94-19116. Special Conditions; Beech Models 65, A65, 65-80, 65-A80, 65-B80, 65-90, 65-A90, 70, B90, C90, C90A, and E90 Airplanes  

  • [Federal Register Volume 59, Number 150 (Friday, August 5, 1994)]
    [Unknown Section]
    [Page 0]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 94-19116]
    
    
    [[Page Unknown]]
    
    [Federal Register: August 5, 1994]
    
    
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    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
    
    Federal Aviation Administration
    
    14 CFR Part 23
    
    [Docket No. 120CE, Special Condition 23-ACE-77]
    
     
    
    Special Conditions; Beech Models 65, A65, 65-80, 65-A80, 65-B80, 
    65-90, 65-A90, 70, B90, C90, C90A, and E90 Airplanes
    
    AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
    
    ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.
    
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued to Elliott Aviation, Des 
    Moines, Iowa, for a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) on the Beech 
    Models 65, A65, 65-80, 65-A80, 65-B80, 65-90, 65-A90, 70, B90, C90, 
    C90A and E90 airplanes. These airplanes will have novel and unusual 
    design features when compared to the state of technology envisaged in 
    the applicable airworthiness standards. These novel and unusual design 
    features include the installation of electronic displays for which the 
    applicable regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate 
    airworthiness standards for the protection of these systems from the 
    effects of high intensity radiated fields (HIRF). These special 
    conditions contain the additional safety standards that the 
    Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety 
    equivalent to the airworthiness standards applicable to these 
    airplanes.
    
    DATES: The effective date of these special conditions is [Date of 
    August 5, 1994.] Comments must be received on or before September 6, 
    1994.
    
    ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed in duplicate to: Federal Aviation 
    Administration, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, ACE-7, 
    Attention: Rules Docket Clerk, Docket No. 120CE, Room 1558, 601 East 
    12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. All comments must be marked: 
    Docket No. 120CE. Comments may be inspected in the Rules Docket 
    weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.
    
    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ervin Dvorak, Aerospace Engineer, 
    Standards Office (ACE-110), Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 
    Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 601 East 12th 
    Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone (816) 426-6941.
    
    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    
    Comments Invited
    
        Although this action is in the form of a final rule that involves 
    requirements affecting flight safety, and, thus, was not proceeded by 
    notice and an opportunity for public comment, comments are invited on 
    these special conditions.
        Interested persons are invited to submit such written data, views, 
    or arguments as they may desire. Communications should identify the 
    regulatory docket and special conditions number and be submitted in 
    duplicate to the address specified above. All communications received 
    on or before the closing date for comments will be considered by the 
    Administrator. These special conditions may be changed in light of the 
    comments received. All comments submitted will be available in the 
    rules docket for examination by interested parties, both before and 
    after the closing date for comments. A report summarizing each 
    substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this 
    rulemaking will be filed in the docket. Persons wishing the FAA to 
    acknowledge receipt of their comments, submitted in response to this 
    request, must include a self-addressed and stamped postcard on which 
    the following statement is made: ``Comments to Docket No. 120CE.'' The 
    postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.
    
    Background
    
        On July 10, 1994, Elliott Aviation, 2800 McKinley Avenue, Des 
    Moines, Iowa 50321, made an application to the FAA for a supplemental 
    type certificate (STC) for the Beech Models 65, A65, 65-80, 65-A80, 65-
    B80, 65-90, 65-A90, 70, B90, C90, C90A and E90 airplanes. The proposed 
    modification incorporates a novel or unusual design feature, such as 
    digital avionics consisting of an electronic flight instrument system 
    (EFIS), that is vulnerable to HIRF external to the airplane.
    
    Type Certification Basis
    
        The type certification basis for the Beech Models 65, A65, 65-80, 
    65-A80, 65-B80, 65-90, 65-A90, 70, B90, C90, C90A and E90 Airplanes is 
    given in Type Certificate Data Sheet No. 3A20.
    
    Discussion
    
        The FAA may issue and amend special conditions, as necessary, as 
    part of the type certification basis if the Administrator finds that 
    the airworthiness standards, designated according to Sec. 21.101(b), do 
    not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards because of novel 
    or unusual design features of an airplane. Special conditions are 
    normally issued according to Sec. 11.49, after public notice, as 
    required by Secs. 11.28 and 11.29(b), effective October 14, 1980, and 
    become a part of the type certification basis.
        Elliott Aviation plans to incorporate certain novel and unusual 
    design features into an airplane for which the airworthiness standards 
    do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for protection 
    from the effects of HIRF. These features include electronic systems, 
    which are susceptible to the HIRF environment, that were not envisaged 
    by the existing regulations for this type of airplane.
    
    Protection of Systems From High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)
    
        Recent advances in technology have given rise to the application in 
    aircraft designs of advanced electrical and electronic systems that 
    perform functions required for continued safe flight and landing. Due 
    to the use of sensitive solid state advanced components in analog and 
    digital electronics circuits, these advanced systems are readily 
    responsive to the transient effects of induced electrical current and 
    voltage caused by the HIRF. The HIRF can degrade electronic systems 
    performance by damaging components or upsetting system functions.
        Furthermore, the HIRF environment has undergone a transformation 
    that was not foreseen when the current requirements were developed. 
    Higher energy levels are radiated from transmitters that are used for 
    radar, radio, and television. Also, the number of transmitters has 
    increased significantly. There is also uncertainty concerning the 
    effectiveness of airframe shielding for HIRF. Furthermore, coupling to 
    cockpit-installed equipment through the cockpit window apertures is 
    undefined.
        The combined effect of the technological advances in airplane 
    design and the changing environment has resulted in an increased level 
    of vulnerability of electrical and electronic systems required for the 
    continued safe flight and landing of the airplane. Effective measures 
    against the effects of exposure to HIRF must be provided by the design 
    and installation of these systems. The accepted maximum energy levels 
    in which civilian airplane system installations must be capable of 
    operating safely are based on surveys and analysis of existing radio 
    frequency emitters. These special conditions require that the airplane 
    be evaluated under these energy levels for the protection of the 
    electronic system and its associated wiring harness. These external 
    threat levels, which are lower than previous required values, are 
    believed to represent the worst case to which an airplane would be 
    exposed in the operating environment.
        These special conditions require qualification of systems that 
    perform critical functions, as installed in aircraft, to the defined 
    HIRF environment in paragraph 1 or, as an option to a fixed value using 
    laboratory tests, in paragraph 2, as follows:
        (1) The applicant may demonstrate that the operation and 
    operational capability of the installed electrical and electronic 
    systems that perform critical functions are not adversely affected when 
    the aircraft is exposed to the HIRF environment defined below:
    
                           Field Strength Volts/Meter                       
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        Frequency                         Peak      Average 
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    10-100 KHz........................................         50         50
    100-500...........................................         60         60
    500-2000..........................................         70         70
    2-30 MHz..........................................        200        200
    30-70.............................................         30         30
    70-100............................................         30         30
    100-200...........................................        150         33
    200-400...........................................         70         70
    400-700...........................................       4020        935
    700-1000..........................................       1700        170
    1-2 GHz...........................................       5000        990
    2-4...............................................       6680        840
    4-6...............................................       6850        310
    6-8...............................................       3600        670
    8-12..............................................       3500       1270
    12-18.............................................       3500        360
    18-40.............................................       2100        750
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    or,
        (2) The applicant may demonstrate by a system test and analysis 
    that the electrical and electronic systems that perform critical 
    functions can withstand a minimum threat of 100 volts per meter, peak 
    electrical field strength, from 10 KHz to 18 GHz. When using this test 
    to show compliance with the HIRF requirements, no credit is given for 
    signal attenuation due to installation.
        A preliminary hazard analysis must be performed by the applicant, 
    for approval by the FAA, to identify electrical and/or electronic 
    systems that perform critical functions. The term ``critical'' means 
    those functions whose failure would contribute to, or cause, a failure 
    condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of 
    the airplane. The systems identified by the hazard analysis that 
    perform critical functions are candidates for the application of HIRF 
    requirements. A system may perform both critical and non-critical 
    functions. Primary electronic flight display systems, and their 
    associated components, perform critical functions such as attitude, 
    altitude, and airspeed indication. The HIRF requirements apply only to 
    critical functions.
        Compliance with HIRF requirements may be demonstrated by tests, 
    analysis, models, similarity with existing systems, or any combination 
    of these. Service experience alone is not acceptable since normal 
    flight operations may not include an exposure to the HIRF environment. 
    Reliance on a system with similar design features for redundancy as a 
    means of protection against the effects of external HIRF is generally 
    insufficient since all elements of a redundant system are likely to be 
    exposed to the fields concurrently.
    
    Conclusion
    
        In view of the design features discussed for the Beech Models 65, 
    A65, 65-80, 65-A80, 65-B80, 65-90, 65-A90, 70, B90, C90, C90A and E90 
    Airplanes, the following special conditions are issued. This action is 
    a rule of general applicability and affects only those applicants who 
    apply to the FAA for approval of these features on these airplanes.
        The substance of these special conditions has been subject to the 
    notice and public comment procedure in several prior rulemaking 
    actions. For example, the Dornier 228-200 (53 FR 14782, April 26, 
    1988), the Cessna Model 525 (56 FR 49396, September 30, 1991), and the 
    Beech Model 200, A200, and B200 airplanes (57 FR 1220, January 13, 
    1992). It is unlikely that additional public comment would result in 
    any significant change from those special conditions already issued and 
    commented on. For these reasons, and because a delay would 
    significantly affect the applicant's installation of the system and 
    certification of the airplane, which is imminent, the FAA has 
    determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and 
    impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special 
    conditions without notice. Therefore, these special conditions are 
    being made effective upon publication in the Federal Register. However, 
    as previously indicated, interested persons are invited to comment on 
    these special conditions if they so desire.
    
    List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23
    
        Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and symbols
    
    Citation
    
        The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:
    
        Authority: Secs. 313(a), 601, and 603 of the Federal Aviation 
    Act of 1958; as amended (49 U.S.C. 1354(a), 1421, and 1423); 49 
    U.S.C. 106(g); 14 CFR 21.16 and 21.101; and 14 CFR 11.28 and 11.49.
    
    Adoption of Special Conditions
    
        Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
    Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of 
    the type certification basis for the modified Beech Models 65, A65, 65-
    80, 65-A80, 65-B80, 65-90, 65-A90, 70, B90, C90, C90A and E90 
    airplanes:
        1. Protection of Electrical and Electronic Systems from High 
    Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF). Each system that performs critical 
    functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the operations, 
    and operational capabilities of these systems to perform critical 
    functions, are not adversely affected when the airplane is exposed to 
    high intensity radiated electromagnetic fields external to the 
    airplane.
        2. For the purpose of these special conditions, the following 
    definition applies: Critical Functions: Functions whose failure would 
    contribute to or cause a failure condition that would prevent the 
    continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.
    
        Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on July 28, 1994.
    Barry D. Clements,
    Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
    [FR Doc. 94-19116 Filed 8-4-94; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-M
    
    
    

Document Information

Effective Date:
8/5/1994
Published:
08/05/1994
Department:
Federal Aviation Administration
Entry Type:
Uncategorized Document
Action:
Final special conditions; request for comments.
Document Number:
94-19116
Dates:
The effective date of these special conditions is [Date of August 5, 1994.] Comments must be received on or before September 6, 1994.
Pages:
0-0 (1 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Federal Register: August 5, 1994, Docket No. 120CE, Special Condition 23-ACE-77
CFR: (1)
14 CFR 23