFR 73.1(a)(1)) nor to require long-range planning by power reactor
licensees for permanent protection against land vehicle bombs. However,
as a matter of prudence, it directed development of NRC and licensee
contingency plans for dealing with a possible land vehicle bomb threat
to power reactors, should one arise.
On June 11, 1991 (56 FR 26782), the Commission denied a petition
for rulemaking to revise the design basis threat to include explosive-
laden vehicles (PRN-73-9). In denying that petition, the NRC noted that
the decision was based, in part, on the fact that only one truck bomb
attack (1970) had occurred in the United States; there had been no
other vehicle bomb attacks in the Western Hemisphere; there had been
none outside areas of civil unrest; and there had been none directed
against a nuclear activity. The vehicle bomb attack on the World Trade
Center represented a significant change to the domestic threat
environment that changed many of the points used in denying the
petition and eroded the basis for concluding that vehicle bombs could
be excluded from any consideration of the domestic threat environment.
For the first time in the United States, a conspiracy with ties to
Middle East extremists clearly demonstrated the capability and
motivation to organize, plan, and successfully conduct a major vehicle
bomb attack. Regardless of the motivations or connections of the
conspirators, it is significant that the bombing was organized within
the United States and implemented with materials obtained on the open
market in the United States. Accordingly, the Commission believes that
the threat characterized in the final rule is appropriate.
As a result of the World Trade Center bombing, the NRC believes
that the construction of a vehicle bomb is more likely to develop
without advance indications. The NRC does not believe that it can
quantify the likelihood of vehicle bomb attack. However, it has
performed a conditional probabilistic risk analysis for an existing
power reactor site, assuming an attempt to damage a nuclear power plant
with a design basis vehicle bomb placed at locations within the
protected area that would create the greatest risk to public health and
safety. The analysis indicated that the contribution to core damage
frequency could be high.
Barriers installed to protect against vehicle intrusion into
protected areas would also protect, to varying degrees, against vehicle
bombs. The NRC believes that adjusting the location of barriers where
necessary to ensure a capability of protecting vital equipment against
a design basis vehicle bomb would provide an additional, substantial
increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety.
Further, the NRC believes that the incremental costs to licensees to
analyze the degree of protection against a vehicle bomb and to make
adjustments in vehicle control measures in limited cases are justified,
particularly considering the provisions in the rule allowing licensees
to propose alternative measures if a site-specific analysis indicates
that the costs of fully meeting the rule's design goals and criteria
are not justified by the added protection that would be provided. The
NRC's additional deterministic evaluations and limited probabilistic
assessments have supported the NRC's earlier findings that protecting
against vehicle intrusion and a vehicle bomb would substantially
increase the overall protection of public health and safety. The NRC
has updated the regulatory analysis to include these evaluations.
Additional issues raised and the NRC response to these issues are
provided in the sections listed below that follow:
I. Threat Considerations
A. Coupling Vehicle Intrusion and Vehicle Bomb Threat
B. Characteristics of Design Basis Vehicle/Explosive
C. ``Margin of Prudence''
D. Design Basis Threat Re-Evaluation
E. Applicability of 10 CFR 50.13
F. ``Threat'' or ``Alert'' Program
II. Regulatory and Backfit Analyses
A. Redundant Engineered Safeguards Systems
B. Peer Review of Analyses
C. Clarification
III. Rule Implementation
A. Schedule
B. NRC Review and Approval of Submittals
C. Vehicle Barriers
D. Passive Vehicle Barriers
E. Active Vehicle Barriers
F. Alternative Measures to Protect Against Explosives
IV. NRC Inspection
V. Miscellaneous
A. Research Reactors
B. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations
C. Office of Management and Budget Supporting Statement
I. Threat Considerations
A. Coupling Vehicle Intrusion and Vehicle Bomb Threat
Comment. NUMARC and several utilities commented that the proposed
rule unnecessarily linked vehicle intrusion with a vehicle bomb. NUMARC
commented that the proposed rule contemplates that the intruding
vehicle would be fully loaded with personnel, equipment, and a large
explosive device. NUMARC also commented that any considerations of a
vehicle bomb should be for a stationary vehicle. NUMARC stated that
coupling the vehicle intrusion event and vehicle bomb event added
unnecessary conservatism. For example, to protect against a moving
vehicle, bomb barriers would, in some cases, need to be more
substantial to stop penetration of vehicle. NUMARC proposed that the
revised design basis threat should include either a land vehicle
intrusion or a detonation of explosives outside the protected area, but
not a combination of the two. Along this same line, one comment
expressed the opinion that the proposed language implies the need to
protect against a vehicle used for transport, not for breaching a
barrier or for use as a truck bomb.
Another comment expressed a concern that a major defect in the rule
is the lack of the assumption that the adversary could blast away a
fence if a licensee were to choose to use, for example, cabling in the
fence as the means to stop a vehicle. The respondent proposed that any
barrier should be a heavy mass which would be resistant to destruction.
Response. The Commission agrees with the NUMARC comment that the
proposed rule could be read to imply that licensees would be required
to provide protection against an intrusion by adversaries using a
vehicle for transportation coincident with a vehicle bomb. This was not
the intent and the rule wording has been revised to clarify this point.
Commission deliberations on the rule have considered use of the vehicle
as transportation for an adversary and a vehicle bomb as separate
threats to be protected against. Any coupling of adversary tactics
associated with the rule was intended to allow for more efficient and
cost effective protection against either a vehicle intrusion to gain
rapid access to vital areas, as a single act, or against a vehicle
bomb.
Meeting the requirements of the final rule will result in
substantial protection from a vehicle bomb whether it is moving or
stationary. The NRC's regulatory analysis indicated that, because of
the short distances between vital areas and portions of some protected
area boundaries, protection against a vehicle at those boundaries would
be inconsistent with NUMARC's stated goal of being able to safely shut
down a plant following the detonation of an explosive device outside
the protected area.
Regarding the comment that the rule should include the assumption
that adversaries may use devices to destroy less substantial barriers
and then gain access, the Commission does not agree that this
assumption should be included in the rule. The NRC assessment of the
threat environment does not support this assumption. Further, use of
such a technique by an adversary would tend to diminish one of the
major advantages of use of a vehicle--the element of surprise.
B. Characteristics of Design Basis Vehicle/Explosive
Comment. NUMARC provided a detailed proposal for characteristics of
a design basis vehicle that could be used to attempt penetration of a
nuclear power plant protected area and a design basis bomb that could
be used in an attempt to damage plant equipment. Other comments
indicated that vehicle speed should take into consideration terrain and
seasonal conditions and that the proposed vehicle explosive device size
was excessive and not justified by historical experience, particularly
that in the United States.
Response. The Commission notes that it has relied on analogous
historical data when enumerating the attributes of a design basis
threat because there has never been a terrorist attack on an NRC-
licensed power reactor facility or a credible threat of an attack. This
was the methodology used in formulating the original design basis
threat statements in the late 1970s, and it was used in defining the
proposed design basis vehicle threat. The design basis vehicle was
defined after examining several hundred actual vehicle bombing attacks
occurring worldwide during approximately the past decade. Historical
data indicates that vehicle bombs, similar to the design basis vehicle,
have been used in the past and their use can reasonably be expected to
continue to occur in the future. The Commission has made some changes
in the detailed characteristics of the design basis vehicle. The
revised characteristics will require licensees to provide substantial
protection against a moving vehicle bomb. In addition, the NRC's
implementation guidance discusses how the design of barrier systems can
account for site-specific limits on the speed that a vehicle could
attain because of factors such as terrain.
Comment. One comment expressed confusion over reference to the
design basis vehicle as a ``4-wheel drive vehicle'' in that this could
imply that non 4-wheel drive vehicles would not have to be protected
against. The comment recommended that the final rule language be
changed to require protection against all land vehicles.
Response. The Commission disagrees that the term ``4-wheel drive
vehicle'' needs clarification. It reasons that protection against
intrusion by a 4-wheel drive vehicle encompasses protection against a
land vehicle with less than 4-wheel drive.
Comment. Other comments noted that the regulatory language should
be changed to remove reference to equipment and explosives capable of
being hand-carried, as opposed to that which the vehicle could carry.
Response. As stated previously, this issue is being clarified by a
revision of the design basis threat statement to separate the threat of
intrusion versus vehicle bomb. In an intrusion event, the vehicle is
obviously capable of transporting the equipment and explosives proposed
to be hand-carried by an adversary. While the vehicle could carry more
equipment than can be carried by the persons being transported, it is
unlikely that this additional equipment would be of use to the
adversaries. The vehicle is essentially a means of transport for the
adversaries, and it is unlikely that once adversaries have left the
vehicle they would be able to return to obtain additional equipment or
explosives.
Comment. One utility provided specific questions regarding several
assumptions associated with the vehicle bomb. These included whether:
The vehicle is under control by adversaries up to the point of
detonation;
The vehicle bomb automatically detonates when the adversary loses
control of the vehicle or after a pre-defined time period;
The vehicle is used in combination with a secondary external event,
e.g., loss of offsite power; and,
Point of detonation, i.e., crash point or at a later point as
vehicle rolls towards a facility.
Response. With respect to a vehicle bomb, for analysis purposes the
device would be considered to detonate at the point where the vehicle
impacted the vehicle barrier system. Whether adversaries still have
control of the vehicle or whether the detonation of the device is
delayed should have little impact on the analysis of the effect of the
explosive blast. Because the barrier system is intended to protect
against vehicles gaining proximity to vital areas, the barrier system
should not allow a vehicle to fully penetrate it and continue to roll
towards a facility.
With respect to a secondary external event, power reactor licensees
must protect against all capabilities and attributes described by the
design basis threat for radiological sabotage. This would not include
protection against other natural events, such as damage from a
hurricane, coincident with a sabotage threat. However, with respect to
loss of off-site power, licensees should consider its loss, if vital
equipment is assumed damaged, in their analysis of the effects of a
vehicle bomb. This consideration is compatible with the basic premise
that equipment not designated and protected as vital is vulnerable to
damage and is not available.
C. ``Margin of Prudence''
Comment. NUMARC and several utilities commented on NRC's use of the
term ``margin of prudence'' as the basis for support of the proposed
rulemaking. NUMARC commented that it is inappropriate to use such an
undefined concept as a basis for rulemaking. These comments indicated
that NRC expansion into matters of prudence is unwarranted and would
result in expansion of the NRC's sphere of regulatory influence beyond
plant safety.
Response. Use of the term ``margin of prudence'' must be put in
perspective as used by the NRC in this rulemaking. The NRC requires an
established level of security at nuclear power reactor sites as a
provision against possible security contingencies that might arise. The
NRC has concluded that a satisfactory level of security is one that is
designed and implemented to protect against a hypothetical threat
(design basis threat) that contains certain adversary attributes. These
attributes have been selected based on Commission analyses of actual
terrorist attributes and on judgment. The term ``margin of prudence''
was used in recent Commission deliberations to suggest that the World
Trade Center bombing and the Three Mile Island intrusion had caused a
change in the domestic threat environment or in the NRC's understanding
of the sabotage threat that was not satisfactorily addressed by the
existing design basis threat. Further, the term was used to suggest
that a modification of the design basis threat was necessary to
reestablish a level of security commensurate with the nature of
security contingencies that might arise. Its use was illustrative only
of the relationship between an actual threat and the hypothetical
design basis threat and the change in that relationship caused by the
World Trade Center and Three Mile Island events. The NRC intended no
wider or expanded use of the term.
D. Design Basis Threat Re-Evaluation
Comment. NUMARC and several utilities commented that the revision
to the design basis threat to address malevolent use of vehicles should
be addressed in an integrated manner so that rulemaking on this topic
would not be impacted after completion of an ongoing, more
comprehensive review of the design basis threat. Other comments
expressed concerns about deficiencies in the design basis threat that
need to be addressed. Deficiencies identified by these comments
included: protection against more than one insider, protection against
a larger number of external attackers, capability of attackers to
operate as more than one team, and use of aquatic vehicles. One comment
was made that ongoing considerations for reductions in the insider
requirements should be part of the overall reconsideration of the
design basis threat.
Response. The Commission notes that use of a vehicle by adversaries
was addressed under Phase I of a re-evaluation of the design basis
threat which the NRC began in the Spring of 1993. This phase of the re-
evaluation has been completed. Other attributes associated with the
design basis threat, such as those characterized in comments on the
proposed rule, have been reviewed and considered as part of Phase II of
the re-evaluation. NRC staff recommendations on this part of the re-
evaluation were provided to the Commission in a classified paper on
March 15, 1994.
E. Applicability of 10 CFR 50.13
Comment. NUMARC, NUBARG, and several utilities stated that the
proposed change in the design basis threat to include malevolent use of
a vehicle amounts to escalation of the threat to efforts by an enemy of
the United States. The comments contended that the proposed changes to
the design basis threat are, therefore, in conflict with 10 CFR 50.13,
which specifies that licensees are not required to provide for design
features to protect against attacks and destructive acts by an enemy of
the United States. One comment recommended that NRC should re-evaluate
the design basis threat assumption to now include foreign enemies of
the United States.
Response. In 10 CFR 50.13, which was promulgated on September 26,
1967 (32 FR 13445), the regulations provide that applicants for
construction permits, operating licenses, or amendments thereto, need
not provide for design features or other measures to protect against
the attacks or destructive acts, including sabotage, by an enemy of the
United States. The issue raised in a contested application for a power
reactor construction permit, which led to the promulgation of 10 CFR
50.13, was whether the reactor should be constructed to withstand a
missile attack from Cuba. There is a significant difference in the
practicality of defending against a missile attack and constructing a
vehicle barrier at a safe standoff distance from vital areas.
The statement of considerations for 10 CFR 50.13 makes it clear
that the scope of that regulation is to relieve applicants of the need
to provide protective measures that are the assigned responsibility of
the nation's defense establishment. The Atomic Energy Commission
recognized that it was not practical for the licensees of civilian
nuclear power reactors to provide design features that could protect
against the full range of the modern arsenal of weapons. The statement
concluded with the observation that assessing whether another nation
would use force against a nuclear power plant was speculative in the
extreme and, in any case, would involve the use of sensitive
information regarding both the capabilities of the United States'
defense establishment and diplomatic relations.
The new rule, with its addition to the design basis threat and
added performance requirements, is in response to a clearly
demonstrated domestic capability for acts of extreme violence directed
at civilian structures. The participation or sponsorship of a foreign
state in the use of an explosives-laden vehicle is not necessary. The
vehicle, explosives, and know-how are all readily available in a purely
domestic context. It is simply not the case that a vehicle bomb attack
on a nuclear power plant would almost certainly represent an attack by
an enemy of the United States, within the meaning of that phrase in 10
CFR 50.13.
Further, characterizing the threat as ``para-military'' adds little
to the understanding of the intent of 10 CFR 50.13. ``Para-military''
suggests an armed, trained group acting outside of a legally
constituted military organization. In that sense, the design basis
threat prior to this amendment already described a ``para-military''
group. ``Para-military'' groups of entirely domestic origin exist.
Accordingly, the amended regulation and supporting analyses need not
address 10 CFR 50.13, either on the grounds that a vehicle bomb attack
is an attack by an enemy of the United States or the action of a
``paramilitary'' group. That regulation is irrelevant to the present
rulemaking.
The implication of the comments regarding 10 CFR 50.13 is that the
simple addition of a vehicle bomb to the design basis threat should
shift the function of providing physical security for nuclear power
plants from the licensee to the Federal Government. The respondents
present no real evidence or persuasive arguments for such a radical
change in the regulatory environment.
F. ``Threat'' or ``Alert'' Program
Comment. One comment suggested that the NRC develop and implement a
``threat or alert'' program similar to the Department of Defense's
Defense Condition ``DEFCON'' program. It was recommended that, under
such a program, the NRC would immediately notify the industry when
information is received from the intelligence community of an impending
security alert and provide a recommended level of action. Licensees, in
turn, would be required to develop security response plans based on
NRC-established threat levels.
Response. The Commission believes that its current Information
Assessment Team approach for notifying licensees of significant events
has been effective in disseminating and coordinating such information.
The Information Assessment Team (IAT) assesses in a timely manner
reported threats to NRC-licensed facilities, materials, and activities
to determine credibility and make recommendations to NRC management.
The IAT is composed of experienced Headquarter's and Regional staff who
are on-call 24 hours a day and bring a variety of expertise to the
assessment process, such as reactor systems, site specific information,
and liaison with other Federal agencies, including close coordination
with the Department of Energy on threat advisories to the utility
industry and NRC licensees. The IAT was established in 1976, and since
that time has supported NRC decision makers responding to a range of
threats, from bomb threats against reactors to times of international
tension during Operation Desert Shield and Storm. For example,
coordinated threat advisories related to the latter were issued by the
IAT on August 24, 1990, January 9, 1991, and April 2, 1991. However,
the NRC does not believe that the IAT is an adequate alternative to
vehicles barriers at nuclear power plants.
II. Regulatory and Backfit Analysis
A. Redundant Engineered Safeguards Systems
Comment. One comment indicated that the proposed rule did not
adequately take into consideration the existing engineered safeguards
systems installed at nuclear power plants. The comment was made that
unauthorized access and possible damage to any one vital area does not
necessarily prevent the safe shut down of the nuclear reactor.
Response. The Commission agrees that consideration should be given
to engineered safeguards systems and believes that flexibility has been
built into the rule to allow for consideration of such existing
systems. The redundancy and diversity of existing engineered safeguards
systems was considered in the NRC analysis of the capability of
existing licensee security measures to protect against a violent
external assault that includes a vehicle as a mode of transportation.
Specific plant equipment layout can be a factor in protective
considerations against a vehicle bomb. Equipment that is redundant or
provides backup to equipment assumed to be damaged by a vehicle bomb
may be considered in the analysis for determining whether protective
measures established to protect against vehicle intrusion fully meet
the design goals and criteria for protection against a land vehicle
bomb.
B. Peer Review of Analysis
Comment. One comment recommended that any research results, risk
analyses, cost calculations and other work by the NRC should be subject
to peer review.
Response. The NRC believes that its work is subject to various
types of review and, in a sense, is subject to peer review. Portions of
the risk analyses were conducted by groups with appropriate expertise,
including threat assessment, physical security system performance
evaluation, critical target set analysis, safety system inspections,
probabilistic risk analysis, vehicle barrier design, and vehicle bomb
analysis. In addition, the types of efforts mentioned by the comment
are often the subject of multiple office review within the NRC. Several
technical review groups, both within and external to the NRC, provide
further consideration of NRC staff work. Finally, with respect to
rulemaking, analyses are the subject of public comment.
C. Clarification
Comment. One comment noted that the wording associated with the
backfit analysis in the proposed Federal Register notice did not
precisely coincide with that found under 10 CFR 50.109 (a)(3).
Response. The Commission notes that the wording in the notice is
wording that is used for most NRC rules that are subject to
backfitting. The Commission considers that this wording is consistent
with the requirement cited.
III. Rule Implementation
A. Schedule
Comment. A large number of comments were received on the schedules
associated with the proposed rule. Some indicated that the proposed
schedule to submit a summary description of the barrier system and
results of vehicle bomb comparison within 90 days was not long enough.
One comment was received supporting the proposed schedule. Those
commenting that the schedule was too tight expressed concern that 90
days did not provide sufficient time to perform a thorough design
analysis, particularly if alternative measures were to be proposed.
NUMARC, and several other respondents, recommended that licensees be
provided 180 days after issuance of the rule to provide a summary
description of the barrier system.
A number of comments were also received stating that the proposed
schedule to confirm implementation within 360 days after issuance of
the rule was not long enough. Those commenting that the schedule for
completion of installation was too tight expressed concern that the
schedule did not adequately account for material procurement and
availability, outage schedules, and weather circumstances. NUMARC and
several other respondents recommended that licensees be provided 18
months after issuance of the rule to complete installation of measures
to meet the rule. A few comments were received that recommended that
implementation schedules be established on a case-by-case basis.
Response. The Commission agrees that an extension to the schedule
is reasonable based on the fact that this is a new program for power
reactor sites, that there may be some difficulty in procurement of
active vehicle barrier systems, and that possible deleterious effects
on scheduling may result from the weather or planned outages.
Accordingly, the time period for submission of the summary required by
10 CFR 73.55(c)(9)(i) is extended from 90 to 180 days from the
effective date of the rule. The implementation period required under 10
CFR 73.55 (c)(9)(ii) is extended from 360 days to 18 months from the
rule's effective date.
B. NRC Review and Approval of Submittals
Comment. Three comments recommended that the NRC should review and
approve all licensee submittals, including the summary description of
the proposed measures to protect against vehicle intrusion, the results
of the vehicle bomb comparison, and, for applicable licensees,
alternative measures to protect against an explosive device.
Response. The NRC believes that approval of all summaries submitted
under 10 CFR 73.55(c)(9)(i) would unnecessarily delay expeditious
implementation of this rule. All licensees are required to amend their
physical security plans to commit to the implementation and use of the
vehicle barrier system described by the regulations. These commitments
are fully inspectable and enforceable by the NRC. The NRC would review
and approve the limited number of requests expected to use alternative
measures that might not fully meet the design goals and criteria for
protection against a vehicle bomb. The final rule has been changed to
clarify that proposals for alternative measures be submitted in
accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90.
C. Vehicle Barriers
Comment. NUMARC and several other respondents expressed concern
that barrier systems would be required to be ``nuclear grade'' and that
this would unnecessarily escalate costs. Another comment expressed the
opinion that, instead of licensees certifying to the NRC that vehicle
barriers meet requirements, they be able to choose barriers from some
pre-approved list. NUMARC commented that design and certification
needed to utilize existing technology and barrier device test results,
or costs would unnecessarily escalate. NUMARC also requested that the
discussion in the Regulatory Guide be expanded to describe flexibility
available to licensees in designing and installing barriers.
Response. The NRC is unaware of any requirement for ``nuclear grade
equipment'' and notes that the expression does not appear in the
proposed rule or supporting guidance. The NRC agrees with the industry
comment that commercially available materials suffice for the
construction of the vehicle barrier if the barrier is capable of
countering the design basis vehicle threat. As suggested by many
respondents, the NRC recommends that affected licensees take advantage
of available information on vehicle barrier testing, much of which has
been conducted by Federal laboratories and agencies.
With respect to the use of ``pre-approved barriers,'' the
Commission believes that most vendors of commercial vehicle barrier
systems know what the ``stopping powers'' of their barriers are.
Licensees should use this as a resource in determining what barrier can
counter the attributes of the Commission's design basis vehicle most
cost effectively. In addition, the NRC has provided information on
performance levels of several types of barriers to affected licensees.
The Commission agrees with the NUMARC comment concerning expansion of
the discussion on the flexibility of designing and installing barriers
in the regulatory guide supporting the rule. The regulatory guide now
reflects this.
Comment. NUMARC expressed the view that compensatory measures, not
explicitly addressed in the proposed rule or regulatory guide, for
maintenance or repair of barriers should be determined by the licensee.
Another comment stated that compensatory measures required if a barrier
is temporarily inoperable, as with maintenance, need to be addressed at
an early stage.
Response. The NRC anticipates that vehicle barriers, particularly
passive barriers, will infrequently become non-functional once
installed. For those infrequent cases, any compensatory measures should
take into consideration the type and cause of the problem and the time
the barrier will be non-functional. For example, for short term
problems with active or passive barriers, compensatory measures would
not be expected to be extensive. In cases where barriers are non-
functional for longer periods, compensatory measures may include
placement of heavy vehicular equipment, concrete highway median
barriers arranged in a serpentine fashion, installation of strands of
airplane arresting wires, or the positioning of an officer armed with a
high power contingency weapon may be appropriate. The regulatory guide
issued in support of this rulemaking has been revised to include
guidance regarding compensatory measures.
D. Passive Vehicle Barriers
Comment. One comment was directed at the guidance that specified
measures should be established to periodically verify the integrity of
passive barriers outside the protected area. It was commented that
passive barriers by their nature (ditches, berms, concrete filled
embedded poles, etc.) do not require inspection, or if so, the period
for inspecting should be on the order of several years. If licensees
were to install a unique passive barrier that should need periodic
inspection, it should be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
Response. The Commission agrees that the components of many passive
barrier systems do not need to be inspected on a weekly or monthly
basis due to the nature of their construction. Observations by routine
security patrols should be sufficient to detect any degradation in the
barrier. Some types of barriers may be more susceptible to
deterioration, damage, or tampering and therefore should be subject to
more frequent observation by security patrols or, in some cases,
periodic inspection. Given the large variation in components of passive
barriers, the Commission considers it appropriate to provide licensees
with flexibility on how to assure the continued integrity of barrier
components. If the barrier system is damaged, the Commission expects
that such damage would be identified in a reasonable period and actions
would be taken promptly to repair the damage.
E. Active Vehicle Barriers
Comment. Two comments were received requesting that the wording in
the proposed regulatory guidance clarify that only one active barrier
is needed to deny access. Also, one utility commented that the
provision in the regulatory guide that specified vehicles and their
operators be authorized for entry before being permitted access inside
the vehicle barrier system would preclude their current practice of
searching the vehicle after entry inside the active barrier.
Response. The NRC agrees with these comments and the guidance in
the regulatory guide supporting the rule has been changed.
Comment. Another comment recommended that specific kinetic energy
be identified for use in design of active barriers with documented
performance satisfying specific energy requirements because this
approach would help avoid costly independent testing to demonstrate
performance.
Response. Guidance previously forwarded to licensees, designated as
Safeguards Information, defines the kinetic energy associated with the
design basis vehicle. As previously stated, the NRC has provided
information to affected licensees on performance levels of several
types of barriers to help avoid costly independent testing.
F. Alternative Measures to Protect Against Explosives
Comment. One comment objected to the rule's provisions that would
allow some licensees to provide only ``substantial protection'' and not
equivalent protection to fully meet the Commission's design goals and
criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb. One comment indicated
that the NRC should not be considering costs in determining the
acceptability of alternative measures because costs should not be
considered relative to enforcing adequate protection. NUMARC commented
that it was reasonable for licensees to have the option to propose
alternative measures for Commission review when the design goals and
criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb cannot be met without a
significant resource burden.
Response. The NRC's regulatory analysis concluded that neither the
Three Mile Island or World Trade Center events demonstrated a need to
redefine adequate protection. The NRC's basis for the backfit being
implemented by this rulemaking was a determination that it would result
in a substantial increase in protection of the public health and
safety. Paragraph 50.109(a)(3) of Title 10, Code of Federal
Regulations, authorizes such a backfit only if the costs of
implementation are justified in view of the increased protection. The
NRC concluded that the estimated costs for all licensees to provide
barriers to protect against vehicle intrusion were justified. However,
at some sites, the location of barriers to protect against vehicle
intrusion could provide substantial protection against a vehicle bomb
without fully meeting the NRC's design goals and criteria for
protection against an explosive device. For these licensees, the
incremental costs for placing barriers further from vital areas or for
providing additional protective measures to fully meet the design goal
and criteria may not be justified by the incremental protection beyond
the substantial level.
Comment. NUMARC objected to the provision that licensees proposing
alternative measures must compare their costs with the costs of
measures needed to fully meet the design goals and criteria for
protection against a vehicle bomb and must provide an assessment
supporting a finding that the additional costs are not justified by the
added protection that would be provided. NUMARC asserted that the NRC
was requiring licensees to perform analyses beyond what the NRC staff
has done in support of the proposed rule.
NUBARG similarly asserted that the NRC was requiring licensees to
prove that alternative measures substantially increase safety, which is
unfair. NUBARG asserts that this requires licensees to perform a
backfit analysis on why they should not install a proposed modification
(one that would fully meet the design goals and criteria) and that this
runs counter to the backfit principle of the NRC providing the
analysis.
Several respondents stated that they understood that the rule and
regulatory guidance specified that those licensees proposing
alternative measures would need to submit to the NRC a quantitative
analysis to justify that the cost of plant specific measures are not
justified by the added protection afforded. The comments indicated
that, based on this understanding, such a task would be difficult, if
not impossible.
A public interest group expressed the opinion that contingency
planning as part of alternative measures is unacceptable when compared
to a permanent vehicle control system.
Response. The optional licensee analysis provided for in the
revised regulations is intended to be similar in approach to that
performed by the NRC in the development of the regulatory analysis for
the rulemaking. The Commission recognizes the difficulties with respect
to quantification of the protection provided (see general discussion)
and would expect licensees to provide a more deterministic analysis in
comparing the relative protection provided by alternative measures
taken by the licensee that don't fully meet the Commission design goal
and criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb. The Commission did
not intend to require its licensees to do more of an analysis or a
different type of analysis than that performed by the NRC. The
quantitative aspects of the analysis required by the regulation only
apply to cost considerations, particularly the comparison of costs
needed to fully meet the Commission's design goals and criteria for
protection against a vehicle bomb with the cost of alternative
measures.
The comment that contingency planning would be an unacceptable
alternative to permanent vehicle barriers does not recognize the
provision in the rule that specifies that all licensees are required to
establish a vehicle barrier system to protect against use of a land
vehicle as a means of transportation to gain unauthorized proximity to
vital areas. Licensees may not substitute contingency plans for vehicle
barriers. Rather, contingency plans were identified as one possible
option for licensees (those few where it may be practical for them to
propose alternative measures to protect against explosives) to
supplement protection provided by the licensee's vehicle barrier system
for protection against a vehicle bomb.
IV. NRC Inspection
Comment. One comment indicated that the NRC should establish
procedures to assure licensee compliance with the rule.
Response. The NRC plans to inspect licensee implementation of the
rule as part of the ongoing reactor inspection program. Most likely the
inspection will be accomplished using a temporary inspection procedure,
which is planned to be prepared after publication of the rule but
before the required implementation date.
As previously stated, all affected licensees are required to amend
their physical security plans in response to this rule. All commitments
in physical security plans are fully inspectable and enforceable by the
NRC.
V. Miscellaneous
A. Research Reactors
Comment. One comment recommended that, in light of the upcoming
1996 Olympics, all reactor fuel, heavy water, and kilocuries of Co and
Cs be removed immediately from the Georgia Tech campus.
Response. While research reactors do not fall within the scope of
this rulemaking, the Commission notes that its threat assessment
activities are performed on a continuing basis, in close liaison with
the intelligence community. Should the level of domestic threat change
at any time, appropriate action will be taken by the NRC. Specifically,
the Atlanta Field Office of the FBI has established liaison with all
Federal agencies in Georgia, including the NRC, relative to the
Olympics. The FBI is the lead law enforcement agency in charge of the
Olympics and, to date, has not indicated that there is any threat to
NRC-licensed facilities or materials relative to the Olympics.
B. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations
Comment. NUMARC commented that independent spent fuel storage
installations (ISFSIs) should be clearly exempted from the rule.
Response. The NRC did not intend for ISFSIs to be subject to this
regulation because of the lower consequences associated with storage of
irradiated fuel removed from a power reactor core, particularly since
spent fuel stored at ISFSIs must be aged for at least one year. The NRC
is currently preparing a proposed rule to clarify physical protection
requirements for ISFSIs. The lessons learned from the TMI intrusion
will be considered in that rulemaking. In addition, the NRC is
attempting to quantify the consequences of a vehicle bomb detonated in
the vicinity of an ISFSI. The results of this study will assist in
making a determination as to whether vehicle bomb protection is needed
at ISFSIs. In the interim, the staff believes that the inherent nature
of the fuel, along with the degree of protection provided by the
approved storage means for spent fuel, provides adequate protection
against a vehicle bomb.
C. Office of Management and Budget Supporting Statement
Comment. One comment identified that the NRC-estimated financial
burden to licensees did not include capital costs for modifications.
Response. The NRC notes that the financial burden cited by the
comment was derived from the Office of Management and Budget Supporting
Statement, required under the Paperwork Reduction Act. This statement
deals solely with the licensee recordkeeping and reporting burden
resulting from the new rule, i.e., the paperwork burden. Actual
construction costs are considered in the regulatory analysis that
supports the rule.
Summary of Changes Made to Rule
The following changes have been made as a result of public comment
analysis:
1. The design basis threat statement for radiological sabotage has
been clarified to separate the threat of a land vehicle used for
intrusion with that of a land vehicle used as a vehicle bomb.
2. ISFSIs have been specifically exempted from the rule.
3. Clarification of what is meant by ``the Commission's design
goals and criteria'' has been added to the regulatory text.
4. The appropriate means for submitting alternative measures has
been clarified under 10 CFR 73.55(c)(9)(i) by adding the phrase ``in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.90.''
5. Summary and implementation schedules have been revised--from 90
to 180 days for summary submittals, and from 360 to 540 days (18
months) for completion of implementation. Both time periods are from
the effective date of the rule which is 1 month from the date of
publication in the Federal Register.
Availability of Supporting Guidance
Two guidance documents are being developed by the NRC in support of
this rule and are expected to be distributed to affected licensees
before the effective date of the rule. These documents are: (1)
Regulatory Guide 5.68, ``Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles
at Nuclear Power Plants'' and (2) NUREG/CR 6190, ``Protection Against
Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants.''
Regulatory Guide 5.68 will be available for inspection and copying
for a fee at the Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW.
(Lower Level), Washington, DC. Copies of issued guides may be purchased
from the Government Printing Office at the current GPO price.
Information on current GPO prices may be obtained by contacting the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box
37082, Washington, DC 20013-2171. Issued guides may also be purchased
from the National Technical Information Service on a standing order
basis. Details on this service may be obtained by writing NTIS, 5825
Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.
Copies of NUREG/CR-6190 may be purchased from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082, Washington,
DC 20013-7082. Copies also will be available from the National
Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA
22161. A copy also will be available for inspection and copying for a
fee in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level),
Washington, DC.
Electronic Submittals
Required paperwork may be submitted, in addition to an original
paper copy, in electronic format on a DOS-formatted (IBM compatible)
5.25 or 3.5 inch computer diskette. Text files should be provided in
WordPerfect format or unformatted ASCII code. The format and version
should be identified on the diskette's external label.
Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability
The Commission has determined under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in
Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule is not a major Federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment
and, therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required. The
rule involves installation of vehicle barriers at operating power
reactor sites and an evaluation of these barriers by the licensee to
determine whether they provide acceptable protection against a land
vehicle bomb under design goals and criteria established by the
Commission.
Implementation of these amendments will not involve release of or
exposure to radioactivity from the site. Construction activities
associated with passive vehicle barriers will involve some earth
movement, either for excavation or development of berms, and possible
destruction of trees and shrubbery. Since most active vehicle barriers
are hydraulically operated, there may on occasion be leakage of this
fluid to the environment. The activities required to implement these
amendments involve no significant environmental impact.
The environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact
on which this determination is based are available for inspection at
the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level),
Washington, DC. Single copies of the environmental assessment and
finding of no significant impact are available from: Carrie Brown, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, telephone (301) 504-
2382.
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
This final rule amends information collection requirements that are
subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et
seq.). These requirements were approved by the Office of Management and
Budget approval number 3150-0002.
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is
estimated to average 500 hours per response, including the time for
reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the
collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate
or any other aspect of this collection of information, including
suggestions for reducing the burden, to the Information and Records
Management Branch (MNBB-7714), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; and to the Desk Officer, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-3019, (3150-0002), Office of
Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.
Regulatory Analysis
The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this
regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the
alternatives considered by the Commission. Interested persons may
examine a copy of the regulatory analysis at the NRC Public Document
Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of
the analysis may be obtained from Robert J. Dube, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 504-2912.
Regulatory Flexibility Certification
As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.
605(b), the Commission certifies that this final rule does not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
The rule affects only licensees authorized to operate a nuclear power
reactor. The utilities that operate these nuclear power reactors do not
fall within the scope of the definition ``small entities'' as given in
the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Small Business Size Standards
promulgated in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration
(13 CFR Part 121).
Backfit Analysis
As required by 10 CFR 50.109, the Commission has completed a
backfit analysis for the final rule. The Commission has determined,
based on this analysis, that backfitting to comply with the
requirements of this final rule provides a substantial increase in
protection to public health and safety or the common defense and
security at a cost which is justified by the substantial increase. The
backfit analysis on which this determination is based reads as follows.
I. Statement of the specific objectives that the proposed action is
designated to achieve.
To publish a rule in response to direction from the Commission in a
staff requirements memorandum dated June 29, 1993. The Commissioners'
decision to proceed with expedited rulemaking was the result of two
events. On February 7, 1993, there was a forced vehicle entry into the
protected area (PA) at Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit 1. On February 25,
1993, a van bomb, containing between 500 and 1,500 pounds of TNT
equivalent, was detonated at the World Trade Center in New York City.
In its subsequent review of the threat environment, the NRC staff
concluded that there is no indication of an actual vehicle threat
against the domestic commercial nuclear industry. Nonetheless, in light
of the vehicle intrusion at TMI and the World Trade Center vehicle
bombing, the NRC staff concluded that a vehicle intrusion or bomb
threat to a nuclear power plant could develop without warning in the
future. The objective of the rulemaking is to enhance reactor safety by
maintaining a prudent margin between what is the current threat
estimate (low) and the design basis threat for radiological sabotage
specified in 10 CFR 73.1(a) (higher).
II. General description of the activity that would be required by
the licensee or applicant in order to complete the proposed action.
The rule requires each licensee authorized to operate a nuclear
power plant to establish vehicle control measures to protect against
the use of a design basis land vehicle as a means of transportation to
gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas. This provides two benefits.
First, it enhances a licensee's ability to interdict an adversary
attempting to use a vehicle as an aid to reach critical safety
equipment. Second, it provides protection against a land vehicle bomb.
The rule requires licensees to evaluate the effectiveness of their
vehicle control measures with respect to the protection they provide
against a land vehicle bomb. Licensees are required to confirm to the
Commission that the vehicle control measures to protect against vehicle
intrusion, alone or in combination with additional measures, fully meet
the Commission's design goals and criteria for protection against a
vehicle bomb. Licensees that can show that the additional costs for
measures required to fully meet the Commission's design goals and
criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb are not justified by the
added protection that would be provided have the option to propose
alternative measures to the Commission. These licensees will not be
relieved of the requirement to protect the facility against vehicle
intrusion.
Licensees that propose alternative measures are required to
describe the level of protection that these measures would provide
against a land vehicle bomb and compare the costs of the alternative
measures with the costs of measures necessary to fully meet the
criteria. The NRC will approve the alternative measures if the measures
provide substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb and if the
licensee demonstrates by an analysis, using the essential elements of
the criteria in 10 CFR 50.109, that the costs of fully meeting measures
needed to protect against a vehicle bomb are not justified by the added
protection provided.
III. Potential change in the risk to the public from the accidental
offsite release of radioactive material.
The potential change in the risk to the public from the accidental
offsite release of radioactive material is discussed in detail in pages
4 through 7 and 10 through 14 of the regulatory analysis that supports
the rulemaking. Failure to protect against attempted radiological
sabotage could result in reactor core damage and large radiological
releases. Based on its assessment, the NRC concludes that amending its
regulations to protect against malevolent use of a vehicle against a
nuclear power plant provides a substantial increase in overall
protection of the public health and safety.
In summary, the TMI event demonstrated some aspects regarding use
of a vehicle by a potential adversary that could present some
challenges not previously considered by staff and licensees. The NRC
considers that providing vehicle intrusion protection provides
substantial enhancement against such a threat. Enhancements to protect
against the vehicle intrusion threat also provide, to varying degrees
dependent on site characteristics, enhancement for protection against
vehicle bombs.
The World Trade Center event demonstrated a capability within the
United States to construct a truck bomb undetected. This recently
demonstrated capability indicates that although a vehicle bomb attack
at a nuclear power plant is not reasonably to be expected, it is
somewhat more likely to develop without advance indications than the
NRC previously believed. Therefore, the NRC considers that providing
permanently installed vehicle bomb protection provides substantial
enhancement against such a threat.
IV. Potential impact on radiological exposure of facility employees
and other onsite workers.
By enhancing protection against the malevolent use of a vehicle,
the rule decreases the potential for radiological exposure of facility
employees and other onsite workers. Although the threat of a
determined, violent attack at a nuclear power plant is considered to be
low, the rule also decreases the risk that onsite workers could be
injured by weapons fire or an explosion.
V. Installation and continuing costs associated with the action,
including the cost of facility downtime or the cost of construction
delay.
Estimates of installation costs are discussed in detail on pages 7
through 10 and 14 of the regulatory analysis. Ranges in cost estimates
for three vehicle types illustrate the strong influence of vehicle
characteristics. In addition, site-specific characteristics influence
costs, including the need at some sites to extend the vehicle exclusion
area beyond portions of the current PA boundary or providing a more
substantial passive barrier.
The NRC staff estimates that about 80 to 90 percent of the sites
will provide safe standoff distances against a vehicle bomb by
providing a vehicle barrier in proximity to the present PA boundary.
For these sites, cost estimates range from $290K for protecting the
smallest protected area against a passenger vehicle to $2,955K for
protecting the largest protected area against a large truck. (The
characteristics of the design basis vehicle used to establish
protection goals are described in a Safeguards Information document
provided separately to affected licensees.) For the remaining 10 to 20
percent of the sites, cost estimates range from $440K to $3,655K.
An important consideration in assessing costs for the 10 to 20
percent of the sites that may have to protect beyond the existing
protected areas is that the only definitive requirement for all
licensees is that they provide measures to protect against the use of a
land vehicle as a means of transportation to gain proximity to vital
areas and that they assess any incremental measures, if necessary, to
meet the design goal for a land vehicle bomb. The NRC will accept
alternative measures if the measures provide substantial protection
against a land vehicle bomb and if the licensee demonstrates by an
analysis, using the essential elements of the criteria in 10 CFR
50.109, that the costs of fully meeting measures needed to protect
against a vehicle bomb are not justified by the added protection
provided.
Continuing costs to maintain barriers should be small.
Implementation of the rule will not require facility downtime or
construction delay.
VI. The potential safety impact of changes in plant or operational
complexity, including the relationship to proposed and existing
regulatory requirements and NRC staff positions.
There should be no adverse safety impact from the rule.
Construction of barriers will be near or beyond existing protected area
perimeters and should not delay authorized access to the protected
area.
VII. The estimated resource burden on the NRC associated with the
action and the availability of such resources.
There should be no new resource burden on the NRC. There will be no
NRC staff licensing review of licensees' vehicle control measures
before implementation. Licensees will be required to retain their
analyses on site for NRC staff review during routine inspections.
Inspection of the approximately 67 total sites for explosive protection
will be about 1 FTE. Reviewing licensee proposals for alternative
measures and 10 CFR 50.109 type analyses will require approximately 1
FTE and 40K of technical assistance from the United States Army Corps
of Engineers.
VIII. The potential impact of differences in facility type, design,
or age on the relevancy and practicality of the proposed action.
The action is relevant for all nuclear power reactors. The action
should also be practical at most sites. If a barrier stopped a vehicle
at the PA perimeter with little or no further penetration, about 90
percent of the sites would provide significant protection against the
design basis vehicle bomb.
In those cases where licensees determine additional security
measures may be needed to protect safe shutdown capability, the rule
permits licensees to either implement the additional security measures
or develop alternative protection strategies. The licensee may propose
alternative measures if the measures provide substantial protection
against a land vehicle bomb and if they demonstrate by an analysis,
using the essential elements of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.109, that the
costs of fully meeting measures needed to protect against a vehicle
bomb are not justified by the added protection provided. The NRC staff
will review licensee's alternative proposals and make an acceptability
determination. The Commission will be notified of such NRC staff
action.
NRC staff's analysis also indicates that there is a high likelihood
that all sites will be capable of achieving and maintaining safe
shutdown if a design basis bomb were detonated at any land accessible
location of a nuclear power plant outside of the owner controlled area.
IX. Whether the proposed action is interim or final, and if
interim, the justification for imposing the proposed action on an
interim basis.
The action is to promulgate a final rule. The rulemaking does not
involve interim actions.
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73
Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Nuclear
materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of
the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is
adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 73.
PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
1. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended,
sec.147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as
amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841,
5844).
Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96
Stat. 2232, 2241, (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also
issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841
note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99-399, 100
Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169).
2. In Sec. 73.1, the introductory text of paragraph (a) and the
text of (a)(1)(ii) are revised and new paragraphs (a)(1)(i)(E) and
(a)(1)(iii) are added to read as follow:
Sec. 73.1 Purpose and scope.
(a) Purpose. This part prescribes requirements for the
establishment and maintenance of a physical protection system which
will have capabilities for the protection of special nuclear material
at fixed sites and in transit and of plants in which special nuclear
material is used. The following design basis threats, where referenced
in ensuing sections of this part, shall be used to design safeguards
systems to protect against acts of radiological sabotage and to prevent
the theft of special nuclear material. Licensees subject to the
provisions of Sec. 72.182, Sec. 72.212, Sec. 73.20, Sec. 73.50, and
Sec. 73.60 are exempt from Sec. 73.1(a)(1)(i)(E) and
Sec. 73.1(a)(1)(iii).
(1) * * *
(i) * * *
(E) A four-wheel drive land vehicle used for transporting personnel
and their hand-carried equipment to the proximity of vital areas, and
(ii) An internal threat of an insider, including an employee (in
any position), and
(iii) A four-wheel drive land vehicle bomb.
* * * * *
3. In Sec. 73.21, a new paragraph (b)(1)(xiii) is added to read as
follows:
Sec. 73.21 Requirements for the protection of safeguards information.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(1) * * *
(xiii) Information required by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR
73.55 (c) (8) and (9).
* * * * *
4. In Sec. 73.55, new paragraphs (c) (7), (8), (9), and (10) are
added to read as follow:
Sec. 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities
in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(7) Vehicle control measures, including vehicle barrier systems,
must be established to protect against use of a land vehicle, as
specified by the Commission, as a means of transportation to gain
unauthorized proximity to vital areas.
(8) Each licensee shall compare the vehicle control measures
established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7) to the Commission's
design goals (i.e., to protect equipment, systems, devices, or
material, the failure of which could directly or indirectly endanger
public health and safety by exposure to radiation) and criteria for
protection against a land vehicle bomb. Each licensee shall either:
(i) Confirm to the Commission that the vehicle control measures
meet the design goals and criteria specified; or
(ii) Propose alternative measures, in addition to the measures
established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7), describe the level
of protection that these measures would provide against a land vehicle
bomb, and compare the costs of the alternative measures with the costs
of measures necessary to fully meet the design goals and criteria. The
Commission will approve the proposed alternative measures if they
provide substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb, and it is
determined by an analysis, using the essential elements of 10 CFR
50.109, that the costs of fully meeting the design goals and criteria
are not justified by the added protection that would be provided.
(9) Each licensee authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor
shall:
(i) By February 28, 1995 submit to the Commission a summary
description of the proposed vehicle control measures as required by 10
CFR 73.55 (c)(7) and the results of the vehicle bomb comparison as
required by 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(8). For licensees who choose to propose
alternative measures as provided for in 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(8), the
proposal must be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90 and include
the analysis and justification for the proposed alternatives.
(ii) By February 29, 1996 fully implement the required vehicle
control measures, including site-specific alternative measures as
approved by the Commission.
(iii) Protect as Safeguards Information, information required by
the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55(c) (8) and (9).
(iv) Retain, in accordance with 10 CFR 73.70, all comparisons and
analyses prepared pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55 (c) (7) and (8).
(10) Each applicant for a license to operate a nuclear power
reactor pursuant to 10 CFR 50.21(b) or 10 CFR 50.22, whose application
was submitted prior to August 31, 1994, shall incorporate the required
vehicle control program into the site Physical Security Plan and
implement it by the date of receipt of the operating license.
* * * * *
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of July 1994.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John C. Hoyle,
Acting Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 94-18638 Filed 7-29-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
