[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 153 (Wednesday, August 7, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 41187-41188]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-20117]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364]
Southern Nuclear Operating Company (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear
Plant, Units 1 and 2); Exemption
I
The Southern Nuclear Operating Company, et al. (SNC or the
licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-2 and
NPF-8 for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Farley).
The licenses provide, among other things, that the licensee is subject
to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or
hereafter in effect.
II
Subsection (a) of 10 CFR 70.24, ``Criticality Accident
Requirements,'' requires that each licensee authorized to possess
special nuclear material shall maintain in each area where such
material is handled, used, or stored, an appropriate criticality
monitoring system. In accordance with Subsection (a)(1) of 10 CFR
70.24, coverage of all such areas at Farley shall be provided by two
criticality detectors. However, exemptions may be requested pursuant to
10 CFR 70.24(d), provided that the licensee believes that good cause
exists for the exemption.
By letter dated May 31, 1996, the licensee requested an exemption
from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24. A previous exemption from the
provisions of 10 CFR Part 70.24 for the storage of special nuclear
material, including reactor fuel assemblies [maximum amount of 1,900 kg
of U-235 in uranium enriched to no more than 3.15 weight percent (w/
o)], was granted to Alabama
[[Page 41188]]
Power Company for Farley Unit 1 in NRC Materials License No. SNM-1647
and for Farley Unit 2 in NRC Materials License No. SNM-1868. The
materials licenses were issued on July 20, 1976, for Unit 1 and March
12, 1980, for Unit 2.
The materials licenses expired upon conversion of the construction
permits to operating licenses, which was June 26, 1977, for Unit 1 and
March 31, 1981, for Unit 2, respectively. The basis for the current
exemption request is the same as for the original request.
Specifically, the licensee proposes to handle and store unirradiated
fuel without having a criticality monitoring system as required by 10
CFR 70.24.
The basis for the exemption is that inadvertent or accidental
criticality will be precluded through compliance with the Farley
Technical Specifications, the geometric spacing of fuel assemblies in
the new fuel storage facility and spent fuel storage pool, and
administrative controls imposed on fuel handling procedures.
Inadvertent or accidental criticality of Special Nuclear Materials
(SNM) while in use in the reactor vessel is precluded through
compliance with the Farley Technical Specifications, including
reactivity requirements (e.g., shutdown margins, limits on control rod
movement), instrumentation requirements (e.g., reactor power and
radiation monitors), and controls on refueling operations (e.g.,
control rod interlocks and source range monitor requirements). In
addition, the operators' attention directed toward instruments
monitoring behavior of the nuclear fuel in the reactor assures that the
facility is operated in such a manner as to preclude inadvertent
criticality. Finally, since access to the fuel in the reactor vessel is
not physically possible while in use and is procedurally controlled
during refueling, there are no concerns associated with loss or
diversion of the fuel.
SNM as nuclear fuel is stored in one of two locations--the spent
fuel pool or the new fuel storage area (NFSA). The spent fuel pool is
used to store irradiated fuel under water after its discharge from the
reactor. The pool is designed to store the fuel in a geometric array
that precludes criticality. In addition, existing Technical
Specification limits on keff are maintained less than or equal to
0.95, even in the event of a fuel handling accident.
The NFSA design precludes criticality by maintaining an effective
multiplication factor less than or equal to 0.95 when the racks are
fully loaded and in the normal dry condition or flooded with unborated
water. The effective multiplication factor is also less than or equal
to 0.98 under optimum moderation conditions (e.g., because of the
presence of aqueous foam or mist). The NFSA is used to receive and
store new fuel in a dry condition upon arrival on site and prior to
loading in the reactor. Administrative controls encompass placing the
assemblies in the fuel inspection stand, performing inspection
activities, and lifting and placement of the assemblies into specified
locations in the NFSA.
The NFSA is protected from the effects of natural phenomena,
including earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and external
missiles. The NFSA is designed to perform its intended function and
maintain structural integrity after a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) or
following a postulated hazard, such as fire, internal missiles, or pipe
break.
Fresh fuel is shipped in a plastic wrap. In some cases the fuel is
stored in the new fuel storage racks with the plastic wrap in place and
in other cases the plastic wrap is removed prior to storage. In all
cases where fuel is stored with the plastic wrap in place, the wrap
either cannot hold water due to its design or in accordance with the
Receipt of New Fuel Procedure it is rendered incapable of holding water
prior to fuel storage. Therefore, there is no concern that the plastic
wrap used as part of fresh fuel storage will hold water due to flooding
from overhead sources. Additionally, as discussed above, the new fuel
storage racks have been analyzed by the licensee for a postulated
flooded condition and the results showed that keff is maintained
less than or equal to 0.95.
Both irradiated and unirradiated fuel is moved to and from the
reactor vessel, and the spent fuel pool to accommodate refueling
operations. Also, unirradiated fuel can be moved to and from the new
fuel storage area. In addition, movements of fuel into the facility and
within the reactor vessel and within the spent fuel pool occur. Fuel
movements are procedurally controlled and designed to preclude
conditions involving criticality concerns. Moreover, previous accident
analyses have demonstrated that a fuel handling accident (i.e., a
dropped fuel element) will not create conditions which exceed design
specifications. In addition, the Technical Specifications specifically
address the refueling operations and limit the handling of fuel to
ensure against an accidental criticality and to preclude certain
movements over the spent fuel pool and the reactor vessel.
Based upon the information provided, there is reasonable assurance
that irradiated and unirradiated fuel will remain subcritical. The
circumstances for granting an exemption to 10 CFR 70.24 are met because
criticality is precluded with the present design configuration,
Technical Specifications requirements, administrative controls, and the
fuel handling equipment and procedures. Therefore, the staff concludes
that the licensee's request for an exemption from the requirements of
10 CFR 70.24 is acceptable and should be granted.
III
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
70.14, this exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or
property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the
public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Southern
Nuclear Operating Company an exemption as described in Section II above
from 10 CFR 70.24, ``Criticality Accident Requirements'' for Farley
Units 1 and 2.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the
quality of the human environment (61 FR 33781).
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of July 1996.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William T. Russell,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 96-20117 Filed 8-6-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
