[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 36 (Monday, February 24, 1997)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 8330-8359]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-4489]
[[Page 8329]]
_______________________________________________________________________
Part III
Department of Transportation
_______________________________________________________________________
Federal Railroad Administration
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49 CFR Parts 223 and 239
Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 36 / Monday, February 24, 1997 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 8330]]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
49 CFR Parts 223 and 239
[FRA Docket No. PTEP-1, Notice No. 1]
RIN 2130-AA96
Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
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SUMMARY: Pursuant to section 215 of the Federal Railroad Safety
Authorization Act of 1994, FRA proposes a rule to require minimum
Federal safety standards for the preparation, adoption, and
implementation of emergency preparedness plans by railroads connected
with the operation of passenger trains, including freight railroads
hosting the operations of rail passenger service. The proposed rule
also requires each affected railroad to instruct its employees on the
plan's provisions. Elements of this emergency preparedness plan would
include communication, employee training and qualification, joint
operations, tunnel safety, liaison with emergency responders, on-board
emergency equipment, and passenger safety information. The plan adopted
by each affected railroad would be subject to formal review and
approval by FRA.
This proposal for emergency preparedness regulations, which
formalizes a planning requirement and identifies certain mandatory
elements, is the second phase in a four-phase process that began in
1994. In the first phase, FRA encouraged railroads to examine their
programs to determine what improvements could be made, while in the
third phase, FRA will review the railroad plans to determine if all
emergency preparedness issues have been adequately addressed within the
varying contexts of railroad operations. In the fourth phase, FRA will
review the implementation and effectiveness of the proposed standards
and related voluntary developments, and will address the need for
further rulemaking activity.
The proposed rule does not apply to tourist and historic railroad
operators. However, after appropriate consultation with the excursion
railroad associations to determine appropriate applicability in light
of financial, operational, or other factors unique to such operations,
emergency preparedness requirements for these operations may be
prescribed by FRA that are different from those affecting other types
of passenger operations.
DATES: (1) Written comments: Written comments must be received on or
before April 25, 1997. Comments received after that date will be
considered by FRA and the Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness
Working Group in preparing the final rule to the extent possible
without incurring additional expense or delay. The docket will remain
open until the Working Group proceedings are concluded. Requests for
formal extension of the comment period must be made by April 10, 1997.
(2) Public hearings: FRA intends to hold two public hearings, and
the dates of these hearings will be published in a forthcoming notice
in the Federal Register. Anyone who desires to make an oral statement
at either of the hearings must notify the Docket Clerk by telephone
(202-632-3198) or mail, and must submit three copies of the oral
statement that he or she intends to make at the hearing. The dates by
which the Docket Clerk must be notified about the oral statement and
receive the three copies of this statement will be set forth in the
notice announcing the public hearings.
ADDRESSES: Written Comments: Written comments should identify the
docket number and must be submitted in triplicate to the Docket Clerk,
Office of Chief Counsel, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh
Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590. Persons desiring to be notified
that their comments have been received by FRA should submit a stamped,
self-addressed postcard with their comments. The Docket Clerk will
indicate on the postcard the date on which the comments were received
and will return the card to the addressee. Written comments will be
available for examination, both before and after the closing date for
written comments, during regular business hours on the Seventh floor of
1120 Vermont Avenue, N.W. in Washington, D.C.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Edward R. English, Director,
Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone number: 202-632-3349), or David
H. Kasminoff, Esq., Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400
Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone: 202-632-3191).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Request for Comments
In accordance with Executive Order 12866, FRA is allowing 60 days
for comments. FRA believes that a 60-day comment period is necessary
for parties with interests that were not represented by the working
group on passenger train emergency preparedness that has been
established by the agency under 49 U.S.C. 20133.
Background
The overall safety record of conventional intercity and commuter
passenger train operations in the United States has been exemplary.
However, accidents continue to occur, often as a result of factors
beyond the control of the passenger railroad. Further, the rail
passenger operating environment in the United States is rapidly
changing--technology is advancing, equipment is being designed for
ever-higher speeds, and many potential new operators of passenger
equipment are appearing. With this more complex operating environment,
FRA must become more proactive to ensure that operators of passenger
train service, as well as freight railroads hosting passenger
operations, engage in careful, advance planning to minimize the
consequences of emergencies that could occur. Even minor incidents
could easily develop into life-threatening events if they are not
addressed in a timely and effective manner.
In recent years, passenger train accidents, such as the tragic
``Sunset Limited'' passenger train derailment near Mobile, Alabama in
September 1993, have demonstrated the need to improve the way railroads
respond in emergency situations. On September 22, 1993, at about 2:45
a.m., barges that were being pushed by the towboat Mauvilla in dense
fog struck and displaced the Big Bayou Canot railroad bridge near
Mobile, Alabama. At about 2:53 a.m., National Railroad Passenger
Corporation (Amtrak) train no. 2, the Sunset Limited, en route from Los
Angeles, California to Miami, Florida with 220 persons on board, struck
the displaced bridge and derailed. The three locomotive units, the
baggage and dormitory cars, and two of the six passenger cars fell into
the water. The fuel tanks on the locomotive units ruptured, and the
locomotive units and the baggage and dormitory cars caught fire. Forty-
two passengers and five crewmembers were killed, and 103 passengers
were injured. The towboat's four crewmembers were not injured.
In a report on the accident released on September 19, 1994, the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that several
circumstances hampered emergency response efforts. NTSB Railroad-Marine
Accident Report 94/01. In its assessment of emergency
[[Page 8331]]
response at the accident site, the NTSB noted that the location of the
accident was remote (accessible only by rail, water, or air), fog in
the area was dense (requiring the use of radar to navigate boats),
limited modes of transportation were available for bringing in
personnel and equipment, and the magnitude of the accident was great.
Nevertheless, the NTSB concluded that, following the delay while
emergency responders identified the location of the accident, emergency
response activities were efficient and effective. The report did find,
however, that Amtrak did not have an effective system in place to
apprise passengers of train safety features, passengers were at a
disadvantage during evacuation due to the absence of portable lighting
on the passenger cars, and emergency responders were at a disadvantage
because they were unable to obtain an adequate passenger and crew list
from Amtrak until the next day. The NTSB also noted that had the Mobile
County Emergency Management Agency held drills to simulate a train
accident, the incident commander may have known about Amtrak's
procedure for accounting for passengers, and CSX Transportation, Inc.,
the owner of the bridge, may have had the correct telephone number to
contact the U.S. Coast Guard.
Considerable effort has focused on how to mitigate casualties after
a train accident occurs. In this regard, even before the occurrence of
the tragic accident near Mobile, FRA had tasked DOT's Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center (TSC), in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to
perform research and to recommend emergency preparedness guidelines for
passenger train operators. The results were published at the end of
1993 as a publication entitled ``RECOMMENDED EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
GUIDELINES FOR PASSENGER TRAINS'' (Volpe Report), which is available to
the public through the National Technical Information Service,
Springfield, VA 22161 (DOT/FRA/ORD-93-24--DOT-VNTSC-FRA-93-23). The
publication references safety recommendations of the NTSB, as well as
many other publications on the subject of emergency preparedness, and
contains recommended guidelines designed to assist passenger train
operating systems and emergency response organization management in
evaluating and modifying or supplementing their emergency response
plans. A copy of the Volpe Report has been placed in the public docket
for this rulemaking.
The Volpe Report recommendations address guidelines relating to
emergency plans, procedures, and training. In addition, guidelines for
passenger train and facility features intended to shorten emergency
response time, improve the effectiveness of evacuating passengers, and
minimize the effects of an emergency are presented. The publication
also lists inter-organizational emergency protocols, which include
those of fire departments, emergency medical services (EMS), police
departments, public utilities, hospitals, and local, State, regional,
and Federal governments.
In an effort to be proactive after the accident near Mobile, FRA
mailed the Volpe Report to all intercity passenger and commuter
railroads, freight railroads, the United Transportation Union, and the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers in March 1994 for their information
and guidance. Concurrent with this mailing, FRA invited the railroads
to attend a roundtable meeting in Washington, D.C., on June 9, 1994, to
discuss the emergency preparedness issues addressed in the publication.
The 23-member roundtable discussion was comprised of representatives
from the following organizations:
Amtrak,
FRA,
Long Island Rail Road (LIRR),
MTA Metro-North Railroad (METRO-NORTH),
Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation (METRA),
Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board (CALTRAIN),
Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (PATH),
Southern California Regional Rail Authority (METROLINK),
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA),
Tri-County Commuter Rail Authority (TRI-RAIL),
TSC, and
Virginia Railway Express (VRE).
During the meeting, FRA agreed to assist the passenger railroads in
establishing improved working relationships with their host freight
railroads. FRA also promised to help the passenger railroads in their
emergency response efforts in larger metropolitan areas by contacting
emergency response agencies and eliciting more cooperation between
them. In addition, FRA stated that it would conduct field visits to
several passenger railroads to study their equipment and their
emergency response and training programs.
At that same meeting, the passenger railroads agreed to provide
stronger supervisory oversight of their emergency response and training
programs, and stated that they would offer additional, structured
``hands-on'' training to their train crews concerning the removal of
emergency windows and passenger evacuation. They also agreed to develop
programs for recurring passenger car inspections, emphasizing checking
of emergency equipment such as windows, tools, and fire extinguishers.
Further, they agreed to improve their methods of apprising passengers
of emergency information, to include seat drops, placards inside each
car, and messages in on-board magazines. While FRA is encouraged that
passenger railroads have already begun to incorporate the
recommendations of the Volpe Report into their own emergency
preparedness plans, more progress by the entire industry is needed.
As a result of concerns raised about the safety of the operation of
rail passenger service, Congress enacted section 215 of the Federal
Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994, Public Law No. 103-440, 108
Stat. 4619, 4623-4624 (November 2, 1994), entitled ``Passenger Car
Safety Standards.'' Section 215, as now codified at 49 U.S.C. 20133,
reads as follows:
Sec. 20133. Passenger cars.
(a) MINIMUM STANDARDS.--The Secretary of Transportation shall
prescribe regulations establishing minimum standards for the safety
of cars used by railroad carriers to transport passengers. Before
prescribing such regulations, the Secretary shall consider--
(1) the crashworthiness of the cars;
(2) interior features (including luggage restraints, seat belts,
and exposed surfaces) that may affect passenger safety;
(3) maintenance and inspection of the cars;
(4) emergency response procedures and equipment; and
(5) any operating rules and conditions that directly affect
safety not otherwise governed by regulations.
The Secretary may make applicable some or all of the standards
established under this subsection to cars existing at the time the
regulations are prescribed, as well as to new cars, and the
Secretary shall explain in the rulemaking document the basis for
making such standards applicable to existing cars.
(b) INITIAL AND FINAL REGULATIONS.--(1) The Secretary shall
prescribe initial regulations under subsection (a) within 3 years
after the date of enactment of the Federal Railroad Safety
Authorization Act of 1994. The initial regulations may exempt
equipment used by tourist, historic, scenic, and excursion railroad
carriers to transport passengers.
(2) The Secretary shall prescribe final regulations under
subsection (a) within 5 years after such date of enactment.
(c) PERSONNEL.--The Secretary may establish within the
Department of Transportation 2 additional full-time equivalent
positions beyond the number
[[Page 8332]]
permitted under existing law to assist with the drafting,
prescribing, and implementation of regulations under this section.
(d) CONSULTATION.--In prescribing regulations, issuing orders,
and making amendments under this section, the Secretary may consult
with Amtrak, public authorities operating railroad passenger
service, other railroad carriers transporting passengers,
organizations of passengers, and organizations of employees. A
consultation is not subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5
U.S.C. App.), but minutes of the consultation shall be placed in the
public docket of the regulatory proceeding.
The Secretary of Transportation has delegated these rulemaking
responsibilities to the Federal Railroad Administrator. 49 CFR 1.49(m).
FRA is committed to the maximum feasible use of collaborative
processes in the development of safety regulations. Consistent with the
intent of Congress that FRA consult with the railroad industry, FRA
invited various organizations to participate in a working group
(Working Group) to focus on the issues related to passenger train
emergency preparedness and build the framework for the development of a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) and, ultimately, a final rule. FRA
held its first Working Group meeting on August 8, 1995. The 33-member
Working Group was comprised of representatives from the following
organizations:
American Public Transit Association (APTA),
Amtrak,
Association of American Railroads (AAR),
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE),
CALTRAIN,
FRA,
LIRR,
Maryland Mass Transit Administration (MARC),
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA),
METRA,
METRO-NORTH,
METROLINK,
National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP),
NTSB,
New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc. (NJTR),
Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District (NICTD),
PATH,
Safe Travel America (STA),
SEPTA,
TRI-RAIL,
TSC,
United Transportation Union (UTU), and
VRE.
Regulations covering rail passenger equipment safety standards--
inspection, testing, and maintenance of passenger equipment; equipment
design and performance criteria related to passenger and crew
survivability in the event of a train accident; and the safe operation
of passenger train service--supplementing existing railroad safety
standards, will be covered by a separate rulemaking and are being
addressed by a separate working group. Persons wishing to receive more
information regarding this other rulemaking should refer to FRA Docket
No. PCSS-1 and contact either Mr. Thomas Peacock, Staff Director,
Motive Power and Equipment Division, Office of Safety Assurance and
Compliance, RRS-14, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C.
20590 (telephone 202-632-3338), or Daniel L. Alpert, Esq., Trial
Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-632-3186).
The proposed rule was developed by FRA in consultation with the
Working Group. The proposal incorporates comments submitted by the
Working Group in response to a preliminary draft of the proposed rule
text. FRA expects that the Working Group will help FRA develop the
final rule based on a consensus process, with facts and analysis
flowing from both the Working Group's deliberations and information
submitted by commenters on this NPRM. In accordance with 49 U.S.C.
20133(d), the evolving positions of the Working Group members--as
reflected in the minutes of the group meetings and associated
documentation, together with data provided by the membership during
their deliberations--will be placed in the public docket of this
rulemaking. All comments submitted in response to this NPRM will be
provided to the Working Group for their consideration in preparation of
the final rule.
FRA convened the first meeting of the Working Group on August 8,
1995, by announcing that the purpose of the meeting was to provide an
opportunity to collectively focus on evaluating issues related to
passenger train emergency preparedness, as well as to develop and
formulate plans and programs that would culminate in a final rule. The
discussion focused on the key issues of emergency notification,
training of railroad employees and emergency responders, suitability of
on-board emergency equipment, and the Volpe Report. While FRA did not
limit the Working Group's discussions, the agency requested that, at a
minimum, the following topics and issues should be considered and
addressed during the consultation process for possible inclusion in the
rule:
Types of safety equipment that should be required in each
passenger car (e.g., fire extinguishers, saws, hammers, and
flashlights) including where the equipment should be located, who
should have access to it, and how to avoid pilferage;
Training for railroad employees on the use of on-board
emergency equipment;
Frequency of inspection of on-board emergency equipment;
Effective marking of emergency windows on each passenger
car;
Informing passengers about safety procedures and emergency
equipment, including locations of exit doors and windows;
Demonstrations by on-board crewmembers of emergency
procedures and exits after major station stops;
Communication capabilities of on-board crewmembers;
Requiring on-board crewmembers to be trained to provide
cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and/or first aid treatment;
Ensuring that on-board crewmembers have contact telephone
numbers for control centers and local authorities;
Requiring preparation of an emergency preparedness plan,
including periodic exercises to test employee knowledge of proper
procedures involving passenger illness or injury, stalled trains,
evacuation procedures, derailments, collisions, severe weather, and
security threats;
Coordinating applicable portions of emergency preparedness
plans between passenger railroads and freight railroads that host these
passenger operations;
Extent to which safety action plans should be regulated in
terms of content or format, and whether such plans should be subject to
FRA review and approval;
Training for auxiliary individuals participating in
passenger emergencies (e.g., control center employees, on-board service
staff, and appropriate supervisory and maintenance personnel);
Training for emergency responders along passenger corridor
routes;
Accounting for the unique emergency preparedness concerns
raised by passenger operations through tunnels, on elevated structures,
and in electrified territory;
Level of training specificity required for each category
of employee;
Requiring passenger railroads to develop and update inter-
organizational emergency protocols with local communities, in order to
augment safety action plans;
[[Page 8333]]
Providing emergency responders with accurate passenger
counts; and
Emergency lighting in passenger cars (e.g., floor strip
lighting, flood lighting, and emergency exit lighting), including
standards for testing and reliability.
FRA deliberated at length with members of the Working Group about
what the proposed rule would demand of affected railroads, in order to
achieve the goal of optimizing their level of preparedness when faced
with passenger train emergencies. The consensus was that the final rule
needed to be flexible in its requirements to allow each railroad to
address the unique characteristics of its individual operation. The
Working Group recommended that FRA require each affected railroad to
prepare a formal emergency preparedness plan covering broad elements,
such as: employee and emergency responder training; on-board crewmember
responsibilities; communication between the train crew and the control
center, and between the control center and the emergency responders;
delineation of passenger railroad and freight railroad responsibilities
in cases of joint operations; and operations in tunnels or over
elevated structures. However, the group urged FRA to afford railroads
considerable latitude to design and administer emergency preparedness
plans that best address each railroad's specific safety issues and
concerns, with each plan then subject to review and approval by FRA.
FRA incorporated the Working Group's recommendations into a draft
NPRM, and mailed the draft to the group on December 14, 1995, along
with a copy of the minutes of the first meeting of the Working Group.
Copies of both documents, and other relevant enclosures, have been
placed in the public docket for this rulemaking. The 34-member Working
Group held its second meeting on February 6-7, 1996, and was comprised
of representatives from the same organizations in attendance at the
first Working Group meeting. The Working Group reviewed the draft and
presented its comments, and a copy of the minutes of the second meeting
of the group has also been included in the rulemaking docket. The
Working Group's comments were then incorporated into this NPRM. Through
subsequent communication with the Working Group, additional specificity
has been incorporated into this proposal.
While FRA has focused on crafting a rule containing comprehensive
requirements in connection with railroads adopting, implementing, and
complying with their emergency preparedness plans, many details remain
unresolved concerning the enforcement obligations that FRA will impose
in the final rule. Among the broad range of possibilities, the final
rule could impose a ``reasonable care'' standard and focus on achieving
substantial compliance, with an emphasis on determining whether each
railroad has demonstrated a general effort to fulfill each of the
elements of its emergency preparedness plan. Under this approach, for
example, FRA would verify whether a railroad has established a training
program for its employees on the applicable provisions of the emergency
preparedness plan, and could impose a civil penalty on a railroad for
failing to comply with this basic element of emergency preparedness.
However, if FRA concluded that the railroad had properly adopted a
training program, but during the occurrence of an actual emergency
several employees failed (under the stress of the situation) to fulfill
all of their responsibilities under the emergency preparedness plan,
FRA would not penalize the railroad. Also, if a railroad failed to
designate an employee to maintain a current list of emergency telephone
numbers, for use by control center personnel to notify outside
emergency responders, adjacent rail modes of transportation, and
appropriate railroad officials that a passenger train emergency has
occurred, FRA could clearly penalize the railroad for this omission.
However, if a railroad's plan properly provided for the maintenance of
the list of emergency telephone numbers, but one telephone number on a
long list of accurate numbers was found by FRA to be out of date, and
thus incorrect, the railroad would not face the imposition of a civil
penalty.
As an alternative, FRA could maintain strict oversight by requiring
compliance with every individual element of the emergency preparedness
plan, and impose a civil penalty in every instance in which a railroad
fails to achieve compliance. Accordingly, under this approach, a
railroad could be penalized for failing to constantly update its list
of emergency telephone numbers, neglecting to distribute applicable
portions of its emergency preparedness plan to all on-line emergency
responders, or operating a train with an incorrect type of on-board
emergency equipment. Rather than stress the concept of determining the
overall level of emergency preparedness achieved by a railroad before
the emergency occurs, this enforcement philosophy would specifically
focus on whether the railroad in fact complied with all of the written
emergency plan procedures for implementing each plan element. FRA
invites commenters to address the questions of what compliance
obligations should exist in the final rule, in the context of requiring
railroads to adopt and implement procedures for achieving emergency
preparedness, and what enforcement policy should be exercised by the
agency regarding those obligations. Commenters are also asked to review
the language of the section-by-section analysis and rule text of the
proposed rule and to offer suggestions on whether FRA's expectations
for compliance with the emergency preparedness plan elements are too
rigid, or not strict enough.
In drafting the final rule, FRA also expects to incorporate all
relevant information derived from the investigation of the accident
involving Amtrak train no. 1, the ``Sunset Limited,'' which occurred in
Hyder, Arizona on October 9, 1995. In that accident, the initial
notification was made by the Amtrak locomotive engineer to the Southern
Pacific Transportation Company (SP) train dispatcher's office in
Denver, Colorado, which then notified the appropriate local emergency
response agencies. The SP yardmaster in Phoenix Yard also dialed 911
after hearing the engineer's radio transmissions to the train
dispatcher.
While the local emergency responders stated that the accident was
handled well by all parties involved, the responders noted that they
were hampered in reaching the accident site by extremely rough terrain,
initially negotiable only by four-wheel drive vehicles until graders
and earth movers created a trail for conventional vehicles. The
responders were somewhat confused by being provided with only a
milepost location instead of a more familiar identifier. The responders
were also frustrated by the lack of an accurate passenger count, but
Amtrak has stated that once it has satellite cellular telephone
capabilities train conductors will report passenger counts to a central
telephone number after leaving each station. In addition, the
responders indicated that, although the emergency lighting did not
function on the overturned passenger cars, passengers were able to
disembark through the car doors and emergency windows.
FRA also expects to include requirements in the final rule relating
to emergency egress from passenger trains, based upon information
obtained from the investigations of the two recent train accidents in
New Jersey and Maryland.
[[Page 8334]]
In the first accident, a near-head-on collision occurred on February 9,
1996 between NJTR trains 1254 and 1107 at milepost 2.8, on the
borderline of Secaucus and Jersey City, New Jersey. Of the 331
passengers and crew on both trains, two crewmembers and one passenger
were fatally injured, and an additional 162 passengers reported minor
injuries. In the second accident, a near-head-on collision occurred on
February 16, 1996 between MARC train 286 and Amtrak train 29 on CSX
Transportation, Inc., at Silver Spring, Maryland, milepost 8.3. The
accident resulted in 11 fatalities, consisting of three crewmembers and
eight passengers, and at least 12 non-fatal injuries to passengers of
the MARC train.
While many of the questions raised by the New Jersey and Maryland
train accidents are being addressed by the working group which is
considering regulations covering rail passenger equipment safety
standards, the important issue of emergency egress must be addressed by
this rulemaking. Specifically, the Silver Spring accident raised
serious concerns as to whether MARC passengers had sufficient
information about the location and operation of emergency exits to
enable them to find and use those exits in an emergency or accident.
FRA believes that all commuter and intercity passenger railroads should
review their practices, in addition to marking the exits, for providing
this information. On February 20, 1996, FRA issued Emergency Order No.
20 (Notice No. 1), which required prompt action to immediately enhance
passenger train operating rules and emergency egress and to develop an
interim system safety plan addressing cab car forward and multiple unit
(MU) operations. 61 FR 6876, Feb. 22, 1996. In pertinent part, Notice
No. 1 of the Emergency Order stated:
[T]here is a need to ensure that emergency exits are clearly
marked and in operable condition on all passenger lines, regardless
of the equipment used or train control system. FRA's regulations
generally require that all passenger cars be equipped with at least
four emergency opening windows, which must be designed to permit
rapid and easy removal during a crisis situation. The investigation
of the Silver Spring accident has raised some concerns that at least
some of the occupants of the MARC train attempted unsuccessfully to
exit through the windows. Whether those same people eventually were
among those who exited safely, or whether those persons were
attempting to open windows that were not emergency windows is not
known at this time. However, there is sufficient reason for concern
to require that measures be taken to ensure that such windows are
readily identifiable and operable when they are needed. Accordingly,
the order requires that any emergency windows that are not already
legibly marked as such on the inside and outside be so marked, and
that a representative sample of all such windows be examined to
ensure operability. (FRA Safety Glazing Standards, 49 CFR Part 223,
require that each passenger car have a minimum of four emergency
window exits ``designed to permit rapid and easy removal during a
crisis situation.'')
61 FR 6880, Feb. 22, 1996.
On February 29, 1996, FRA issued Notice No. 2 to Emergency Order
No. 20 to refine three aspects of the original order, including
providing more detailed guidance on the emergency egress sampling
provision. 61 FR 8703, Mar. 5, 1996. In pertinent part, Notice No. 2 of
the Emergency Order stated:
The original order required but did not set parameters for
testing a representative sample of emergency exits. The alteration
to the emergency egress provisions requires that sampling of
emergency window exits be conducted in conformity with either of two
alternate methods commonly recognized for such efforts. This
modification provides a degree of uniformity industry wide. These
methods require sampling meeting a 95 percent confidence level that
all emergency window exits operate properly (i.e., the methods do
not accept a defect rate of 5 percent). Although the original order
would have required testing all exits on a specific series or type
of car if one such car had a defective window exit, the amended
order permits the use of these commonly accepted sampling techniques
to determine how many additional windows in [sic] test. In general,
these principles require that the greater the percentage of windows
initially found defective, the greater the percentage of windows
that will have to be tested.
In addition, FRA has modified the emergency egress portion of
the order to clarify that the exterior marking requirement applies
to those windows that may be employed for access by emergency
responders, which may be windows other than, or in addition to,
those designed for emergency egress for passengers. In addition, FRA
has modified the interim system safety plan portion of the order to
require discussion of the railroad's programs and plans for liaison
with and training of emergency responders with respect to emergency
access to passengers. The original order required discussion only of
methods used to inform passengers of the location and method of
emergency exits.
61 FR 8703, Mar. 5, 1996.
On March 12, 1996, in response to the MARC train accident in Silver
Spring, Maryland on February 16, 1996, the NTSB issued ``Safety
Recommendations'' to both the Maryland Mass Transit Administration (R-
96-4 through R-96-6) and FRA (R-96-7). The NTSB was concerned because
the emergency quick-release mechanisms for the exterior doors on MARC's
Sumitomo rail cars are located in a secured cabinet some distance from
the doors that they control, and the emergency controls for each door
are not readily accessible and identifiable. The NTSB recommends that
emergency quick-release mechanisms for exterior doors on MARC cars be
well marked and relocated, so that they are immediately adjacent to the
door control and readily accessible for emergency escape. The NTSB also
noted that the left and right rear exterior side doors of the first car
and the front interior end door and the right front exterior door of
the second car were jammed, and observed that none of the car doors had
removable windows or pop-out emergency escape panels (kick panels) for
use in an emergency.
In addition, the NTSB stated that several train passengers were
unaware of the locations of emergency exits, and none knew how to
operate them. The NTSB found that the interior emergency window decals
were not prominently displayed and that one car had no interior
emergency window decals. Also, the exterior emergency decals were often
faded or obliterated, and the information on them, when legible,
directed emergency responders to another sign at the end of the car for
instructions on how to open emergency exits. The NTSB recommends that
all emergency exits be clearly identified, with easily understood
operating instructions prominently located on each car's interior for
use by passengers and on the exterior for use by emergency responders.
Based upon its investigation, the NTSB recommends that FRA:
Inspect all commuter rail equipment to determine whether it has:
(1) easily accessible interior emergency quick-release mechanisms
adjacent to exterior passageway doors; (2) removable windows or kick
panels in interior and exterior passageway doors; and (3)
prominently displayed retroreflective signage marking all interior
and exterior emergency exits. If any commuter equipment lacks one or
more or these features, take appropriate emergency measures to
ensure corrective action until these measures are incorporated into
minimum passenger car safety standards. (Class 1, Urgent Action) (R-
96-7)
Safety Recommendation R-96-7 at page 3.
On March 26, 1996, FRA convened a joint meeting of the Passenger
Train Emergency Preparedness Working Group and the Passenger Equipment
Safety Standards Working Group to discuss the NTSB's recommendations
and incorporate the Safety Board's findings, as appropriate, into each
working group's rulemaking proceeding.
[[Page 8335]]
Fifty-seven members from 21 different organizations attended the joint
meeting. Although some of the recommendations involving structural
modifications to rail equipment will be dealt with by the Passenger
Equipment Safety Standards Working Group, the remaining NTSB
recommendations involving marking, inspection, maintenance, and repair
of emergency exits are reflected in proposed Sec. 223.9(d), entitled
``Requirements for new or rebuilt equipment,'' and proposed
Sec. 239.17, entitled ``Emergency exits.'' The Section-by-Section
Analysis contains a detailed discussion of FRA's proposed requirements,
particularly in light of the two recent accidents in New Jersey and
Maryland and the NTSB's safety investigations and recommendations.
In a letter to FRA dated June 24, 1996, Mr. Donald N. Nelson,
President of Metro-North and Chairperson of APTA's Commuter Railroad
Committee, announced that commuter railroads nationwide are
implementing a series of rail passenger safety initiatives building on
the safety provisions of FRA's Emergency Order No. 20 and the NTSB's
Safety Recommendations R-96-4 through R-96-7. In pertinent part, all
commuter rail authorities have committed to early voluntary
implementation of the emergency preparedness requirements proposed in
this NPRM, including requiring inspection and testing of all emergency
window exits as part of routine car maintenance to ensure correct
operation and ease of egress, offering emergency responder training for
every jurisdiction within each commuter railroad's service area, and
educating passengers on the use of emergency exits on commuter trains.
The commuter railroads also indicated that each one will ensure the
safety of its operation by adopting a comprehensive system safety plan
that:
(a) Defines the overall safety effort, how it is to be implemented
and the staff required to maintain it;
(b) Establishes the safety interface within the railroad, as well
as with its key outside agencies;
(c) Clearly indicates Senior Management support for implementing
the safety plan and the railroad's overall commitment to safety;
(d) Establishes the safety philosophy of the organization and
provides the means for implementation;
(e) Defines the authority and responsibilities of the safety
organization and delineates the safety related authority and
responsibilities of other departments; and
(f) Incorporates safety goals and objectives into the overall
corporate strategic plan.
APTA's Commuter Railroad Committee letter at pages 1 and 2.
As part of the ongoing review process within DOT, and subsequent to
the Working Group's previous opportunities to review the proposed rule
text, FRA implemented changes to the draft regulatory text and
preamble. FRA initiated these changes in order to strengthen the rule's
requirements and establish more objective criteria for FRA's review of
each railroad's emergency preparedness plan. In a letter dated December
27, 1996, FRA sent a copy of the revised regulatory text to members of
the Working Group, and requested comments on issues that the members
wished to see included in the preamble section of the proposal. FRA
requested that all comments be submitted to FRA by the close of
business on January 8, 1997.
Development of the Passenger Safety Program
As discussed above, this proposed rule is one element of a
comprehensive effort to address the safety of rail passenger service.
In addition to this rulemaking, FRA is currently addressing related
issues in several contexts. Recent actions addressing passenger safety
needs have included, for instance, Emergency Order No. 20, which
addressed on an interim basis key issues regarding railroad operating
rules, inspection of required emergency window exits, and emergency
exit signage and marking.
In the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group, FRA is
examining possible requirements for improved emergency egress features
for both retrofit and new construction. Affected railroads have already
completed, or will complete by the end of this calendar year, the
removal of latches requiring special tools for access to manual
releases on powered doors. Separately, FRA is reviewing the totality of
emergency egress requirements and the issue of their overall adequacy,
including the relocation of manual releases to locations immediately
adjacent to end vestibule doors. FRA anticipates that these efforts
will be advanced through a collaborative rulemaking process. However,
if necessary to ensure prompt action, FRA may propose specific
requirements based upon its own staff analysis.
In the context of improving railroad communications, the Railroad
Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) has established a working group to
specifically address communication facilities and procedures, with a
strong emphasis on passenger train emergency requirements. FRA expects
that that group will report recommendations to the RSAC early in 1997.
FRA anticipates that those recommendations will address the issue of
whether there should be redundant communications capability on all
passenger trains. Although that rulemaking will establish minimum
safety requirements with respect to communications equipment, it should
be noted that intercity and commuter railroads already make extensive
provision for ensuring communication capabilities during emergencies.
FRA plans a four-phase process to address emergency preparedness.
In 1994, FRA distributed the Volpe Report described above and
encouraged railroads to examine their existing programs to determine
what improvements could be made. This rulemaking represents the second
step in this process, formalizing a planning requirement and
identifying certain mandatory elements. The third phase will begin as
FRA reviews railroad plans to determine that the issues presented by
the Volpe Report and the rule have been adequately addressed within the
varying contexts of the commuter authority operations. FRA will conduct
a detailed review of each plan. Following review and formal approval of
written plan submissions, it will also be necessary for FRA to
determine how the program is being implemented in the field. FRA will
also be interested in determining how this effort is being integrated
into the overall system safety planning process that commuter
authorities have agreed to undertake.
FRA is optimistic that this approach will yield positive results,
promoting creativity and cross-fertilization of the emergency
preparedness planning process through FRA, APTA, and other channels.
This give-and-take approach should facilitate standardization of
matters involving interface with passengers, while permitting continued
adaptation of programs to local needs.
The fourth phase would involve FRA's review, after having gained at
least a full year of actual experience under the standards proposed
here, of the implementation and effectiveness of the standards and
related voluntary developments. In this phase of activity, FRA would
work with interested parties to evaluate whether further rulemaking or
other action might be necessary to ensure that, for each program
element, standards and practices are sufficiently precise and stringent
to achieve the desired improvements in emergency
[[Page 8336]]
preparedness. Further, this review will determine whether experience in
working with emergency responders indicates that additional program
elements should be addressed.
Section-by-Section Analysis
FRA proposes to amend Part 223 to Title 49, Code of Federal
Regulations by adding three new definitions and requiring railroads
operating passenger train service to clearly mark emergency windows.
FRA also proposes to add Part 239 to Title 49, Code of Federal
Regulations specifically devoted to prescribing minimum Federal safety
standards concerning the preparation, adoption, and implementation of
emergency preparedness plans by railroads connected with the operation
of passenger trains.
1. Definitions: Section 223.5
Section 223.5 would be reorganized and definitions of three
important terms employed in the proposed passenger train emergency
preparedness regulations would be added. The three new defined terms
are ``emergency responder,'' ``passenger train service,'' and
``railroad.'' For ease of reference, FRA proposes to define the term
``railroad'' so as to include the statutory (49 U.S.C. 20102)
definitions of both ``railroad'' and ``railroad carrier'' and to
clarify that those who provide railroad transportation directly or
through an operating contractor are railroad carriers. Thus, the term
``railroad'' is clearly intended to include commuter authorities. These
terms are intended to have the same meaning as in proposed part 239 of
this chapter.
Of course, the term ``railroad,'' as used by FRA in the context of
regulating passenger train emergency preparedness, is not controlled by
the definitions of ``rail carrier'' and ``railroad'' set forth in 49
U.S.C. 20102 (5) and (6). Likewise, FRA does not intend for its
definition of ``railroad'' to have any bearing on how the term is used
for purposes of the regulatory activities of the Surface Transportation
Board.
2. Requirements for New or Rebuilt Equipment: Section 223.9
In accordance with the requirements of 49 CFR 223.9(c) and
223.15(c), all passenger cars must be equipped with at least four
emergency windows, which must be designed to permit rapid and easy
removal during a crisis situation. Proposed paragraph 223.9(d) requires
that all windows intended by a railroad to be used during an emergency
situation be properly marked inside and outside, and that the railroad
post clear and understandable instructions for their use at the
designated locations.
Paragraph 223.9(d)(1) requires that the emergency windows be
conspicuously and legibly marked on the inside of the car with
luminescent material. FRA realizes that during an emergency the main
power supply to the passenger cars may become inoperative and that
crewmembers with portable flashlights may be unavailable. Since lack of
clear identification or lighting could make it difficult for passengers
to find the emergency exits, the proposed rule requires luminescent
material on all emergency windows to assist and speed passenger egress
from the train during an emergency. The marking of the emergency
windows must be conspicuous enough so that a reasonable person, even
while enduring the stress and panic of an emergency evacuation, can
determine where the closest and most accessible emergency route out of
the car is located. In addition, while this proposed section does not
prescribe a particular brand, type, or color of luminescent paint or
material that a railroad must use to identify a window exit, FRA
expects each railroad to select a material durable enough to withstand
the daily effects of passenger traffic, such as the contact that occurs
as passengers enter and leave the cars.
METROLINK, in noting that the last line of paragraph 223.9(d)
requires ``each railroad [to] post clear and legible operating
instructions at or near such exits,'' stated that it assumes that the
referenced instructions relate to the doors rather than the windows.
Paragraph 223.9(d)(2) requires that the emergency windows intended
for emergency access by emergency responders for extrication of
passengers be marked with retroreflective material. Since FRA
recognizes that not every window will be equipped for emergency access,
railroads are required to choose a retroreflective, unique and easily
recognizable symbol that will readily attract the attention of
emergency responders. The proposed rule does not require a specific
size or shape for the symbol, but FRA expects the railroad's emergency
preparedness plan developed pursuant to Sec. 239.13 of this chapter to
contain a provision detailing emergency responder access (along with
passenger car egress), consistent with the evacuation strategy
formulated jointly by the passenger train operator and the emergency
responder organizations, in accordance with the emergency responder
liaison provision set forth in Sec. 239.13(a)(5) of this chapter. Of
course, while the proposed rule would not require emergency responders
to participate in evacuation planning or strategy with the railroads,
the railroads would be required to offer liaison assistance. FRA is
working to identify an appropriate marking that might be capable of
universal recognition. Although the proposed rule allows a marking that
could consist of a symbol or words (such as ``RESCUE ACCESS''), FRA
reserves the right to be more prescriptive in the final rule based upon
a uniform pattern.
The proposed rule requires railroads to post clear and
understandable instructions at designated locations describing how to
operate the emergency windows. This paragraph does not mandate that
railroads use specific words or phrases to guide the passengers and
emergency responders. Instead, each railroad should evaluate the
operational characteristics of its emergency windows, and select key
words or diagrams that adequately inform the individuals who must use
them. While railroads are encouraged to post comprehensive
instructions, FRA also realizes that during an emergency situation
every additional moment devoted to reading and understanding access or
egress information places lives at risk. In addition, FRA would already
expect passengers and emergency responders to be familiar with the
location and operation of the railroad's emergency windows as a result
of emergency responder liaison activities and passenger awareness
programs conducted in accordance with Secs. 239.13 (a)(5) and (a)(7) of
this chapter.
3. Appendix B to 49 CFR Part 223
FRA plans to revise Appendix B to 49 CFR Part 223--Schedule of
Civil Penalties, to include penalties for violations of the provisions
of Sec. 223.9(d) to be included in the final rule. Because such penalty
schedules are statements of policy, notice and comment are not required
prior to their issuance. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A). Nevertheless,
commenters are invited to submit suggestions to FRA describing the
types of actions or omissions that would subject a person to the
assessment of a civil penalty. Commenters are also invited to recommend
what penalties may be appropriate, based upon the relative seriousness
of each type of violation.
4. Purpose and Scope: Section 239.1
Section 239.1(a) states that the purpose of this part is to reduce
the magnitude of casualties in railroad operations by ensuring that
railroads involved in passenger train operations can effectively and
efficiently manage emergencies. Subsection (b) states that
[[Page 8337]]
these regulations provide minimum standards for the subjects addressed,
and the affected railroads may adopt more stringent requirements, so
long as they are not inconsistent with this part. FRA does not in any
way intend that the subject matter of 49 CFR Part 239, Passenger Train
Emergency Preparedness, be read to impose burdens or requirements on
emergency responders who either participate with railroads in emergency
simulations involving the operation of passenger train service or
respond to actual emergency situations, or on any other person who may
be involved with the aftermath of a passenger train emergency not
specified in proposed Sec. 239.3 concerning applicability. Accordingly,
FRA does not intend to restrict a State from adopting a law, rule,
regulation, order, or standard affecting emergency responders.
5. Application: Section 239.3
As a general matter, FRA proposes that this rule apply to all
railroads that operate passenger train service on the general railroad
system of transportation, provide commuter or other short-haul
passenger train service in a metropolitan or suburban area, or host the
operations of such passenger train service. A public authority that
indirectly provides passenger train service by contracting out the
actual operation to another railroad or independent contractor would be
regulated by FRA as a railroad under the provisions of the proposed
rule. Although the public authority would ultimately be responsible for
the development and implementation of an emergency preparedness plan
(along with all related recordkeeping requirements), the railroad or
other independent contractor that operates the authority's passenger
train service would be expected to fulfill all of the responsibilities
under this part with respect to emergency preparedness planning,
including implementation.
The proposed rule is structured to apply to intercity and commuter
service, not tourist operations. At a later time, FRA may propose
application of the rule, or some portion thereof, to tourist, scenic,
historic, and excursion railroads. FRA's regulatory authority permits
it to tailor the applicability sections of its various regulations so
as to expand or contract the populations of railroads covered by a
particular set of regulations. FRA has had jurisdiction over all
railroads since the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 was enacted.
In considering the issue of requiring emergency preparedness
planning by tourist and historic railroad operators in the context of
this rulemaking, FRA has not yet had the opportunity to fully consult
with those railroads and their associations to determine appropriate
applicability in light of financial, operational, or other factors that
may be unique to such railroad operations. After appropriate
consultation with the excursion railroad associations takes place,
emergency preparedness requirements for these operations may be
prescribed by FRA that are different from those affecting other types
of passenger train operations. These requirements may be more or less
onerous, or simply different in detail, depending in part on the
information gathered during FRA's consultation process.
The Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994 instructed
FRA to examine the unique circumstances of tourist railroads when
establishing safety regulations. The Act, which amended 49 U.S.C.
20103, stated that:
In prescribing regulations that pertain to railroad safety that
affect tourist, historic, scenic, or excursion railroad carriers,
the Secretary of Transportation shall take into consideration any
financial, operational, or other factors that may be unique to such
railroad carriers. The Secretary shall submit a report to Congress
not later than September 30, 1995, on actions taken under this
subsection.
Public Law No. 103-440, Sec. 217, 108 Stat. 4619, 4624 (November 2,
1994). In addition, section 215 of that Act specifically permits FRA to
exempt equipment used by tourist, historic, scenic, and excursion
railroads to transport passengers from the initial regulations that
must be prescribed by November 2, 1997. 49 U.S.C. 20133(b)(1). In its
report to Congress entitled ``Regulatory Actions Affecting Tourist
Railroads,'' FRA responded to the direction in the statutory provision
and also provided additional information related to tourist railroad
safety for consideration of the Congress. FRA will address the
emergency preparedness concerns for these unique types of operations at
a later date in a separate rulemaking proceeding. To facilitate
resolution of this issue, and a significant number of related issues,
the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) has established a Tourist
and Historic Railroads Working Group. As a matter of cost efficiency,
the Working Group may elect to cover emergency preparedness planning
for tourist railroads as part of a package of tourist-specific safety
proposals during a multi-day consultation on several rulemaking
dockets. FRA would then issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
addressing issues in several dockets that pertain to these smaller
passenger operations.
In Sec. 239.3(b)(2), FRA proposes that the requirements of this
part would not apply to the operation of private passenger train cars,
including business or office cars and circus trains. While FRA believes
that a private passenger car operation should be held to the same basic
level of emergency preparedness planning as other passenger train
operations, FRA intends to take into account the financial burden
imposed by requiring private passenger car owners and operators to
conform to the requirements of this part. Private passenger cars are
often hauled by host railroads such as Amtrak and commuter railroads,
and these hosts often impose their own safety requirements on the
operation of the private passenger cars. Pursuant to this part, the
host railroads would already be required to have emergency preparedness
plans in place to protect the safety of their own passengers; the
private car passengers would presumably benefit from these plans even
without the rule directly covering private car owners or operators. In
the case of non-revenue passengers, including employees and guests of
railroads that are transported in business and office cars, as well as
passengers traveling on circus trains, the railroads would provide for
their safety in accordance with existing safety operating procedures
and protocols relating to normal freight train operations.
6. Preemptive Effect: Section 239.5
Section 239.5 informs the public as to FRA's views regarding the
preemptive effect of the proposed rule. While the presence or absence
of such a section does not in itself affect the preemptive effect of
this part, it informs the public concerning the statutory provision
which governs the preemptive effect of these rules. Section 20106 of
title 49 of the United States Code provides that all regulations
prescribed by the Secretary relating to railroad safety preempt any
State law, regulation, or order covering the same subject matter,
except a provision necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially
local safety hazard that is not incompatible with a Federal law,
regulation, or order and that does not unreasonably burden interstate
commerce. With the exception of a provision directed at an essentially
local safety hazard, 49 U.S.C. 20106 preempts any State regulatory
agency rule covering the same subject matter as these regulations
proposed today.
Of course, the subject matter of these regulations covers only the
preparation,
[[Page 8338]]
adoption, and implementation of emergency preparedness plans for
passenger train operations. Accordingly, States are in no way preempted
from regulating any of the training requirements or other activities of
the non-railroad emergency responders who arrive at the scene of an
emergency after a railroad's emergency preparedness plan has been
activated.
7. Definitions: Section 239.7
This section contains an extensive set of definitions to introduce
the regulations. FRA intends these definitions to clarify the meaning
of important terms as they are used in the text of the proposed rule.
The proposed definitions are carefully worded in an attempt to minimize
the potential for misinterpretation of the rule. Several of the
definitions introduce new concepts which require further discussion.
Although the definition of ``crewmember'' is primarily intended to
cover persons who either perform on-board functions connected with the
movement of a train (e.g., a locomotive engineer, conductor) or provide
on-board service (e.g., an Amtrak food service employee or sleeping car
attendant), a deadheading employee is covered by the definition as
well. Accordingly, such an employee could count as a ``qualified''
employee under Sec. 239.101(a)(2)(iv) for purposes of meeting a
railroad's minimum on-board staffing requirements for its emergency
preparedness plan. However, during a passenger train emergency
situation, off-duty employees would also be expected to assume their
appropriate roles under the railroad's emergency preparedness plan and
assist the passengers. METROLINK indicated that on some trains it has
conductors who perform the function of fare enforcement, and
recommended that FRA exclude these individuals from the definition of
``crewmember.'' METROLINK also requested that FRA exclude contract food
workers from the definition of ``crewmember.''
The term ``control center'' envisions not only the traditional
railroad concept of a train dispatcher's office, but also railroad
offices that are identified as ``control centers'' but only monitor
railroad operations, and modern system operations centers such as those
of CSX Transportation, Inc., in Jacksonville, Florida and the
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation in Ft. Worth, Texas. The term
does not include a location on a railroad with responsibility for the
security of railroad property, personnel, or passengers.
It is very likely that control center personnel are located at
facilities which are remote from the right-of-way. These facilities
should consist of the necessary command, control, and communications
equipment to maintain normal train operations, to control electric
traction, and to maintain communications throughout the passenger train
system. In addition to these functions, the control center should help
coordinate responses to emergencies by using equipment such as radio
communications systems, direct ``hotline'' telephones, wayside power
removal controls, and ventilation controls under the direction of
emergency responders, according to the protocols and procedures of the
emergency preparedness plan.
Typical emergency scenarios encompassed by the term ``emergency''
or ``emergency situation'' involving a significant threat to the safety
or health of one or more persons requiring immediate action may include
one or more of the following: illness or injury; a stalled train in a
tunnel or on a bridge; collision with a person, including suicides;
collision or derailment; fire; collision or derailment with a fire;
collision or derailment with water immersion; severe weather
conditions; natural disasters; and security situations (e.g., bombings,
bomb threats, hijacking, civil disorders, and other acts of terrorism).
The term ``qualified,'' as used in the rule, means employees who
are trained under an applicable emergency preparedness plan's
components and implies no provision or requirement for Federal
certification of persons who perform those functions.
The definition of ``railroad'' is based upon 49 U.S.C. 20102 (1)
and (2), and encompasses any person providing railroad transportation
directly or indirectly, including a commuter rail authority that
provides railroad transportation by contracting out the operation of
the railroad to another person, as well as any form of nonhighway
ground transportation that runs on rails or electromagnetic guideways,
but excludes urban rapid transit not connected to the general system.
The terms explained here are not exhaustive of the definitions that
are proposed for inclusion in Sec. 239.7. This introduction merely
provides a sampling of the most important concepts of the proposed
rule. Many other terms are defined and explained in the section-by-
section analysis when analyzing the actual proposed rule text to which
they apply.
8. Responsibility for Compliance: Section 239.9
Section 239.9 clarifies FRA's position that the requirements
contained in the proposed rules are applicable to any ``person,''
including a contractor, that performs any function required by the
proposed rules. Although all sections of the proposed rule address the
duties of a railroad, FRA intends that any person who performs any
action required by this part on behalf of a railroad is required to
perform that action in the same manner as required of a railroad or be
subject to FRA enforcement action. For example, if an independent
contractor is hired by a railroad to maintain its records of
inspection, maintenance, and repair of emergency window and door exits,
pursuant to proposed Sec. 239.17, the contractor would be required to
perform those duties in the same manner as required by a railroad.
9. Penalties: Section 239.11
Section 239.11 identifies the penalties that FRA may impose upon
any person, including a railroad or an independent contractor providing
goods or services to a railroad, that violates any requirement of this
part. These penalties are authorized by 49 U.S.C. 21301, 21304, and
21311, formerly contained in Sec. 209 of the Federal Railroad Safety
Act of 1970 (Safety Act) (49 U.S.C. 20101-20117, 20131, 20133-20141,
20143, 21301, 21302, 21304, 21311, 24902, and 24905, and Secs. 4(b)(1),
(i), and (t) of Public Law 103-272, formerly codified at 45 U.S.C. 421,
431 et seq.). The penalty provision parallels penalty provisions
included in numerous other regulations issued by FRA under authority of
the provisions of law formerly contained in the Safety Act.
Essentially, any person who violates any requirement of this part or
causes the violation of any such requirement will be subject to a civil
penalty of at least $500 and not more than $10,000 per violation. Civil
penalties may be assessed against individuals only for willful
violations, and where a grossly negligent violation or a pattern of
repeated violations creates an imminent hazard of death or injury to
persons, or causes death or injury, a penalty not to exceed $20,000 per
violation may be assessed. In addition, each day a violation continues
will constitute a separate offense. Finally, a person may be subject to
criminal penalties for knowingly and willfully falsifying reports
required by these regulations. FRA believes that the inclusion of
penalty provisions for failure to comply with the regulations is
important in
[[Page 8339]]
ensuring that compliance is achieved not only in terms of developing
and implementing emergency preparedness plans, but also to better
determine if railroads are planning ahead to minimize the consequences
of emergencies that could occur.
The final rule will include a schedule of civil penalties in an
Appendix A to 49 CFR Part 239, to be used in connection with this part.
Because such penalty schedules are statements of policy, notice and
comment are not required prior to their issuance. See 5 U.S.C.
553(b)(3)(A). Nevertheless, commenters are invited to submit
suggestions to FRA describing the types of actions or omissions under
each regulatory section that would subject a person to the assessment
of a civil penalty. Commenters are also invited to recommend what
penalties may be appropriate, based upon the relative seriousness of
each type of violation.
10. Emergency Preparedness Plan: Section 239.101
In drafting the proposed rule, FRA recognized that the operations
of each individual passenger train system must be considered in the
development and implementation of effective emergency preparedness
programs. Factors which should be considered include system sizes and
route locations, types of passenger cars and motive power units, types
of right-of-way structures and wayside facilities, and numbers of
passengers carried, as well as internal railroad organizations and
outside emergency response resources. Under the proposed rule, each
railroad subject to the regulation is required to establish an
emergency preparedness plan designed to safely manage emergencies and
minimize subsequent trauma and injury to passengers and on-board
railroad personnel. The plan must reflect the railroad's policies,
plans, and readiness procedures for addressing emergencies. The
railroad is expected to employ its best efforts, under the
circumstances of the emergency situation, to execute the provisions of
its plan.
In their development of emergency preparedness plans, FRA
encourages railroads to integrate, as practicable, the recommended
guidelines contained in the Volpe Report. The report provides a
comprehensive degree of specificity. While the proposed rule does not
require the special level of detail reflected in the Volpe Report, FRA
advocates that railroads voluntarily incorporate such elements and
items as appropriate into the development of their own emergency
preparedness plans, and exclude recommendations only after judicious
consideration.
While FRA stresses that each railroad should retain latitude in
developing an emergency preparedness plan appropriate for its
operations, the plan must provide a comprehensive overview, make clear
and positive statements to railroad employees, and contain
implementation details concerning the roles, responsibilities, and
expectations for employee participation. The plan does not have to be
one single document with every section applying to every railroad
employee and location; instead, the plan may consist of multiple
documents, with a separate section of the plan detailing the specific
responsibilities for each job category or function. In instances where
a freight railroad hosts the operations of a passenger railroad, both
railroads would have to address issues of emergency preparedness.
However, the rule would require the hosting freight railroad to develop
only the applicable portions of an emergency preparedness plan uniquely
dealing with the passenger operations not otherwise addressed.
The majority of passenger train operational difficulties are
handled effectively and do not become emergencies. Since in many
instances a train crew can immediately take action to resolve a problem
and potential emergency without evacuating the train, existing
emergency preparedness policies de-emphasize immediate evacuation from
trains located between stations unless passengers and crews are in
immediate danger. Accordingly, in most situations, after notifying the
control center that a problem exists and receiving permission, the
train crew will move the train to the nearest station or safe location
(e.g., outside a tunnel) before taking further action. If the train
crew is unable to resolve the situation, railroad personnel or outside
emergency responders may be sent to the emergency scene to provide
mechanical aid, alternate transportation, or medical assistance.
The effectiveness of a railroad's overall response under its
emergency preparedness plan will be greatly influenced by the type of
emergency with which the train crew is presented (e.g., injury or
illness, stalled train, suicide or accidental collision with a person,
derailment or collision, smoke or fire, severe weather conditions or
natural disasters, and vandalism or sabotage). The response will also
be affected by the characteristics and type of train involved and the
functional status of electrical and mechanical systems, including
lighting, ventilation, and public address systems. In addition, the
operational environment (e.g., a train is located in a tunnel, on an
elevated structure, or in electrified territory), and the type of
right-of-way structure or wayside facility must be addressed, as
appropriate, in each railroad's emergency preparedness plan.
The emergency preparedness plan should establish a chain of command
which assigns functions and responsibilities to appropriate passenger
railroad operating personnel, while recognizing the authority and
responsibilities of emergency responders. Coordination is important to
the ability of all parties to respond appropriately to an emergency,
regardless of its size and location. Documentation, including
applicable portions of the emergency preparedness plan, protocols, and
procedures within rulebooks, manuals, and guidelines for control center
employees and on-board personnel, provides the basic framework for
coordination between all internal parties responding to an emergency.
This internal documentation should address at least the following
issues:
Delineation of functions and responsibilities during
emergencies for passenger railroad operating personnel, including
control center personnel;
Telephone numbers of railroad personnel and emergency
responders who need to be notified;
Criteria for determining whether an emergency exists and
requires assistance from emergency responders;
Procedures for determining the specific type, location,
and severity of the emergency, and thus which response is appropriate;
Procedures for notifying emergency responders; and
Procedures and decision-making criteria for transferring
incident responsibility from the passenger railroad operator to
emergency responders.
Section 239.101 sets forth the general requirement that railroads
shall develop and comply with their own emergency preparedness plans
and written procedures to implement their own plans for addressing
issues of emergency preparedness, that meet Federal minimum standards.
Paragraph 239.101(a) requires all railroads affected by this proposed
part to develop and implement written procedures to fulfill each
applicable element of this section. Depending on the nature of a
railroad's operations, as well as on whether its operations involve a
host freight railroad, different elements of this proposed section may
be fulfilled by more than one entity. While FRA requires all elements
of this section to
[[Page 8340]]
be addressed for each passenger train operation, the rule does not
mandate that every element be addressed in each affected entity's
emergency preparedness plan. Accordingly, if a passenger train service
operator relies on its freight railroad host to notify outside
emergency responders after an emergency occurs, FRA would permit the
freight railroad's emergency preparedness plan to address this element.
Provided that both entities properly coordinate their emergency
preparedness plans (and include cross-reference citations to each
other's plan), the passenger train service operator's plan could omit
this item and still be in compliance with the proposed rule.
The proposed rule would not require that the public authority and
the operating railroad or independent contractor each file a separate
emergency preparedness plan with FRA if the operating railroad or
independent contractor is the only party performing a function under
the regulation. However, each party's responsibility for compliance
with this part must be clearly spelled out in the emergency
preparedness plan or plans that are filed with FRA for approval
covering the entire passenger train service operation. After approval
of the plan or plans, FRA may hold the public authority or the other
entity or both responsible for compliance with this part.
FRA proposes to establish the parameters for such a plan and defer
to the expertise of each individual railroad to adopt a suitable
emergency preparedness plan for its railroad, in accordance with these
parameters. As noted previously in the preamble to this proposed rule,
the emergency preparedness plan may consist of multiple documents, with
a separate document detailing the responsibilities of each category of
employee under the railroad's plan. Each railroad is also encouraged to
review the suggestions provided in the Volpe Report before developing
an emergency preparedness plan in accordance with the requirements set
forth in this section. In developing the plan, railroads are reminded
that the goal of the proposed rule is to maximize the safety of
passengers, railroad personnel, emergency response personnel, property,
and the general public which come in contact with the railroad by
providing for immediate notification of outside law enforcement
officials and emergency responders. Railroads should not instruct their
on-board employees to substitute as professional emergency responders
and delay notification of appropriate railroad and outside officials.
Paragraph 239.101(a)(1) sets forth the requirement that the
passenger train crewmembers must communicate immediately and
effectively with each other, as well as with the control center and the
passengers. Typically, in an emergency situation the proposed rule
requires an on-board train crewmember to immediately contact the
control center via a dependable on-board radio or an alternate means of
communication (e.g., wayside railroad telephone, public telephone,
private residence telephone, or cellular telephone) to advise
appropriate railroad officials of the nature of the emergency and the
type of assistance required. After this initial notification to the
control center occurs, the passengers must be informed of the emergency
and provided directions. As appropriate, all passengers should be
accounted for (particularly in sleeping compartments) so as to expedite
evacuation, if necessary, and to avoid needless effort to search for
``missing'' persons.
METROLINK stated that the train crewmember should notify the
passengers after consultation with the control center and the control
center officer, unless the train must be evacuated immediately. Also,
the LIRR recommended that FRA revise paragraph 239.101(a)(1) in the
final rule to require an on-board crewmember to remove all occupants of
the train from imminent danger as a first step after he or she quickly
and accurately assesses the passenger train emergency situation. FRA
recognizes that each emergency situation is unique, and may require
rapid decisionmaking by on-board crewmembers on how best to ensure the
safety of the passengers. Moreover, it is FRA's expectation that
railroads will properly train their employees to perform the requisite
life-saving functions after an emergency (e.g., relocation of
passengers from a smoke-filled car to a safer section of the train or
evacuation of the passengers from a derailed car), in conjunction with
their responsibilities to assess the nature of the emergency and notify
the control center as soon as practicable thereafter. Accordingly,
while FRA may conclude in the course of investigating a specific train
incident or accident that a particular employee's egregious mishandling
of an emergency situation warrants individual enforcement action and/or
enforcement action against the railroad, we are reluctant to strictly
impose the precise order or manner in which on-board crewmembers must
execute their individual responsibilities under the railroad's
emergency preparedness plan. However, in the course of drafting the
final rule text, FRA may elect to incorporate recommended practices as
specific directives to railroads concerning how they must respond to
the various types of emergency situations most likely to occur during
passenger operations, such as on-board fires, downed electrical power
sources, or passenger injuries from a derailment.
Although the proposed rule does not require a railroad to use a
specific means of communication, FRA expects the railroad to select a
method that is effective and capable of reaching pertinent railroad
control centers and on-board locations in order to comply with the
notification requirement of this subsection. FRA further expects that
railroads will voluntarily build redundancy into their emergency
preparedness plans by outfitting their crewmembers with an immediately
available backup means of communication, in the event that primary
communications systems are either damaged during the emergency or
otherwise rendered inoperative. For example, a cellular telephone could
be made available for use by on-board crewmembers to contact the
control center in the event the locomotive radio is inoperative. Also,
on-board crewmembers could still maintain proper communication with the
passengers, in the event that regular or emergency power was
unavailable to operate the train's public address system, by using
portable megaphones. Commenters are asked to discuss whether the final
rule should expand the subsection's language requiring notification to
mandate a specific primary means of communication, and/or whether the
final rule should also require each affected railroad to equip its
passenger trains with a secondary means of communication in the event
that the primary means is unavailable. This issue may be resolved in
this proceeding or in the context of the forthcoming revision of the
Radio Standards and Procedures in 49 CFR Part 220. That rulemaking was
tasked to the RSAC on April 1, 1996.
It is FRA's understanding that many railroads publish an emergency
toll-free telephone number in the employee timetable which connects
with the control center office. Amtrak also has a nationwide toll-free
telephone number which connects the caller to the national Amtrak
police desk in Washington, DC, which is manned around the clock. The
rule does not require that notification to either the control center or
the train passengers occur within a precisely measured number of
minutes, rather it uses the
[[Page 8341]]
words ``as soon as practicable'' in order to give railroads maximum
flexibility. FRA expects that in the totality of the circumstances of
the emergency situation, the train crewmembers will exercise their best
judgment using the railroad's own emergency preparedness plan
procedures.
Under current practice, Amtrak's notification of the emergency
responders will vary slightly depending on whether or not the passenger
train emergency occurs in Amtrak-dispatched territory. In territory
where trains are dispatched by Amtrak, either the control center will
directly notify the emergency responder or the control center will
notify Amtrak police, who will then, as appropriate, notify pertinent
emergency responders, state and federal agencies, and Amtrak
supervisors. In territory where trains are not dispatched by Amtrak,
the host railroad control center will directly notify the appropriate
emergency responders, government agencies, and host railroad
supervisors. Which emergency responders and agencies are notified
depends on the nature of the emergency. Most control centers have
emergency telephone numbers already in their computer systems, usually
listed alphabetically by city, with hard copy backups.
FRA is aware that each railroad's operations are somewhat unique,
and that the appropriate persons and organizations who must be notified
will vary based upon the railroad's individual operating
characteristics and the actual type of emergency that occurs.
Accordingly, paragraph 239.101(a)(1)(ii) does not specify emergency
responder organizations (e.g., fire departments, helicopter rescue
groups) or job titles or duties of appropriate railroad officials whom
the control center must contact. The subsection also does not specify
which control center employees may be designated by the railroad to
maintain the list of emergency telephone numbers; METROLINK recommended
that FRA require that the railroad designate an employee function or
position to be responsible for maintaining current emergency telephone
numbers, rather than a particular employee. In addition, the term
``adjacent'' is not defined (e.g., a distance measurement from the
passenger train experiencing the emergency to adjacent rail modes) for
purposes of determining which other rail modes must be notified.
Instead, consistent with the Working Group's recommendation that the
proposed rule should provide each affected railroad with flexibility to
implement the rule's provisions, this subsection requires that the
emergency preparedness plan state how the railroad will achieve the
appropriate notifications.
Paragraph 239.101(a)(2) requires that the emergency preparedness
plan provide for initial and periodic training at least once every two
years of all railroad employees who have responsibilities under the
plan, and that the training address the role of each affected employee.
Adequate training is integral to any safety program. This subsection
recognizes that the successful implementation of an emergency
preparedness plan depends upon the knowledge of the on-board and
control center personnel about the system route characteristics,
passenger cars and motive power units, and emergency plans, protocols,
procedures, and on-board emergency equipment. An employee who has not
been trained to react properly during an emergency situation may
present a significant risk to railroad personnel and passengers.
Employees must receive ``hands-on'' instruction concerning the
location, function, and operation of on-board emergency equipment,
stressing the following:
Opening emergency window, roof, and door exits, with an
emphasis on operating them during adverse conditions such as when a
rail car is overturned;
Use of emergency tools and fire extinguishers;
Use of portable lighting when the main power source is
unavailable on a passenger train; and
Use of megaphones and public address systems (if they are
provided by the railroad for communication purposes).
The proposed rule affords the passenger railroad operator a time
period of up to two years to provide each session of ``periodic''
training after the operator provides initial training in the emergency
preparedness plan's provisions to its employees. The periodic training
requirement is intended to inform railroad personnel of changes in
procedures and equipment and ensure that their skills remain at a level
that enables them to effectively execute their responsibilities under
the emergency preparedness plan. In addition, the recurrent training
will reinforce segments of the emergency preparedness plan for
individuals who have not performed properly.
FRA concludes that the unique operating characteristics of all the
different railroads subject to the proposed rule, as well as the
financial costs involved with providing training, would make it
impractical to include a calendar year or other more restrictive or
specific requirement for periodic training in the proposed rule.
Moreover, assuming that FRA elects to specify in the final rule that
the upper limit of the term ``periodic'' will remain at two years,
anytime the provisions of an emergency preparedness plan are invoked
during an actual emergency, we would count that event toward the
training requirement for those affected employees.
FRA is interested in receiving comments from railroads on the costs
of implementing the on-board personnel training requirements of the
proposed rule. Specifically, FRA wants to determine the extent of the
current training that railroads already provide to their on-board
employees (including emergency preparedness training) as part of
regular operating rules training programs. Comments are requested
concerning the estimated dollar amount of the incremental additional
costs connected with modifying existing training programs to comply
with this proposal. FRA is interested in ascertaining whether the
proposed training requirements will add merely de minimis costs to each
railroad's existing training program or if compliance would entail
moderate or significant additional costs.
As discussed in the analysis of proposed Sec. 239.103, FRA expects
railroads operating passenger train service to conduct emergency
simulations to evaluate their overall emergency response capabilities
and ensure that emergency preparedness plans, procedures, and equipment
address the particular needs of various types of passengers. Emergency
simulations can help railroads achieve theses goals through careful
selection of the time and location of the simulation and participation
by personnel from the railroads, outside emergency responder
organizations, and ``volunteer passengers''. In addition to classroom
training, simulations provide employees with a practical and realistic
understanding of rules, procedures, trains, and right-of-way
structures/wayside facilities as they relate to emergency response. FRA
expects that the employee training provided in accordance with
paragraph 239.101(a)(2) will include instruction on the importance of
emergency simulations in achieving successful implementation of the
emergency preparedness plan.
The proposed rule does not require on-board personnel to receive
training in first aid or in CPR. Although FRA initially considered
including these items as training requirements in the
[[Page 8342]]
proposed rule, or at least mandating that railroads offer employees the
opportunity to receive this training, the consensus of the Working
Group was that both first aid and CPR training should be excluded from
the rule. The Working Group stressed that the goal of the proposed rule
is to ensure that emergency responders arrive promptly at the scene of
an emergency, not to train on-board personnel to act as emergency
responders. The Working Group also stated that even if FRA requires a
railroad to offer first aid and CPR training, no railroad can literally
force an on-board crewmember to assist an ailing passenger. Further,
trains with heavier passenger loadings are likely to have on board one
or more medical professionals whose skills will be more extensive, and
better practiced, than those of a crewmember whose primary and
recurring duties do not include medical emergencies.
During the Working Group meeting on February 7, 1996, Amtrak stated
that it is spending between $2.5 to $3 million by fiscal year 1998 to
train the chiefs of on-board service and to provide for at least one
employee on every train being trained to administer first aid and
perform CPR. Under the Amtrak plan, employees will not be required to
use this training, merely to receive it. Despite the extent of Amtrak's
commitment to voluntarily providing extensive first aid and CPR
training, Amtrak did not want these items required in the final rule.
Another member of the Working Group, Metrolink, stated that it has
served approximately eight million passengers in three years of
operation, and has never had a passenger require CPR. Metrolink also
noted that commuter railroads generally operate in populated areas,
with professional emergency responders in most cases only minutes away.
The LIRR stated that it offers CPR training to newly hired employees
and shows a refresher film to employees every five years, but
acknowledged that it cannot force employees to administer CPR. The
railroad also noted that it would never want the engineer to leave the
controls of the locomotive during an emergency. NJTR indicated that its
train crews already have many duties to perform during an emergency and
that first aid and CPR should be performed by emergency medical
services personnel.
FRA invites commenters to submit their views on whether the final
rule should include the issues of first aid and CPR training. If FRA
does decide to address these issues, one option would be to mandate
that railroads offer their employees first aid and CPR training,
without requiring employees to actually use this training during an
emergency. Under this scenario, a railroad employee who offered no
assistance during an emergency, because he or she feared coming into
contact with an injured or ill passenger's bodily fluids, would not
violate these regulations. (The experience of the American Red Cross is
that volunteers who receive first aid and CPR training, and appropriate
equipment, are motivated to provide needed assistance when the time
comes.) The second option would be not only to require railroads to
train their employees in first aid and CPR, but also to mandate that
employees use this training during an emergency.
The proposed rule also does not require railroads to record the
number of passengers riding on their trains at any given time or to
record how many people get on and off at each train stop. Although lack
of an exact passenger manifest may delay emergency responders in
determining when every passenger has been removed from a derailed or
disabled train, the frequency with which many passenger trains pick up
and discharge passengers would create logistical difficulties for a
train operator. A train crew can usually provide a good estimate to
emergency responders, so that they can respond with the necessary
personnel and equipment. Moreover, it is doubtful that emergency
responders would simply trust an exact passenger count provided by a
train crew and cease looking for additional survivors of an emergency.
Commenters are invited to offer proposals for training on-board
crewmembers to track the exact number of passengers present on a train
at any given moment, and to include suggestions on cost-efficient
technology for achieving this goal.
The proposed rule also requires appropriate training of control
center personnel who affect the implementation of a railroad's
emergency response plan. FRA expects the railroad to provide training
only for the requisite control center employees designated under the
plan to convey the nature and extent of a passenger train's emergency
to the emergency responder organizations. Accordingly, FRA does not
wish to require training of other control center employees who perform
merely incidental functions, e.g., a clerical or other office employee
who receives a telephone call from a stalled train.
The term ``accurately measure'' is used in proposed paragraph
239.101(a)(2)(iii) relative to employee qualification in a broad sense
to mean that the employee being tested will show to the railroad
sufficient understanding of the emergency preparedness plan subject
area for which he or she is responsible, and that the employee can
perform the duties required under the plan in a safe and effective
manner. Proficiency must be demonstrated by successful completion of a
written examination, but in addition may be illustrated by an
interactive training program using a computer, a practical
demonstration of understanding and ability, or an appropriate
combination of these in accordance with this section.
This section permits railroads discretion to design the tests that
will be employed (which for most railroads will entail some
modification of their existing ``book of rules'' examination to include
new subject areas), provided that the design addresses all relevant
elements of the emergency preparedness plan. This section does not
specify things like the number of questions to be asked or the passing
score to be obtained. It does, however, contain the requirement that
the test not be conducted with open reference books unless use of such
materials is part of a test objective. This section also requires that
the test be in writing. In deciding to require a written test, FRA was
aware that the test taking skills of some individuals may be deficient
and that some persons may have literacy problems. However, FRA believes
that minimum reading and comprehension skills are needed to assure
proper execution of an emergency preparedness plan.
Paragraph 239.101(a)(2)(iv) requires that at least one on-board
crewmember be qualified under the applicable provisions of the
railroad's emergency preparedness plan. For example, a commuter
railroad operates with a three-person crew fully trained under the
applicable provisions of the railroad's emergency preparedness plan,
but includes an engineer trainee in the locomotive cab who is not
qualified under the plan's provisions. Since the train already has a
fully trained and qualified crew operating the train, the commuter
railroad is in full compliance with the proposed rule even though one
on-board crewmember is not qualified under the emergency preparedness
plan. This paragraph may also apply if, for example, a fully-trained
passenger train crew turns over the operation of its train to a freight
railroad train crew that is not qualified under the passenger
railroad's emergency preparedness plan. Provided that the passenger
train is operated by the freight crew with at least one on-board
crewmember of the passenger train present who is qualified under the
[[Page 8343]]
passenger railroad's emergency preparedness plan, there would be no
violation of the proposed rule. Although the proposed rule requires
only one qualified crewmember, FRA anticipates that railroads will
voluntarily elect to train most, if not all, on-board crewmembers in
emergency response procedures.
Paragraph 239.101(a)(3) contains the requirement that freight
railroads must prepare emergency preparedness plans addressing
instances when they host the operations of rail passenger service over
their lines. Even though freight railroads may neither provide nor
operate rail passenger service themselves, and therefore not be subject
to most requirements of the proposed rule, these railroads still have
certain significant emergency preparedness responsibilities. The
emergency preparedness plans for freight railroads must, at a minimum,
include procedures for making emergency responder notifications, and
discuss their general capabilities for rendering assistance to the
involved passenger railroads during emergency situations. The hosting
freight railroads must address any physical and operating
characteristics of their rail lines that may affect the safety of these
rail passenger operations, e.g., evacuating passengers from a train
stalled in a tunnel or on an elevated structure.
FRA expects a railroad that operates rail passenger service over
the line of a freight railroad to review all of the requirements
imposed by the proposed rule with the host railroad, and coordinate
their respective roles in implementing a coherent response to an
emergency situation. While FRA presumes that the freight railroad will
bear primary responsibility for ensuring the emergency preparedness of
any railroad permitted to operate intercity passenger or commuter
trains over its line, the proposed rule does not restrict the host
railroad and the operating railroad from assigning responsibility for
compliance with this part via a private contractual arrangement. FRA
included the coordination requirement to ensure that all railroads
involved in a particular rail passenger service operation understand
each other's crucial role in planning for emergency preparedness.
Paragraph 239.101(a)(4)(i) addresses FRA's expectations for
compliance with this part from railroads with operations that include
tunnels of considerable length, where immediate passenger egress is not
feasible. In order to limit the number of structures covered by this
proposed paragraph to the longer ones that could be expected to present
more impediments to the safe and orderly withdrawal of passengers from
a disabled train, tunnels of less than 1,000 feet are excluded. This
limitation is reasonable, considering that intercity passenger trains
seldom consist of less than four cars and often have many more cars
than this, implying a minimum total train length of 400 or more feet.
Most likely, a train of this or greater length will have either the
head or rear end close to or outside of a tunnel portal should an
unplanned stop occur in a tunnel less than 1,000 feet long.
Over the years, passenger train emergencies have occurred in
tunnels where existing emergency procedures and tunnel characteristics,
such as lighting and communication capabilities, were determined to be
inadequate. In order to better evaluate tunnel safety issues related to
emergency preparedness, FRA requested additional information from the
railroad industry. The results were summarized in a report entitled
``Tunnel Safety Analysis'' (Tunnel Report), which was published by FRA
in February 1990. A copy of the report was also made available to the
rail passenger railroads for their information and guidance, and has
been placed in the docket for this rulemaking. FRA encourages all
railroads required to address tunnel safety in their emergency
preparedness plans to consult the Tunnel Report for guidance. FRA is
also aware that many State and local jurisdictions already impose site-
specific regulations to address tunnel safety, and that most railroads
with operations involving tunnels have long-standing internal emergency
tunnel procedures.
Paragraph 239.101(a)(4)(ii) proposes that railroads operating on
elevated structures, over drawbridges, and in electrified territory,
incorporate emergency preparedness procedures into their plans to
address these unique physical characteristics. For example, in an
emergency in electrified territory, the control center should be
responsible for issuing instructions to deenergize the electrical
power. Also, the train crew and emergency responders should know how,
when, and when not to remove on-board power from the train, including
traction power, train-lined (head-end) power to individual cars, and
battery source power.
Paragraph 239.101(a)(4)(iii) recognizes that the emergency
preparedness plans of certain freight and passenger railroads will need
to address the unique safety concerns posed by adjacent rail modes of
transportation. For example, employees of a freight railroad to which
this part applies, who have knowledge of or observe an emergency in a
common corridor, e.g., fire, derailment, or intrusion by rapid transit
rail equipment or vehicles, must be required by the plan to immediately
notify the control center with details. The control center must attempt
to determine the exact location of the incident, any condition that
would affect safe passage by affected trains or road vehicles, and
whether hazardous materials are involved, and then initiate appropriate
responsive action.
Many emergencies require response from outside emergency responder
organizations in addition to the railroad. Proper coordination of roles
between all of the organizations that may respond to an emergency is
essential to ensure timely and effective response, since the number of
passengers carried and the railroad operating environment may be quite
different according to the type of service and routes. Paragraph
229.101(a)(5) recognizes that the successful implementation of any
emergency preparedness plan depends upon the affected railroads
maintaining current working relationships with the emergency responder
organizations, so that each party can learn of the full preparedness
capabilities that the other can offer during an emergency. In this
regard, each railroad's emergency preparedness plan must provide for
distribution to emergency responders of railroad equipment diagrams and
manuals, right-of-way maps, information on physical characteristics
such as tunnels, bridges, and electrified territory, and other related
materials. In order to continually reinforce the familiarization of the
emergency responder organizations with the railroads' protocols,
procedures, operations, and equipment, the proposed rule requires
railroads to periodically distribute applicable portions of the plan to
emergency responders at least once every three years, even if no
changes have been implemented. Further, since the knowledge and ability
to carry out procedures and use emergency equipment are essential to
the success of emergency response actions, the proposal requires the
railroads to promptly notify emergency responders whenever material
alterations to the plan occur (e.g., revisions to emergency exit
information, pertinent changes in system route characteristics or
railroad equipment operated on the system, or updates to names and
telephone numbers of relevant contact officials on the railroad).
FRA wants to ensure that the emergency responders will receive the
maximum amount of available
[[Page 8344]]
information about a railroad's operations in advance of an emergency,
and hopes that emergency responders will voluntarily study the material
distributed and participate in emergency simulations. However, the
proposed rule would only require that affected railroads make the
operations information available to emergency responders, and that the
responders merely be invited to participate in emergency simulations.
FRA has no authority to penalize an emergency responder organization if
it chooses to ignore the distributed information or refuses to attend
simulations with the railroad. Likewise, the proposed rule would not
hold a railroad accountable for an emergency responder organization's
unwillingness to enter into a liaison relationship, provided that the
railroad made the liaison opportunities known and available to the
responders.
In its comments on the revised regulatory text, METROLINK
questioned the meaning in paragraph 239.101(a)(5)(ii) of the phrase
``maintaining an awareness of each emergency responders' capability.''
METROLINK noted that its operations include 33 different fire
districts, over 50 ambulance companies, and 45 police agencies, and
contended that maintaining this type of awareness is not a railroad
function. METROLINK also stressed that the proposed rule does not
require emergency responders to notify each affected railroad when
their capabilities change, and stated that it is the responsibility of
the emergency responders to establish mutual aid with other local
agencies when emergency situations exceed their capabilities. In
addition, METROLINK indicated that it lacks the technical capacity to
know or understand when a significant change may occur in an emergency
responder's response capability.
FRA is aware of the great number of jurisdictions that intercity
trains operate through, and that it is neither simple nor inexpensive
for passenger train operators to provide material and familiarization
to every outside emergency response organization within all individual
communities along each route. Some commuter train operators have
developed booklets and videotapes to illustrate equipment and describe
entry and evacuation procedures for its trains and certain right-of-way
facilities. However, Amtrak stated at the Working Group meetings that
because it operates through thousands of jurisdictions with thousands
of potential emergency responder organizations located throughout the
United States, it would have difficulty complying with this paragraph.
While FRA considers the establishment of liaison relationships
between railroads involved with rail passenger operations and emergency
responders crucial to achieving the goals of the proposed rule, the
agency is also fully aware of the unique circumstances of Amtrak's
operations. Commenters are invited to suggest either how Amtrak can
best comply with the emergency responder liaison requirement as set
forth in the proposed rule, or whether the final rule should establish
a different standard for railroads that operate in territories with
large numbers of potential emergency responders to contact. Any
commenter proposing two or more sets of standards should also suggest
what numerical or mileage criteria should be used to distinguish the
railroads, and state how these differing standards would still ensure
adequate levels of safety and emergency preparedness.
Paragraph 239.101(a)(6) states that each railroad's emergency
preparedness plan shall indicate the types of on-board emergency
equipment and the location on each passenger car. Although the proposed
rule requires a minimum of only one fire extinguisher and one pry bar
per passenger car, and one flashlight per on-board crewmember, FRA
would strongly encourage each railroad to voluntarily supplement this
list of on-board emergency equipment. Further, FRA recognizes that
there may be special local interests that might need to be
accommodated, particularly in cases of public authorities operating
passenger train service within only one territory. While national
uniformity to the extent practicable of laws, regulations, and orders
related to railroad safety is important, FRA does not wish to decrease
the level of emergency preparedness already in place on a passenger
railroad.
FRA must determine whether the final rule should specifically
address special circumstances that may exist in local jurisdictions
throughout the country on a categorical basis, which are currently
subject to more stringent requirements than the minimum quantities of
on-board emergency equipment set forth in the proposed rule.
Accordingly, FRA invites comments on what types and quantities of on-
board emergency equipment railroads are currently required to carry
pursuant to laws in the local jurisdictions in which they operate. FRA
also invites comments on the reasons for these more stringent
requirements. Depending on the comments received, FRA may adopt the
minimums set forth in the text of the proposed rule or decide to
broaden the coverage and requirements of Sec. 239.101(a)(6) by
specifying additional types and/or quantities of on-board emergency
equipment that some or all railroads must carry on each passenger car.
This paragraph does not require railroads to instruct their
passengers about either the location or use of the on-board emergency
equipment. As stated, FRA is committed to crafting a final rule that
avoids micromanagement of the provisions of a railroad's emergency
preparedness plan. FRA recognizes that passengers might benefit from
receiving routine instructions about the location and operation of on-
board emergency equipment during each train trip, in the event that the
crewmembers are injured or otherwise unable to access the equipment
before the outside emergency responders arrive. However, FRA is also
aware from its consultations with the Working Group that pilferage of
on-board emergency equipment is a serious problem on many passenger
railroads, and that specifically focusing the attention of passengers
on where the equipment is located would only exacerbate the problem.
Clearly, the equipment can only help both crewmembers and passengers
during an emergency if it is available for proper use. Also, members of
the Working Group stressed that regular riders on intercity or commuter
operations are probably already familiar with the on-board emergency
equipment by virtue of their frequent presence on the train, and would
not benefit from any additional required information.
Since the rulemaking on rail passenger equipment safety standards
is still ongoing, FRA is unable to state whether railroads will be
required to install permanent or auxiliary emergency lighting on their
rail cars. However, whatever requirements eventually appear in a new
set of regulations at 49 CFR Part 238, paragraph 239.101(a)(6)(ii)
states that auxiliary portable lighting must be available for
assistance in an emergency and should be routinely maintained and
replaced as necessary. The proposed rule does not require that every
rail passenger car have such lighting, but the train itself must carry
enough portable lighting capable of fostering passenger evacuation. In
its comments on paragraph 239.101(a)(6)(ii) of the revised regulatory
text, METROLINK stated that FRA needs to define the phrase ``auxiliary
portable lighting must be accessible,'' and questioned whether a
flashlight is an acceptable form of
[[Page 8345]]
such lighting. FRA intends for a handheld flashlight, such as a
flashlight with a ``D'' cell, to be one of the means of satisfying the
auxiliary portable lighting requirement.
Finally, paragraph 239.101(a)(7) requires railroads to make
passengers aware of emergency procedures to follow before an emergency
situation develops, thus enabling them to respond properly during the
emergency. All passenger awareness efforts must emphasize that
passengers must follow the directions of the train crew during an
emergency. If passengers are on a disabled train, but are not injured
or facing imminent danger, they could safely await the arrival of
trained emergency responders with appropriate evacuation equipment.
However, in a serious emergency involving smoke or fire, passengers may
have to evacuate the train before emergency responders arrive. Thus,
operators of rail passenger service should take steps to increase
passenger awareness about basic evacuation procedures. Since passengers
could inadvertently jeopardize their own safety, it is appropriate for
them to take the initiative only if the crewmembers are incapacitated.
Passenger railroads must educate passengers about their role in
cooperating in emergencies by conspicuously and legibly posting
emergency instructions inside each passenger car, and by utilizing at
least one of the additional methods designated in this paragraph to
provide safety awareness information. These methods include
distributing pamphlets, posting information in stations on signs or on
video monitors, and the review of procedures by crewmembers via public
address announcements. All brochures and signage must emphasize that
passengers must follow the directions of the train crew during an
emergency.
Although paragraph 239.101(a)(7)(ii)(A) permits a railroad to
fulfill the secondary passenger education requirement of the proposed
rule by making on-board announcements, the proposed language does not
specify the frequency with which these announcements must be made
during a train run. While FRA believes that, with regard to intercity
service, announcements are appropriate after at least each major
passenger pick-up point, commenters are invited to suggest ways of
providing safety information to all new riders without becoming
repetitious to the remaining passengers. In addition, while the
proposed rule requires railroads to utilize only one additional method
to disseminate safety awareness information to passengers, FRA
encourages railroads to employ as many of the options as possible based
on operating and budgetary considerations.
The information in the various sources of passenger safety
awareness information must be consistent in content and sufficient for
first-time users of the railroad, but not so overwhelming as to arouse
undue concern. All information must be printed or spoken in English,
but railroads serving large non-English speaking communities should
consider providing information in other languages as well. Materials
for persons who are visually impaired should be printed in large type
format and in braille. Finally, for persons with other types of
disabilities, appropriate passenger awareness materials should provide
information about evacuation policies and procedures and other
emergency actions, to the extent practicable.
Passenger awareness education should include information that may
permit passengers to accomplish the following:
Recognize and immediately report potential emergencies to
crewmembers;
Recognize hazards;
Recognize and know how and when to operate appropriate
emergency-related features and equipment, such as fire extinguishers,
train doors, and emergency exits; and
Recognize the potential special needs of fellow passengers
during an emergency, such as children, the elderly, and disabled
persons.
Paragraph 239.101(a)(7)(iii) requires railroads to perform surveys
of their passengers in order to learn how successful the passenger
awareness program activities have been in apprising passengers of the
procedures that must be followed during an emergency. In addition to
verifying that passengers can locate and operate the emergency window
and door exits in the event of an evacuation, the surveys must
determine that passengers know where the safety information is posted
in the car and that during an emergency they must follow the directions
of the train crew.
Although the railroad is required to maintain records of the
information obtained from its passenger surveys, the proposal does not
mandate that railroads ask passengers to complete written
questionnaires. Instead of handing out questionnaire surveys at station
stops and hoping that passengers will voluntarily elect to either
provide responses in narrative form or fill in answers to multiple
choice questions, the railroad could direct its employees to wait at
either station stops or onboard trains and orally read the questions to
selected members of the traveling public who voluntarily agree to
participate. The oral responses would then be recorded by the railroad
in writing on records that would be maintained at the system
headquarters for the railroad and at the division headquarters for each
division where the surveys were conducted (i.e., the records
availability must be division specific). The records can consist of
multiple documents, and may contain separate sections covering
locations of the safety information on the cars and knowledge of the
safety procedures to follow in an emergency. Additionally, railroads
must make these survey records available to duly authorized FRA
representatives for inspection and copying (e.g., photocopying or
handwritten notetaking) during normal business hours.
The proposal specifies that a railroad must survey a representative
sample of passengers at least once during each calendar year to
determine the effectiveness of its passenger awareness activities. FRA
is not proposing a methodology for conducting this sampling, nor is it
requiring that the surveys be distributed at every station stop or
along particular major lines. FRA is confident that each railroad will
use due dilgence in surveying a statistically significant cross section
of its customer population in order to periodically update and improve
its passenger safety awareness information and amend its emergency
preparedness plan, as appropriate. Although FRA is proposing that
railroads conduct the surveys at least annually, we expect that after
the initial education effort takes place in the first year that the
rule is in effect the ridership awareness level will reach a percentage
in the range of between 60 to 75 percent. If this increased awareness
level occurs, as reflected in a high rate of correct survey responses,
FRA believes that the requirement could be modified to permit railroads
to conduct the surveys at least once every three years. FRA seeks
public comment on both whether the final rule should permit railroads
to conduct surveys less frequently than annually, and if so, on what
would be an appropriate minimum percentage of public awareness that
must be reached before less frequent surveying would be justified.
Since the issue of passenger surveys was not fully developed with
the Working Group during the drafting of this proposal, FRA looks
forward to working with the members of the
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Working Group during the final rule phase to develop the most effective
means of verifying that the passenger awareness program activities will
achieve their objectives. In this regard, FRA seeks comments on whether
the survey process anticipated by this proposal can be a reliable
measure of the effectiveness of the passenger information programs or
whether there are more efficient or less expensive means than surveys
to determine the success of these programs, such as focus groups or
unstructured meetings and discussions with members of the traveling
public. Commenters from railroads are urged to discuss what sampling
techniques they currently use when they conduct customer satisfaction
surveys in order to assist them in improving passenger comfort,
determining if railroad employees are providing proper customer
service, and planning timetable schedules.
Since proposed paragraph 239.101(a)(7)(ii) requires railroads to
utilize an additional method of providing safety information without
specifying how frequently the information must be provided, commenters
are encouraged to address this issue by indicating whether each
railroad should be allowed to study the results of the passenger
surveys in order to determine the effectiveness and proper timing of
passenger safety awareness program activities appropriate for its
operation. Accordingly, instead of specifying a fixed maximum time
interval between utilization of the additional forms of program
activity, FRA could elect to require that railroads determine the
optimal frequency that best serves their passengers. In addition, it is
expected that as the traveling public grows more accustomed to reading
and understanding the emergency instructions posted inside all
passenger cars on bulkhead signs, seatback decals, or seat cards the
need for redundant reminders (e.g., on-board announcements, ticket
envelope safety information, or public service announcements),
especially at frequent time intervals, will greatly diminish. Moreover,
depending on the additional method selected, different time intervals
may be appropriate. For example, while it may be suitable for a
railroad to distribute safety awareness information on a seat drop
every three months, the railroad may conclude that it should arrange
for public service announcements on a weekly basis. Commenters
recommending inclusion of fixed timeframes for providing passengers
with additional methods of safety awareness information are urged, if
possible, to provide scientific or sociological data and/or cost
estimates to support their suggested time intervals.
11. Passenger Train Emergency Simulations: Section 239.103
Section 239.103 recognizes that one of the most effective training
techniques is a simulation of specific emergency scenarios. Simulations
may vary from a small-scale drill or tabletop exercise for just one
train crew or control center operator, to a full-scale emergency
exercise involving several levels of railroad management that includes
the voluntary participation of fire departments, ambulance and
emergency medical service units, local police, sheriff and state police
organizations, local emergency auxiliary groups, and state and federal
regulatory agencies. While simulations are primarily designed to
demonstrate that railroad employees can quickly and efficiently manage
an emergency situation to ensure that emergency responders arrive
quickly, simulations are also intended to determine whether train crews
are properly trained to get passengers out of an imperiled train.
The tabletop exercise is the simplest to stage, as it involves only
a meeting room and knowledgeable managers and employees from the
passenger train operator and the appropriate responding organizations
who voluntarily participate. For an imaginary emergency, the actions to
be taken by the appropriate personnel are described; the time,
equipment, and personnel necessary are estimated; and potential
problems are predicted. Conflicts of functional areas, lack of
equipment, procedural weaknesses or omissions, communication
difficulties, and confusing terminology are among the problems which
can be identified.
Passenger train operators can drill their train crews, other on-
board personnel, supervisors, and control center operators on emergency
operating procedures by posing a hypothetical emergency for employees
to resolve without dispatching emergency responders to the scene. A
drill could also involve the voluntary participation of personnel of a
particular response organization, e.g., a fire department. The same
type of problems as indicated for the tabletop exercise can be
identified, and the actual response capabilities of personnel in terms
of their knowledge of procedures and equipment can be evaluated.
Full-scale emergency exercises require weeks of carefully organized
plans involving all participating organizations and will involve the
expenditure of funds for both the training and actual full-scale
exercise. Recording or videotaping the scenes and conversations in key
areas of the exercise itself will serve as valuable classroom training
for later years. A full-scale exercise is the total application of the
resources of the passenger railroad operator and the voluntarily
participating emergency response organizations. Such an exercise can
reveal the degree of familiarity of both the passenger train system and
emergency response organization personnel with train operations, the
physical layout of trains, right-of-way structures and wayside
facilities, emergency exits, and emergency equipment. Thus,
shortcomings in the emergency preparedness plan and specific response
protocols and procedures, as well as equipment, can be identified and
corrected.
FRA is seriously evaluating whether tabletop exercises should be
afforded the same weight in the final rule as full-scale simulations
for purposes of demonstrating the readiness of a railroad to
successfully react to a passenger train emergency, and we are
considering requiring that each railroad conduct a minimum number of
its simulations as full-scale exercises. In this regard, FRA is
skeptical as to whether a tabletop exercise can equal the
comprehensiveness of a full-scale exercise and be a highly effective
means of determining whether a railroad is adequately prepared for the
likely variety of emergency scenarios that could occur on its lines, as
well as an important training tool for the train crews, control center
employees, and members of the emergency responder community who elect
to participate. In considering whether to strengthen the emergency
simulation requirement, FRA is aware that realistic full-scale
simulations that enable all participants to practice using the on-board
emergency equipment and emergency exits, and encourage the emergency
responders to become personally familiar with passenger equipment and
applicable railroad operations, could prove invaluable in helping
railroads and the emergency responder community to manage real
emergencies in ways that tabletop exercises cannot. However, FRA is
also aware that the financial and logistical costs of conducting full-
scale simulations are undoubtedly higher, including the need to close
railroad tracks during the hours of the simulation, opportunity costs
for the railroads due to lost use of the passenger equipment that is
employed
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in the simulations, unavailability of firefighting and rescue equipment
for other emergencies while the simulations are being conducted, and
salary costs for many or all of the simulation participants.
In order to best determine whether the final rule should require
full-scale emergency simulations in conjunction with tabletop
exercises, or perhaps in place of such exercises, FRA must carefully
weigh the expected costs and potential benefits of all available
options. FRA therefore seeks public comment on the perceived
effectiveness of both full-scale emergency simulations and tabletop
exercises, including a discussion of whether tabletop exercises can
achieve the equivalent level of emergency preparedness as full-scale
simulations. FRA is particularly interested in receiving comments from
the emergency responder community, especially from those members who
have participated in either emergency simulations or actual emergency
situations with railroads.
To achieve a maximum level of effectiveness, drills and exercises
should reinforce classroom training in emergency response and passenger
evacuation for the passenger train operator personnel and the emergency
response units who voluntarily participate. Procedures should also be
included to teach personnel to identify the emergency and distinguish
its unique demands, and to follow through with the appropriate
responses. In addition, the drills and exercises should be planned to
minimize hazards which could create an actual emergency or cause
injuries and to provide a mechanism for simultaneous testing and
reinforcement of emergency operating procedures for specific types of
emergencies and evacuation procedures. Moreover, the drills and
exercises should test the communication capabilities and coordination
of the passenger operator with the emergency responders, as well as the
operability and effectiveness of emergency equipment.
Paragraph (b) requires each railroad that provides commuter or
other short-haul passenger train service to conduct an emergency
simulation at least once during every two calendar year on all major
lines, and include at least 50 percent of the major lines in the total
number of simulations held during any given calendar year. Since FRA
has determined that a train crew on a commuter or other short-haul
operation will usually operate a train along the same line for an
extended period of time, and that emergency responder organization
personnel tend to be line-specific in terms of their familiarity with a
railroad's operations, it is crucial that each affected railroad
provide adequate opportunities along all of its major lines for its
employees and the responder community to obtain emergency simulation
training. While FRA anticipates that each commuter or short-haul
railroad will conduct emergency simulations as frequently as possible
on its entire system, the proposal applies only to operations over
major lines so that the railroad can best reach the most heavily
traveled portions of its system while conserving limited resources. In
this regard, FRA recognizes that emergency responder organizations tend
to be densely located along the major lines of commuter and short-haul
railroad operations.
FRA seeks public comment on whether the final rule should require a
different timetable for accomplishing emergency simulations along each
major route and/or require a greater total number of emergency
simulations during any given calendar year. In this regard, since
emergency simulations are such an important means for a railroad to
measure its degree of emergency preparedness, FRA is considering
strengthening the final rule to require that each railroad conduct a
sufficient number of emergency simulations so that each major line will
be included at least once during every calendar year, instead of only
once during every two calendar years.
Although the proposal sets forth a requirement for each commuter
and short-haul railroad to perform emergency simulations on all of its
major lines, FRA does not expect the railroad to require all employees
along those lines who are trained under the emergency preparedness plan
to attend the simulations, nor do we expect the railroad to invite all
potential emergency responders along those lines to participate. While
FRA hopes that over the long term all railroad employees involved in
the operation of passenger train service, as well as the applicable
members of the emergency responder community, will have the opportunity
to participate in this valuable training exercise and enhance their
individual emergency preparedness skills, the simulations are also
intended to identify shortcomings in each railroad's emergency
preparedness plan and specific response protocols and procedures. The
railroad must discuss the identified weaknesses and overall
effectiveness of the emergency preparedness plan with the simulation
participants at the debriefing and critique session held under proposed
Sec. 239.105, and then initiate any appropriate improvements and/or
amendments to the plan. As part of this review process, FRA expects the
railroad to revise its training program and liaison relationships with
the emergency responder community, in accordance with proposed
Sec. 239.101. Accordingly, while the proposed rule does not mandate
that affected railroads conduct numerous simulations all along the
major lines so as to include every possible participant, FRA concludes
that the lessons learned from the required debriefing and critique
sessions will have far reaching benefits.
In order to ensure that each affected railroad evaluates its
overall emergency response capabilities through careful selection of
the appropriate scenarios and locations on each of its main lines for
the emergency simulations, the proposal requires each railroad to
organize simulations that will adequately test the performance of the
railroad's program under the variety of emergency situations that could
reasonably be expected to occur on the operation. For example, a
railroad operating in territory that includes underground tunnels will
need to conduct simulations to test the railroad's ability to ensure
employee and passenger safety during an emergency situation occurring
in this unique environment. Adequate lighting and sources of air in
tunnels and underwater tubes are critical for successful passenger
evacuation during emergencies. Further, emergency responders depend on
sufficient lighting for visibility during fire suppression and rescue
operations. If the railroad intends to evacuate passengers by using
cross passages and/or fire doors leading to the opposite track area, or
a separate center passageway between the adjacent track areas, the
simulation should include practice in the requisite evacuation
protocols and procedures.
In the case of a railroad providing intercity passenger service
involving a number of lines operated over long distances, such as the
coast-to-coast service provided by Amtrak, the need for the railroad to
carefully plan its simulations and concurrently examine the
effectiveness of its emergency preparedness plan under a variety of
scenarios becomes crucial. Many of Amtrak's lines run for hundreds of
miles through remote locations that could include risks from tunnel
mishaps, natural disasters (e.g., fires, floods, and earthquakes),
hazardous material leaks, and/or acts of terrorism. Further, because of
the length of time required to travel these lines, the same train will
be operated by more than one crew and may involve operation over
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the line of a freight railroad. Since Amtrak's lines traverse numerous
populated communities throughout the United States, an emergency
situation could require the assistance of any number of potentially
thousands of emergency responders from these locations.
While FRA is not proposing at this time to require operators of
intercity service to conduct additional emergency simulations along its
lines in order to reach a greater proportion of employees and members
of the emergency response community (equivalent to the number required
on the major lines of railroads that provide commuter or other short-
haul service), we do expect such railroads to plan simulations that
sufficiently test the elements of their emergency preparedness plan
under the variety of circumstances that could occur in intercity
service. Although FRA recognizes that the length and diversity of
Amtrak's operations limit the potential benefits from resources spent
on conducting emergency simulations, the proposed rule requires Amtrak
to conduct at least two full-scale or tabletop exercises per year on
each of its business units. However, FRA is considering imposing more
rigorous requirements in the final rule on operators of intercity
service such as Amtrak in order to ensure the requisite level of
emergency preparedness. By considering each of the emergency scenarios
that could possibly occur on the different segments of the railroad
(e.g., simulations of a derailment at a remote location where emergency
responder assistance is not immediately available, an on-board fire
inside a tunnel or on a bridge, a derailment involving a freight train
carrying a hazardous materials spill, etc.), Amtrak can carefully
design a program to fulfill its overall emergency response needs. While
we recognize that the term ``business unit'' represents the current
organizational structure of Amtrak in 1997, and have therefore
incorporated that concept into the proposed rule, FRA expects to craft
a term for inclusion in the final rule that has broader applicability.
While the proposal requires railroads that provide intercity
passenger train service to conduct two emergency simulations on each
business unit or other major organizational element during each
calendar year, FRA seeks public comment on whether this number should
be increased in the final rule. Commenters, especially those
representing members of the emergency response community, are
encouraged to discuss how their recommended minimum number of required
emergency simulations can best achieve the rule's emergency
preparedness objectives in a cost beneficial manner that does not
compromise rail safety. In recommending an optimal minimum number of
emergency simulations, commenters are specifically urged to opine on
how a passenger railroad as diverse as Amtrak, which operates coast-to-
coast service under a wide variety of operating conditions through the
jurisdictions of numerous emergency responders, can best achieve the
emergency preparedness goals of this section throughout its entire
system without expending a disproportionate amount of its limited
resources.
12. Debriefing and Critique: Section 239.105
Section 239.105 recognizes the value of conducting a formal
evaluation process after the occurrence of either an actual emergency
situation or an emergency simulation such as a full-scale or tabletop
exercise to determine what lessons can be learned. To increase the
effectiveness of the evaluation of an emergency simulation, railroad
personnel should be designated as evaluators to provide a perspective
on how well the emergency preparedness plan and procedures were carried
out. Although not required by the proposed rule, railroads are also
encouraged to invite outside emergency response organizations and other
outside observers to participate as evaluators. Evaluators should be
given copies of the railroad's emergency preparedness plan before the
simulation is conducted, and a preliminary meeting should be held to
familiarize the evaluators with the drill or exercise and assign
functional areas of concern for evaluation (e.g., communications,
evacuation times). Depending on the elaborateness of the simulation,
evaluators may also choose to use video cameras to record the sequence
of events, actions of personnel, and use of emergency equipment.
The purpose of a debriefing and critique session is to review with
railroad personnel the reports of evaluators, present comments or
observations from other persons, and to assess the need for any
remedial action, either to correct deficiencies or to generally improve
the effectiveness of the emergency operations and procedures. Persons
responsible for conducting the sessions should be instructed by the
railroad to ask questions that will test emergency preparedness
procedures, assess training, and evaluate equipment. After a
simulation, these persons should debrief all participants (including
simulated victims, if any) who can offer valuable insights and thus
help the railroad to revise its procedures. The debriefing session
should help to determine what emergency preparedness or response
procedures could not be used because of the special circumstances of
either the train or the passengers, and whether coordination between
the railroad and the emergency responders requires improvement.
The above method of conducting post-simulation debriefing and
critique sessions should also be used by railroads to evaluate
reactions to actual emergencies. Weaknesses in emergency preparedness
procedures and equipment and areas for improving training should be
identified, and the railroad shall amend its emergency preparedness
plan in accordance with proposed Sec. 239.201. All persons involved
should be debriefed.
Although the term ``emergency or emergency situation'' is defined
in proposed Sec. 239.7 to include a collision with a person, including
suicides, FRA does expect a railroad to conduct a debriefing and
critique session after every grade crossing accident. While the
railroad would still be expected to invoke its emergency preparedness
plan in the event of a grade crossing accident, the goal of this
proposed rule is to ensure that railroads effectively and efficiently
manage passenger train emergencies. Accordingly, FRA does not intend
for the debriefing and critique requirements of this section to apply
when an emergency situation involves only a motorist or pedestrian who
has been injured or killed, and does affect the passengers onboard the
train. In addition, a railroad cannot count its activation of the
emergency preparedness plan under these circumstances for purposes of
satisfying the emergency simulation requirements of Sec. 239.103. While
a significant derailment with one or more injured passengers or a fire
on a passenger train would undoubtedly involve significant threats to
passenger safety, and therefore require a debriefing and critique
session, the proposed rule leaves open the question of what other types
of emergency situations would trigger the requirements of this section.
Since the threshold issue of what constitutes a ``significant threat''
to the safety or health of one or more persons requiring immediate
action has not been fully determined by either FRA or the Working
Group, FRA is seeking public comment on what sorts of situations to
include in the final rule under the definition of ``emergency'' or
``emergency situation'' set forth in proposed Sec. 239.7.
[[Page 8349]]
The proposed rule does not require railroads to use a prescribed
FRA form or other specific document at the debriefing and critique
sessions, nor does the proposed rule set forth specific questions that
railroads must ask after a simulation or actual emergency.
However, as a result of whatever means the railroad selects to
ascertain the effectiveness of its emergency preparedness plan,
paragraph (b) requires the railroad to determine the functional
capabilities of the on-board communications equipment, the timeliness
of the required emergency notifications, and the overall efficiency of
the emergency responders and the emergency egress of the passengers.
In order to achieve the goals of this proposed section, and to
comply with the debriefing and critique recordkeeping requirement of
paragraph (c), evaluators should be provided with critique sheets, to
be collected and used in the debriefing and critique sessions conducted
by the railroads. At a minimum, whatever documentation the railroad
selects to comply with paragraph (c) should contain the date(s) and
location(s) of the simulation and the debriefing and critique session,
and should include the names of all participants. Under the proposed
rule, the critique sheets, or equivalent records, would then be
maintained by the railroad at its system and applicable division
headquarters, and be made available for FRA inspection and copying
during normal business hours.
FRA invites comments on whether the final rule should specify
additional types of issues that must be addressed by railroads at
debriefing and critique sessions (in addition to the five issues
required to be addressed in proposed paragraph (b)), or whether each
railroad should retain some flexibility to develop it own approach to
conducting these sessions. In this regard, FRA encourages comments on
the relative value of the final rule requiring discussion and
documentation of any or all of the following questions:
Did on-board personnel try to initiate a radio call
immediately?
How long did it take for on-board personnel to reach and
inform the control center of the emergency situation?
What was the method of notification to the control center?
Was the method an on-board radio or a wayside radio (if equipped)?
Was there adequate radio communication equipment? Was it
used properly? Did it work properly?
Did on-board personnel know the proper emergency telephone
number to call from the wayside telephone?
Did on-board personnel identify him/herself to the control
center by name and location?
Did on-board personnel report the number (approximate or
actual, as appropriate) and status of the passengers?
Did on-board personnel make audible, appropriate
announcements to passengers? How many minutes elapsed after the
simulation or emergency began before the first announcement was made?
Did on-board personnel properly operate the fire
extinguishers?
Did on-board personnel request deenergization of the third
rail or catenary power?
Did on-board personnel request the halting of train
movements?
How long did it take for the first emergency response unit
to arrive at the emergency scene?
How long did it take to completely evacuate the train or
right-of-way structure or wayside facility and/or extinguish a fire
(real or simulated)?
In its comments on the revised regulatory text, METROLINK stated
that if a commuter railroad performs a tabletop exercise or simulation
it cannot follow the criteria for a debriefing and critique session set
forth in this section. Specifically, METROLINK contends that during
field drill and tabletop exercise simulations the railroads usually do
not involve real passengers and do not notify the emergency responders
via the normal means of communication. Moreover, the emergency
responders do not respond with lights and sirens as they would under
real emergency conditions.
13. Emergency Exits: Section 239.107
In the course of normal passenger train operations, persons enter
and exit passenger cars at a station platform through doors on the side
of the train. However, when a disabled train cannot be moved to the
nearest station, alternative evacuation methods must be employed.
Emergency access to and egress from a passenger car may be achieved
through outside doors, end doors, and windows. In some emergencies,
such as when a fire is confined to a single passenger car, persons may
be moved through the end door(s) to an adjacent car. In other
emergencies, transfer of all the passengers from the disabled train may
be required.
Not all passenger cars have vestibule side doors on both ends, and
in some equipment, operation of these doors has required considerable
effort, including hand tools. If a power loss occurs, crewmembers may
be unable to open either or both of the car vestibule side doors from
the normal key control station in the car. If side-door emergency
controls permit opening of only one sliding door, it could prove
difficult to move certain individuals through it. Also, if the
vestibule side doors cannot be opened immediately from either the
inside or the outside, persons may panic and could be injured as others
attempt to leave the car.
Commuter railroads have agreed to FRA's request that arrangements
requiring hand tools (coins and pencils) be retrofitted. Two railroads
with significant numbers of affected cars are already completing this
work, and this issue will be separately addressed in the forthcoming
NPRM on Passenger Equipment Safety Standards. The Passenger Equipment
Safety Standards Working Group will be evaluating other improvements in
door design and operation. Paragraph 239.107(a) requires that all doors
intended by a railroad to be used during an emergency situation be
properly marked inside and outside, and that the railroad post clear
and understandable instructions for their use at the designated
locations.
Paragraph 239.107(a)(1) requires that the emergency egress exits be
conspicuously and legibly marked on the inside of the car with
luminescent material or be properly lighted. FRA realizes that during
an emergency the main power supply to the passenger cars may become
inoperative and that crewmembers with portable flashlights may be
unavailable. Since lack of clear identification or lighting could make
it difficult for passengers to find the emergency door exits, the
proposed rule requires luminescent material on all emergency egress
door exits (or secondary auxiliary lighting near these exits) to assist
and speed passenger egress from the train during an emergency. The
marking of the emergency door exits must be conspicuous enough so that
a reasonable person, even while enduring the stress and panic of an
emergency evacuation, can determine where the closest and most
accessible emergency route out of the car is located. In addition,
while this proposed section does not prescribe a particular brand,
type, or color of luminescent paint or material that a railroad must
use to identify an exit, FRA expects each railroad to select a material
durable enough to withstand the daily effects of passenger traffic,
such as the contact that occurs as passengers enter and leave the cars.
Paragraph 239.107(a)(2) requires that the emergency door exits
intended for emergency access by emergency
[[Page 8350]]
responders for extrication of passengers be marked with retroreflective
material, so that the emergency responders can easily distinguish them
from the nonaccessible doors simply by shining their flashlights or
other portable lighting on the marking or symbol selected by the
railroad. Again, while this proposed section does not prescribe that a
railroad use a particular brand, type, or color of retroreflective
material to identify an access location, FRA expects each railroad to
select a material durable enough to withstand the daily effects of
weather and passenger contact, and capable of resisting, to the extent
possible, the effects of heat and fire. If all doors are equally
operable from the exterior, no designation would be useful, nor would
any be required. In a separate rulemaking, FRA's Passenger Equipment
Safety Standards Working Group (FRA Docket No. PCSS-1) will address
appropriate requirements for periodic maintenance and replacement of
the emergency door exit markings.
The proposed rule requires railroads to post clear and
understandable instructions at designated locations describing how to
operate the emergency door exits. This section does not mandate that
railroads use specific words or phrases to guide the passengers and
emergency responders. Instead, each railroad should evaluate the
operational characteristics of its emergency door exits, and select key
words or diagrams that adequately inform the individuals who must use
them. While railroads are encouraged to post comprehensive
instructions, FRA also realizes that during an emergency situation
every additional moment devoted to reading and understanding access or
egress information places lives at risk. In addition, FRA would already
expect passengers and emergency responders to be familiar with the
location and operation of the railroad's emergency door exits as a
result of emergency responder liaison activities and passenger
awareness programs conducted in accordance with proposed Sec. 239.101
(a)(5) and (a)(7).
Paragraph (b) requires each railroad operating passenger train
service to properly consider the nature and characteristics of its
operations and passenger equipment to plan for routine and scheduled
inspection, maintenance, and repair of all windows and door exits
intended for either emergency egress or rescue access by emergency
responders. In the case of emergency window exits, the inspection,
maintenance, and repair activities should be performed consistent with
the requirements of part 223 of this chapter. While the proposed rule
does not require railroads to perform these tasks in accordance with a
specific timetable or methodology, except with respect to the periodic
sampling requirement for emergency window exits discussed below, FRA
expects each railroad to develop and implement procedures for achieving
the goals of this paragraph. Visual inspections must be performed
periodically to verify that no emergency exit has a broken release
mechanism or other overt sign that would render it unable to function
in an emergency. Maintenance, including lubrication or scheduled
replacement of depreciated parts or mechanisms, must be performed in
accordance with standard industry practice and/or manufacturer
recommendations. All emergency exits that are found during the course
of an inspection or maintenance cycle to be broken, disabled, or
otherwise incapable of performing their intended safety function must
be repaired before the railroad may return the car to passenger
service.
Carrying forward requirements currently contained in FRA's
Emergency Order No. 20, the proposed rule also requires each railroad
to periodically test a representative sample of emergency window exits
on its passenger cars to verify their proper operation. The sampling of
these emergency window exits must be conducted in conformity with
either of two commonly recognized alternate methods, which will provide
a degree of uniformity industry wide. Both methods require sampling
meeting a 95-percent confidence level that all emergency window exits
operate properly (i.e., the methods do not accept a defect rate of 5
percent). Rather than require railroads to test all window exits on a
specific type or series of car if one car has a defective window exit,
the proposed rule permits the railroads to use commonly accepted
sampling techniques to determine how many additional windows to test.
In general, these principles require that the greater the percentage of
windows exits that a railroad finds defective, the greater the
percentage of windows that the railroad will have to test.
Specifically, sampling must be conducted to meet a 95-percent
confidence level that no defective units remain in the universe and be
in accord with either Military Standard MIL-STD-105(D) Sampling for
Attributes or American National Standards Institute ANSI-ASQC Z1.4-1993
Sampling Procedures for Inspections by Attributes. Defective units must
be repaired before the passenger car is returned to service.
The proposal specifies that a railroad must test a representative
sample of emergency window exits on its cars at least once during every
180 days to verify their proper operation. However commenters are
encouraged to address this issue by indicating whether the sampling
should occur on an annual basis, or on a less frequent basis.
Commenters are also urged, if possible, to provide scientific data and/
or cost estimates to support their suggested sampling interval.
The inspection, maintenance, and repair records concerning
emergency window and door exits must be retained at the system
headquarters for the railroad and at the division headquarters for each
division where the inspections, maintenance, or repairs are performed
(i.e., the records availability must be division specific). The records
can consist of multiple documents, and may contain separate sections
covering inspection, maintenance, and repair or separate sections
covering different types of passenger equipment. Additionally,
railroads must make these inspection, maintenance, and repair records
available to duly authorized FRA representatives for inspection and
copying (e.g., photocopying or handwritten notetaking) during normal
business hours.
METROLINK commented that in order to avoid the unnecessary burden
of maintaining duplicate records, the rule should require railroads to
store all of the maintenance records for the emergency window and door
exits at the site of the inspections. In METROLINK's case, that site
would be the applicable division headquarters, which is no more than 15
miles from its system headquarters. METROLINK also noted that paragraph
239.107(c) does not indicate for how long the inspection records must
be retained, and recommended that since the current rule calls for
major service inspections to be retained for 180 days (or until the
next inspection is performed) the final rule should establish a similar
timeframe.
14. Emergency Preparedness Plan; Filing and Approval: Section 239.201
Section 239.201 specifies the process for review and approval of
each railroad's emergency preparedness plan by FRA. The intent of the
review and approval is to be constructive, rather than restrictive. It
is anticipated that the railroads will develop and implement varied
plans based upon the special circumstances involving their individual
operations. Under the proposal, FRA would also require that the
railroad summarize its internal discussions and deliberative processes
[[Page 8351]]
to explain how the railroad's unique and individual operating
characteristics determined how each issue was finally addressed in the
emergency preparedness plan. Specifically, FRA expects the railroad to
include a review of the analysis that led to each element of the
emergency preparedness plan it submits to FRA for approval, including a
consideration of the expected monetary costs and anticipated safety
benefits associated with each section of the plan.
In its comments, METROLINK stated that the term ``analysis'' in the
phrase ``shall include a summary of the railroad's analysis supporting
each plan element and describing how each condition on the railroad's
property is addressed in the plan'' is vague and lacking in direction.
METROLINK then asked whether FRA expects to receive a cost benefit
analysis, systems approach, or safety value analysis. In addition,
METROLINK questioned whether the term ``condition on the railroad's
property'' concerns elements of the plan such as earthquakes, wind, and
power outages.
FRA will conduct a review of each plan so that there can be an open
discussion of the plan's provisions from which all concerned parties
can benefit. However, in order to ensure compliance with minimum plan
requirements FRA will review each plan in detail prior to approval and
implementation. FRA expects to involve members of the Passenger Train
Emergency Preparedness Working Group in developing benchmark criteria
for plan approvals to simplify plan development and approval. It is
anticipated that this criteria will address program elements that
include the following:
Specific course content for training programs of on-board
personnel, control center personnel, and other key employees;
Minimum requirements for emergency exercises, including
frequency and content of drills with emergency responders and
simulations to determine rapidity of emergency evacuations under
varying scenarios;
Specific means for providing emergency safety information
to passengers, similar to on-board briefings provided in commercial
aviation;
Detailed requirements for tunnel safety, including
lighting and equipment; and
Additional attention to emergency equipment, by
prescribing types and numbers of various kinds of equipment that may be
useful under varying operating scenarios.
FRA will also review all plan amendments prior to their going into
effect. FRA requests comment on whether there are any categories of
plan amendments that should be permitted to go into effect immediately,
prior to review and approval, because they constitute improvements for
which implementation delay should be avoided.
All persons, such as contractors, who perform any action on behalf
of a railroad will be required to conform to the emergency preparedness
plans in effect on the railroads upon which they are working. Persons
whose employees are working under a railroad's approved emergency
preparedness plan need not submit a separate plan to FRA for review and
approval. For example, if a railroad hires an outside independent
contractor to conduct an emergency simulation pursuant to 49 CFR
239.103, the contractor must perform this task in accordance with the
railroad's plan. However, if a freight railroad train crew operates a
passenger train for a commuter rail authority, the freight railroad
must coordinate the applicable portions of its emergency preparedness
plan with the corresponding portions of the commuter rail authority's,
unless an assignment of responsibility for compliance is made under 49
CFR 239.101(a)(3).
The proposed rule does not specifically call for the involvement of
railroad employees or their representatives in the process of designing
or reviewing the emergency preparedness plan, because the
responsibility for having a plan that conforms with this rule lies with
the employer. However, it should be noted that the success of an
emergency preparedness plan will require the willing cooperation of all
persons whose duties or personal safety are affected by the plan.
15. Retention of Emergency Preparedness Plan: Section 239.203
The emergency preparedness plan and all subsequent amendments must
be retained at the system headquarters for the railroad and at the
division headquarters for each division where the plan is in effect
(i.e., the records availability must be division specific). The
emergency preparedness plan may consist of multiple documents or
booklets and may contain separate sections covering the varying job
functions and plan responsibilities of on-board and control center
personnel. Additionally, railroads must make their emergency
preparedness plan records available to duly authorized FRA
representatives for inspection and copying (e.g., photocopying or
handwritten notetaking) during normal business hours.
16. Operational (efficiency) tests: Section 239.301
Section 239.301 contains the requirement that railroads monitor the
routine performance of employees who have individual responsibilities
under the emergency preparedness plan to verify that the employee can
perform the duties required under the plan in a safe and effective
manner. It permits the railroad to test proficiency by requiring the
employee to complete a written or oral examination, an interactive
training program using a computer, a practical demonstration of
understanding and ability, or an appropriate combination of these in
accordance with this section. This testing can also involve check rides
and control center visits, along with unannounced, covert observation
of the employees.
This section requires a railroad to keep a record of the date,
time, place, and result of each operational (efficiency) test that was
performed in accordance with its emergency preparedness plan. Each
record must identify the railroad officer administering the test of
each employee. Accordingly, by identifying the specific data points
that each record must provide, this section will promote the
examination of relevant information from captured data sources,
enabling FRA to better determine the effectiveness of a railroad's
emergency preparedness plan. Written or electronic records must be kept
of these operational (efficiency) tests for one calendar year after the
end of the year in which the test was conducted, available for
inspection and copying by FRA during normal business hours.
17. Electronic recordkeeping: Section 239.303
Section 239.303 authorizes railroads to retain their operational
(efficiency) test records by electronic recordkeeping, subject to the
conditions set forth in that provision. This provision provides an
alternative for railroads retaining certain information, as required in
proposed Sec. 239.301. FRA realizes that requiring railroads to retain
the information in paper form would impose additional administrative
and storage costs, and that computer storage of these documents would
also enable railroads to immediately update any amendments to their
operational testing programs.
Each participating railroad must have the essential components of a
computer system, i.e., a desktop computer and either a facsimile
machine or a printer connected to retrieve and produce
[[Page 8352]]
records for immediate review. The material retrieved in hard copy form
must contain relevant information organized in usable format to render
the data completely understandable. The documents must be made
available for FRA inspection during normal business hours, which FRA
interprets as the times and days of the week when railroads conduct
their regular business transactions. Nevertheless, FRA reserves the
right to review and examine the documents prepared in accordance with
the Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness regulations at any
reasonable time if situations warrant.
Additionally, each railroad must provide adequate security measures
to limit employee access to its electronic data processing system and
must prescribe who can create, modify, or delete data from the
database. Although FRA does not identify the management position
capable of instituting changes in the database, each railroad must
indicate the source authorized to make such changes. Each railroad must
also designate who will be authorized to authenticate the hard copies
produced from the electronic format. In short, each railroad electing
to electronically retain its records must ensure the integrity of the
information and prevent possible tampering of data, enabling FRA to
fully execute its enforcement responsibilities.
Regulatory Impact
Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
This proposed rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing
policies and procedures. Due to the intense public interest in the
subject matter of the proposed rule, the proposed rule is considered to
be significant under both Executive Order 12866 and DOT policies and
procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979). FRA has prepared and
placed in the docket a regulatory analysis addressing the economic
impact of the proposed rule. It may be inspected and photocopied at the
Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, Seventh Floor, 1120 Vermont Avenue, N.W.,
in Washington, D.C. Photocopies may also be obtained by submitting a
written request to the FRA Docket Clerk at Office of Chief Counsel,
Federal Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington,
D.C. 20590.
As part of the benefit-cost analysis, FRA has assessed quantitative
measurements of costs and benefits expected from the adoption of the
proposed rule. The Net Present Value (NPV) of the total 20-year costs
which the industry is expected to incur is $4.285 million. Following is
a breakdown of the costs by requirement.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section Requirement Cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
239.101, 201, 203............... Emergency Preparedness $105,754
Plan (EPP).
Control Center 957
Notification.
On-board Personnel 0
Training.
Control Center 55,520
Personnel Training.
Joint Operations...... 16,562
Parallel Operations... 1,297
Emergency Responder
Liaison
--Provide EPP to 12,741
Responders.
--Awareness of 56,928
Responder
Capabilities.
On-board Emergency
Equipment
--One Fire 147,801
Extinguisher/Car.
--One Pry Bar/Car..... 92,066
--Instruction on Pry 242,868
Bar Use.
Passenger Safety
Awareness
--Permanent On-board 65,611
Procedures.
--Periodic 0
Reinforcement.
--Annual Customer 26,616
Surveys.
239.103, 105.................... Passenger Train 969,140
Emergency Simulations.
239.107......................... Emergency Exits
--Marking--Interior... 450,525
--Marking--Exterior... 1,347,505
--Inspection and 327,948
Recordkeeping.
239.301......................... Operational Efficiency 590,441
Tests.
---------------
Total....................... ...................... 4,510,280
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Each year there are passenger train accidents which result in one
or more fatalities. In the last ten years there have been about seven
passenger train accidents which resulted in a significant loss of life.
FRA does not know how many commuter or intercity train accidents will
occur in the future. Although the passenger rail industry has a very
high level of safety, the potential for injuries and loss of life in
certain emergency situations is very high. FRA believes that the
proposed rule represents a cost-effective approach to providing a
reasonable level of protection against known threats to human life, and
that if only two fatalities were to be avoided over a twenty-year
period then the rule would be cost beneficial. Accordingly, while FRA
cannot predict with confidence the likelihood of particular accident
circumstances in which particular rule elements will be useful, FRA
believes that it is reasonable to expect that the measures called for
in this proposal would prevent or mitigate the severity of injuries
greater in value than the costs of developing and implementing
emergency preparedness plans.
Monetary benefit levels associated with several of the proposed
requirements are not estimated due to lack of data. FRA would greatly
appreciate receiving information and comments regarding the benefits
that would result from complying with the distinct requirements
proposed. It should be noted that FRA expects total benefits to exceed
total costs for the proposed rule, and that the rule's provisions are
necessary components of FRA's overall initiatives for passenger train
emergency preparedness.
Included within the $4,510,280 total cost figure are proposed
requirements for equipping each passenger car with a pry bar, marking
and inspecting emergency exits, and providing passengers with emergency
situation procedures that will ensure that each
[[Page 8353]]
passenger is able to escape from a life threatening situation on his or
her own initiative. The NPV of the twenty-year cost associated with the
requirements aimed at ensuring that in a life threatening situation
passengers trapped in a car would be afforded enough opportunity to
escape safely is $1.2 million.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section Requirement Cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
239.101......................... Pry Bars
--One Pry Bar per Car. $ 92,066
--Instruction on Pry 242,868
Bar Use.
Passenger Safety
Awareness
--Permanent Car 65,611
Procedures.
--Periodic 0
Reinforcement.
Annual Customer 26,616
Surveys.
239.107......................... Marking Emergency 450,525
Exits--Interior.
Inspection of 327,948
Emergency Exits.
---------------
Total....................... ...................... 1,193,820
------------------------------------------------------------------------
These costs would be justified if the next passenger train emergency
situation is handled in such a way that loss of life is contained.
As previously noted, FRA is allowing 60 days for comments and
invites public comment on the issue of regulatory impact. FRA seeks
comment and/or data to help identify or quantify other factors that may
affect the benefits or costs of the proposal, including alternatives
that were not explored by the Working Group and any costs or benefits
associated with such alternatives.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.)
requires an assessment of the impacts of proposed rules on small
entities. This proposed rule affects intercity and commuter passenger
railroads. Commuter railroads are part of larger transit organizations
that receive Federal funds. The American Public Transit Association
(APTA) represents the interests of commuter railroads in regulatory
matters. Further, the proposed standards were developed by FRA in
consultation with a Working Group that included Amtrak, individual
commuter railroads, and APTA.
Entities impacted by the proposed rule are governmental
jurisdictions or transit authorities, none of which are small for
purposes of the United States Small Business Administration (i.e., no
entity operates in a locality with a population of under 50,000
people). Smaller commuter railroads will not be affected
disproportionately. The level of costs incurred by each organization
should vary in proportion to the organization's size. For instance,
railroads with fewer employees and fewer passenger cars will have lower
costs associated with both employee efficiency testing and emergency
exit inspections.
Smaller passenger rail operations such as tourist, scenic,
excursion, and historic railroads are excepted from the proposed rule.
The proposed rule does not affect small entities.
A joint FRA/industry working group formed by the RSAC is currently
developing recommendations regarding the applicability of FRA
regulations, including this one, to tourist, scenic, historic, and
excursion railroads. After appropriate consultation with the excursion
railroad associations takes place, emergency preparedness requirements
for these operations may be proposed by FRA that are different from
those affecting other types of passenger train operations. These
requirements may be more or less onerous, or simply different in
detail, depending in part on the information gathered during FRA's
consultation process.
Paperwork Reduction Act
The proposed rule contains information collection requirements. FRA
has submitted these information collection requirements to the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and approval in accordance
with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d) et seq.).
FRA has endeavored to keep the burden associated with this proposal as
simple and minimal as possible. The proposed sections that contain the
new and/or revised information collection requirements and the
estimated time to fulfill each requirement are as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondent Total annual Average time Total annual Total annual
CFR section universe responses per response burden hours burden cost
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
223..9d/ 239.107:
A. Emergency egress..... 17 RRs.......... 1,300 new 4 minutes...... 621 $18,630
decals.
4,575 replace 7 minutes...... .............. ..............
decals.
1,300 new ............... .............. ..............
decals.
B. Emergency exits...... 17 RRs.......... 6,320 new 4 minutes...... 824 24,720
decals.
............... 7 minutes...... .............. ..............
239.107(b).................. 17 RRs.......... 1,800 tests.... 20 minutes (18 600 18,000
minutes to
perform test
and 2 minutes
for
recordkeeping).
239.101/239.201............. 17 RRs.......... 17 plans....... 158 hours...... 2,685 90,168
17 RRs.......... 17 amendments.. 1.6 hours...... 27 756
239.101 (1)(i).............. 17 RRs.......... N/A............ Usual and N/A N/A
customary
procedure--No
new paperwork.
239.101 (1)(ii)............. 17 RRs.......... N/A............ Usual and N/A N/A
customary
procedure--No
new paperwork.
239.101 (1)(ii)............. 5 RRs........... 5 updates of 1 hour......... 5 140
records.
239.101 (a)(3).............. 33 RRs.......... 33 negotiations 16 hours....... 528 19,800
239.101 (a)(7)(ii).......... 5 RRs........... 1,300 passenger 5 minutes per 108 2,808
cars. bulkhead card.
[[Page 8354]]
5 safety 1 hour per RR 5 190
messages. to develop
safety message.
239.105..................... 17 RRs.......... 66 records..... 30 minutes per 33 924
record.
239.301/ 239.303............ 17 RRs.......... 11,600 tests... 8 minutes per 1,547 58,786
test.
239.101 (a)(5).............. 16 RRs.......... 16 reponses to 2 hours........ 32 896
distribute
info to
emergency
responders.
1 RR (Amtrak)... 1 response to 100 hours...... 100 2,800
distribute
info to
emergency
responders.
16 RRs.......... 16 updates of 30 minutes per 8 224
emergency updated.
responder
records.
1RR (Amtrak).... 1 update of 5 hours........ 5 140
emergency
responder
records.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All estimates include the time for reviewing instructions;
searching existing data sources; gathering or maintaining the needed
data; and reviewing the information. Pursuant to 44 U.S.C.
3506(c)(2)(B), FRA solicits comments concerning: whether these
information collection requirements are necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of FRA, including whether the information
has practical utility; the accuracy of FRA's estimates of the burden of
the information collection requirements; the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be collected; and whether the burden of
collection of information on those who are to respond, including
through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of
information technology, may be minimized. For information or a copy of
the paperwork package submitted to OMB, please contact Ms. Gloria
Swanson at 202-632-3318.
Organizations and individuals desiring to submit comments on the
collection of information requirements should submit their views in
writing to the Office of Management and Budget, Attention: Desk Officer
for the Federal Railroad Administration, Office and Information and
Regulatory Affairs, New Executive Office Building, 726 Jackson Place,
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20503, and should also send a copy of their
comments to Ms. Gloria D. Swanson, Federal Railroad Administration,
RRS-21.1, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington D.C. 20590. Copies of
any such comments should also be submitted to the docket of this
rulemaking at the mailing address for the Docket Clerk provided above.
OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collection of
information requirements contained in this NPRM between 30 and 60 days
after publication of this document in the Federal Register. Therefore,
a comment to OMB is best assured of having its full effect if OMB
receives it within 30 days of publication. The final rule will respond
to any OMB or public comments on the information collection
requirements contained in this proposal.
FRA is not authorized to impose a penalty on persons for violating
information collection requirements which do not display a current OMB
control number, if required. FRA intends to obtain current OMB control
numbers for any new information collection requirements resulting from
this rulemaking action prior to the effective date of a final rule. The
OMB control number, when assigned, will be announced in the Federal
Register.
Environmental Impact
FRA has evaluated these proposed regulations in accordance with its
procedures for ensuring full consideration of the environmental impact
of FRA actions, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act
(42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), and related directives. This notice meets the
criteria that establish this as a non-major action for environmental
purposes.
Federalism Implications
This proposed rule has been analyzed in accordance with the
principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 12612, and it has
been determined that the proposed rule does not have sufficient
federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism
Assessment. The fundamental policy decision providing that Federal
regulations should govern aspects of service provided by municipal and
public benefit corporations (or agencies) of State governments is
embodied in the statute quoted above. FRA has made every effort to
provide reasonable flexibility to State-level decision making and has
included commuter authorities as full partners in development of this
proposed rule.
List of Subjects
49 CFR Part 223
Railroad safety, Glazing standards.
49 CFR Part 239
Railroad safety, Passenger train emergency preparedness.
Request for Public Comments
FRA proposes to amend part 223 and adopt a new part 239 of Title
49, Code of Federal Regulations, as set forth below. FRA solicits
comments on all aspects of the proposed rule whether through written
submissions, or participation in the public hearing, or both. FRA may
make changes in the final rule based on comments received in response
to this notice.
The Proposed Rule
In consideration of the foregoing, FRA proposes to amend chapter II
of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations as follows:
PART 223--[AMENDED]
1. The authority citation for part 223 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20105-20114, 20133, 20701,
21301-21302, and 21304; Sec. 215, Pub. L. No. 103-440, 108 Stat.
4623-4624 (49 U.S.C. 20133); and 49 CFR 1.49(c), (g), (m).
2. By revising Sec. 223.5 to read as follows:
Sec. 223.5 Definitions.
As used in this part--
Caboose means a car in a freight train intended to provide
transportation for crewmembers.
Certified glazing means a glazing material that has been certified
by the manufacturer as having met the testing requirements set forth in
Appendix A of this part and that has been installed in such a manner
that it will perform its intended function.
Designated service means exclusive operation of a locomotive under
the following conditions:
[[Page 8355]]
(1) The locomotive is not used as an independent unit or the
controlling unit is a consist of locomotives except when moving for the
purpose of servicing or repair within a single yard area;
(2) The locomotive is not occupied by operating or deadhead crews
outside a single yard area; and
(3) The locomotive is stenciled ``Designated Service--DO NOT
OCCUPY''.
Emergency opening window means that segment of a side facing
glazing location which has been designed to permit rapid and easy
removal during a crisis situation.
Emergency responder means a qualified member of a police or fire
department, or other organization involved with public safety, who
responds to a passenger train emergency.
End facing glazing location means any location where a line
perpendicular to the plane of the glazing material makes a horizontal
angle of 50 degrees or less with the centerline of the locomotive,
caboose or passenger car. Any location which, due to curvature of the
glazing material, can meet the criteria for either a front facing
location or a side facing location shall be considered a front facing
location.
Locomotive means a self-propelled unit of equipment designed
primarily for moving other equipment. It does not include self-
propelled passenger cars.
Locomotive cab means that portion of the superstructure designed to
be occupied by the crew while operating the locomotive.
Passenger car means a unit of rolling equipment intended to provide
transportation for members of the general public and includes self-
propelled cars designed to carry baggage, mail, express and passengers.
Passenger train service means the transportation of persons (other
than employees, contractors, or persons riding equipment to observe or
monitor railroad operations) in intercity passenger service, commuter
or other short-haul service.
Railroad means:
(1) Any form of non-highway ground transportation that runs on
rails or electromagnetic guideways, including:
(i) Commuter or other short-haul rail passenger service in a
metropolitan or suburban area and commuter railroad service that was
operated by the Consolidated Rail Corporation on January 1, 1979, and
(ii) High speed ground transportation systems that connect
metropolitan areas, without regard to whether those systems use new
technologies not associated with traditional railroads, but does not
include rapid transit operations in an urban area that are not
connected to the general railroad system of transportation and
(2) A person that provides railroad transportation, whether
directly or by contracting out operation of the railroad to another
person.
Rebuilt locomotive, caboose or passenger car means a locomotive,
caboose or passenger car that has undergone overhaul which has been
identified by the railroad as a capital expense under Surface
Transportation Board accounting standards.
Side facing glazing location means any location where a line
perpendicular to the plane of the glazing material makes an angle of
more than 50 degrees with the centerline of the locomotive, caboose or
passenger car.
Windshield means the combination of individual units of glazing
material of the locomotive, passenger car, or caboose that are
positioned in an end facing glazing location.
Yard is a system of auxiliary tracks used exclusively for the
classification of passenger or freight cars according to commodity or
destination; assembling of cars for train movement; storage of cars; or
repair of equipment.
Yard caboose means a caboose that is used exclusively in a single
yard area.
Yard locomotive means a locomotive that is operated only to perform
switching functions within a single yard area.
3. In Sec. 223.9, paragraph (d) is added to read as follows:
Sec. 223.9 Requirements for new or rebuilt equipment.
* * * * *
(d) Marking. Each railroad providing passenger train service shall
ensure that:
(1) All emergency windows are conspicuously and legibly marked with
luminescent material on the inside of each car to facilitate passenger
egress. Each railroad shall post clear and legible operating
instructions at or near such exits.
(2) All windows intended for emergency access by emergency
responders for extrication of passengers are marked with a
retroreflective, unique, and easily recognizable symbol or other clear
marking. Each railroad shall post clear and understandable window
access instructions either at each window or at the car ends.
4. Part 239 is added to read as follows:
PART 239--PASSENGER TRAIN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Subpart A--General
Sec.
239.1 Purpose and scope.
239.3 Application.
239.5 Preemptive effect.
239.7 Definitions.
239.9 Responsibility for compliance.
239.11 Penalties.
Subpart B--Specific Requirements
239.101 Emergency preparedness plan.
239.103 Passenger train emergency simulations.
239.105 Debriefing and critique.
239.107 Emergency exits.
Subpart C--Review, Approval, and Retention of Emergency Preparedness
Plans
239.201 Emergency preparedness plan; filing and approval.
239.203 Retention of emergency preparedness plan.
Subpart D--Operational (Efficiency) Tests; Inspection of Records and
Recordkeeping
239.301 Operational (efficiency) tests.
239.303 Electronic recordkeeping.
Appendix A to Part 239--Schedule of Civil Penalties (Reserved)
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20105-20114, 20133, 21301,
21304, and 21311; Sec. 215, Pub. L. No. 103-440, 108 Stat. 4623-4624
(49 U.S.C. 20133); and 49 CFR 1.49 (c), (g), (m).
Subpart A--General
Sec. 239.1 Purpose and scope.
(a) The purpose of this part is to reduce the magnitude and
severity of casualties in railroad operations by ensuring that
railroads involved in passenger train operations can effectively and
efficiently manage passenger train emergencies.
(b) This part prescribes minimum Federal safety standards for the
preparation, adoption, and implementation of emergency preparedness
plans by railroads connected with the operation of passenger trains,
and requires each affected railroad to instruct its employees on the
plan's provisions. This part does not restrict railroads from adopting
and enforcing additional or more stringent requirements not
inconsistent with this part.
Sec. 239.3 Application.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), this part applies to all:
(1) Railroads that operate intercity or commuter passenger train
service on standard gage track which is part of the general railroad
system of transportation;
[[Page 8356]]
(2) Railroads that provide commuter or other short-haul rail
passenger train service in a metropolitan or suburban area [as
described by 49 U.S.C. 20102(1)], including public authorities
operating passenger train service; and
(3) Freight railroads hosting the operation of passenger train
service described in paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this section.
(b) This part does not apply to:
(1) Rapid transit operations in an urban area that are not
connected with the general railroad system of transportation;
(2) Operation of private cars, including business/office cars and
circus trains; or
(3) Tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion operations, whether on
or off the general railroad system.
Sec. 239.5 Preemptive effect.
Under 49 U.S.C. 20106 [formerly Sec. 205 of the Federal Railroad
Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 434)], issuance of these regulations
preempts any State law, rule, regulation, order, or standard covering
the same subject matter, except a provision necessary to eliminate or
reduce an essentially local safety hazard, that is not incompatible
with Federal law or regulation and does not unreasonably burden
interstate commerce.
Sec. 239.7 Definitions.
As used in this part--
Adjacent rail modes of transportation includes other railroads,
trolleys, light rail, and heavy transit.
Crewmember means a person, other than a passenger, who performs
either:
(1) On-board functions connected with the movement of the train or
(2) On-board service.
Control center means a central location on a railroad with
responsibility for directing the safe movement of trains.
Division headquarters means the location designated by the railroad
where a high-level operating manager (e.g., a superintendent, division
manager, or equivalent), who has jurisdiction over a portion of the
railroad, has an office.
Emergency or emergency situation means an unexpected event related
to the operation of passenger train service involving a significant
threat to the safety or health of one or more persons requiring
immediate action.
Emergency preparedness plan means one or more documents focusing on
preparedness and response in dealing with a passenger train emergency.
Emergency responder means a qualified member of a police or fire
department, or other organization involved with public safety, who
responds to a passenger train emergency.
Emergency window means that segment of a side facing glazing
location which has been designed to permit rapid and easy removal in an
emergency situation.
Joint operations means rail operations conducted by more than one
railroad on the same track regardless of whether such operations are
the result of:
(1) Contractual arrangements between the railroads;
(2) Order of a governmental agency or a court of law; or
(3) Any other legally binding directive.
Passenger train service means the transportation of persons (other
than employees, contractors, or persons riding equipment to observe or
monitor railroad operations) by railroad in intercity passenger
service, commuter, or other short-haul passenger service.
Private car means a rail passenger car used to transport non-
revenue passengers on an occasional contractual basis, and includes
business/office cars and circus trains.
Qualified means a status attained by an employee who has
successfully completed any required training for, has demonstrated
proficiency in, and has been authorized by the employer to perform the
duties of a particular position or function.
Railroad means:
(1) Any form of non-highway ground transportation that runs on
rails or electromagnetic guideways, including:
(i) Commuter or other short-haul rail passenger service in a
metropolitan or suburban area and commuter railroad service that was
operated by the Consolidated Rail Corporation on January 1, 1979, and
(ii) High speed ground transportation systems that connect
metropolitan areas, without regard to whether those systems use new
technologies not associated with traditional railroads, but does not
include rapid transit operations in an urban area that are not
connected to the general railroad system of transportation and
(2) A person that provides railroad transportation, whether
directly or by contracting out operation of the railroad to another
person.
Railroad officer means any supervisory employee of a railroad.
System headquarters means the location designated by the railroad
as the general office for the railroad system.
Sec. 239.9 Responsibility for compliance.
Although the requirements of this part are stated in terms of the
duty of a railroad, when any person, including a contractor for a
railroad, performs any function required by this part, that person
(whether or not a railroad) is required to perform that function in
accordance with this part.
Sec. 239.11 Penalties.
Any person who violates any requirement of this part or causes the
violation of any such requirement is subject to a civil penalty of at
least $500 and not more than $10,000 per violation, except that:
Penalties may be assessed against individuals only for willful
violations, and, where a grossly negligent violation or a pattern of
repeated violations has created an imminent hazard of death or injury
to persons, or has caused death or injury, a penalty not to exceed
$20,000 per violation may be assessed. Each day a violation continues
shall constitute a separate offense. A person may also be subject to
the criminal penalties provided for in 49 U.S.C. 21311 (formerly
codified in 45 U.S.C. 438(e)) for knowingly and willfully falsifying
reports required by this part. Appendix A contains a schedule of civil
penalty amounts used in connection with this part.
Subpart B--Specific Requirements
Sec. 239.101 Emergency preparedness plan.
(a) Each railroad to which this part applies shall adopt and comply
with written emergency preparedness plan procedures for implementing
each plan element, including those listed below.
(1) Communication. (i) Initial and on-board notification. An on-
board crewmember shall quickly and accurately assess the passenger
train emergency situation and then notify the control center as soon as
practicable by the quickest available means. The train crewmember shall
then inform the passengers about the nature of the emergency and
indicate what corrective countermeasures are in progress.
(ii) Notifications by control center. The control center shall
promptly notify outside emergency responders, adjacent rail modes of
transportation, and appropriate railroad officials that a passenger
train emergency has occurred. Each railroad shall designate an employee
responsible for maintaining current emergency telephone numbers for use
in making such notifications.
(2) Employee training and qualification. (i) On-board personnel.
The railroad's emergency preparedness plan shall address individual
employee
[[Page 8357]]
responsibilities, and provide for initial and periodic training at
least once every two years on the applicable plan provisions,
including, as a minimum:
(A) Rail equipment familiarization;
(B) Situational awareness;
(C) Passenger evacuation;
(D) Coordination of functions; and
(E) ``Hands-on'' instruction concerning the location, function, and
operation of on-board emergency equipment.
(ii) Control center personnel. The railroad's emergency
preparedness plan shall require initial and periodic training at least
once every two years of responsible control center personnel on
appropriate courses of action for each potential emergency situation.
(iii) Testing of on-board and control center personnel. A railroad
shall have procedures for testing a person being evaluated for
qualification under the emergency preparedness plan. The testing
methods selected by the railroad shall be:
(A) Designed to accurately measure an individual employee's
knowledge of his or her responsibilities under the plan;
(B) Objective in nature;
(C) Administered in written form; and
(D) Conducted without reference to open reference books or other
materials except to the degree the person is being tested on his or her
ability to use such reference books or materials.
(iv) On-board staffing. Each passenger train shall have a minimum
of one on-board crewmember who is qualified under the applicable
emergency preparedness plan's provisions.
(3) Joint operations. (i) Each freight railroad hosting passenger
train service shall have an emergency preparedness plan addressing its
specific responsibilities consistent with this part.
(ii) Each railroad that operates passenger train service over the
line of a freight railroad shall coordinate the applicable portions of
its emergency preparedness plan with the corresponding portions of the
freight railroad's emergency preparedness plan, to ensure that an
optimum level of preparedness is achieved. Nothing in this paragraph
shall restrict the ability of the railroads to provide for an
appropriate assignment of responsibility for compliance with this part
among those railroads through a joint operating agreement or other
binding contract. However, the assignor shall not be relieved of
responsibility for compliance with this part.
(4) Special circumstances. (i) Tunnels. When applicable, the
railroad's emergency preparedness plan shall reflect readiness
procedures designed to ensure passenger safety in an emergency
situation occurring in a tunnel of 1,000 feet or more in length. The
railroad's emergency preparedness plan shall address, as a minimum,
availability of emergency lighting, access to emergency evacuation
exits, benchwall readiness, ladders for detraining, effective radio or
other communication between on-board crewmembers and the control
center, and options for assistance from other trains.
(ii) Other operating considerations. When applicable, the
railroad's emergency preparedness plan shall address passenger train
emergency procedures involving operations on elevated structures,
including drawbridges, and in electrified territory.
(iii) Parallel operations. When applicable, the railroad's
emergency preparedness plan shall provide for coordination of emergency
efforts where adjacent rail modes of transportation run parallel to
either the passenger railroad or freight railroad hosting passenger
operations.
(5) Liaison with emergency responders. Each railroad to which this
part applies shall establish and maintain a working relationship with
the on-line emergency responders by, as a minimum:
(i) Distributing applicable portions of its current emergency
preparedness plan at least once every three years, or whenever the
railroad materially changes its plan in a manner that could reasonably
be expected to affect the railroad's interface with the on-line
emergency responders, whichever occurs earlier, including documentation
concerning the railroad's equipment and the physical characteristics of
its line, necessary maps, and the names and telephone numbers of
relevant railroad officers to contact;
(ii) Maintaining an awareness of each emergency responders'
capabilities; and
(iii) Inviting emergency responders to participate in emergency
simulations, including tabletop exercises.
(6) On-board emergency equipment. (i) General. Each railroad's
emergency preparedness plan shall designate the types of on-board
emergency equipment and indicate their location(s) on each passenger
car. This equipment shall include, at a minimum:
(A) One fire extinguisher per passenger car;
(B) One pry bar per passenger car; and
(C) One flashlight per on-board crewmember.
(ii) On-board emergency lighting. Consistent with the requirements
of 49 CFR Part 238, auxiliary portable lighting must be accessible.
(iii) Maintenance. Each railroad's emergency preparedness plan
shall provide for scheduled maintenance and replacement of on-board
emergency equipment and lighting.
(7) Passenger safety information. (i) General. Each railroad's
emergency preparedness plan shall provide for passenger awareness of
emergency procedures, to enable passengers to respond properly during
an emergency.
(ii) Passenger awareness program activities. Each railroad shall
conspicuously and legibly post emergency instructions inside all
passenger cars (e.g., on car bulkhead signs, seatback decals, or seat
cards) and shall utilize one or more of the following additional
methods to provide safety awareness information:
(A) On-board announcements;
(B) Laminated wallet cards;
(C) Ticket envelopes;
(D) Timetables;
(E) Station signs or video monitors;
(F) Public service announcements; or
(G) Seat drops.
(iii) Passenger surveys. Each railroad shall survey representative
samples of passengers at least once during each calendar year to
determine the effectiveness of its passenger awareness program
activities, and shall improve its program, as appropriate, in
accordance with the information developed.
(A) The survey shall be designed to examine passenger awareness of
the location(s) on the passenger car of the available safety
information and verify passenger knowledge of the safety procedures to
be followed in the event of an emergency.
(B) The railroad shall inform each surveyed passenger that
completion of the survey is strictly voluntary.
(C) Each railroad shall maintain records of its passenger surveys
at its system headquarters and applicable division headquarters. These
records shall be made available to representatives of FRA for
inspection and copying during normal business hours.
(b) [Reserved]
Sec. 239.103 Passenger train emergency simulations.
(a) General. Each railroad operating passenger train service shall
conduct emergency simulations, either full-scale or tabletop exercises,
in order to determine its capability to execute the emergency
preparedness plan under the variety of scenarios that could reasonably
be expected to occur on its operation, and ensure coordination with all
emergency responders who voluntarily agree to participate in the
emergency simulations.
[[Page 8358]]
(b) Frequency of the emergency simulations. Each railroad that
provides commuter or other short-haul passenger train service shall
conduct a sufficient number of emergency simulations so that each major
line will be included at least once during every two calendar years and
the number of simulations performed during any given calendar year will
include at least 50 percent of the total number of major lines. Each
railroad that provides intercity passenger train service shall conduct
at least two emergency simulations during each calendar year for each
business unit or other major organizational element.
(c) Definition. As used in this section, in the case of a railroad
that provides commuter or other short-haul passenger train service,
major line includes each principal route and its branches.
(d) Actual emergency situations. Provided that a railroad conducts
a debriefing and critique session meeting the requirements of
Sec. 239.105 of this subpart, a railroad may count the activation of
its emergency preparedness plan during an actual emergency situation
toward the minimum number of simulations required under this section.
However, a railroad may substitute the activation of its emergency
preparedness plan to satisfy no more than 50 percent of the total
number of simulations required under this section.
Sec. 239.105 Debriefing and critique.
(a) General. Each railroad operating passenger train service shall
conduct a debriefing and critique session after each passenger train
emergency situation or simulation to determine the effectiveness of its
emergency preparedness plan, and shall improve and/or amend its plan,
as appropriate, in accordance with the information developed.
(b) Purpose of debriefing and critique information. The debriefing
and critique session shall be designed to determine, at a minimum:
(1) Whether the on-board communications equipment functioned
properly;
(2) The elapsed time between the occurrence of the emergency
situation or simulation and notification to the emergency responders
involved;
(3) Whether the control center promptly initiated the required
notifications;
(4) How quickly and effectively the emergency responders responded
after notification; and
(5) The efficiency of passenger egress from the car through the
emergency exits.
(c) Records. Each railroad shall maintain records of its debriefing
and critique sessions at its system headquarters and applicable
division headquarters. These records shall be made available to
representatives of FRA for inspection and copying during normal
business hours.
Sec. 239.107 Emergency exits.
(a) Marking. Each railroad operating passenger train service shall
ensure that each of the following occur.
(1) All door exits intended for emergency egress are either lighted
or conspicuously and legibly marked with luminescent material on the
inside of the car. Each railroad shall post clear and understandable
instructions at or near such exits.
(2) All door exits intended for emergency access by emergency
responders for extrication of passengers are marked with
retroreflective material. Each railroad shall post clear and
understandable instructions at each such door.
(b) Inspection, maintenance, and repair. Consistent with the
requirements of part 223 of this chapter, each railroad operating
passenger train service shall provide for scheduled inspection,
maintenance, and repair of emergency window and door exits. Each
railroad shall test a representative sample of emergency window exits
on its cars at least once every 180 days to verify their proper
operation, and shall repair a defective unit before returning the car
to service.
(c) Records. Each railroad operating passenger service shall
maintain records of its inspection, maintenance, and repair of
emergency window and door exits at its system headquarters and
applicable division headquarters. These records shall be made available
to representatives of FRA for inspection and copying during normal
business hours.
Subpart C--Review, Approval, and Retention of Emergency
Preparedness Plans
Sec. 239.201 Emergency preparedness plan; filing and approval.
(a) Filing. Each railroad to which this part applies shall file one
copy of its emergency preparedness plan with the Associate
Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh
Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590, not more than 180 days after (the
effective date of the final rule), or not less than 90 days prior to
commencing passenger operations, whichever is later. The emergency
preparedness plan shall include the name, title, address, and telephone
number of the primary person to be contacted with regard to review of
the plan, and shall include a summary of the railroad's analysis
supporting each plan element and describing how each condition on the
railroad's property is addressed in the plan. Each subsequent amendment
to a railroad's emergency preparedness plan shall be filed with FRA not
less than 60 days prior to the proposed effective date.
(b) Approval. (1) Within 180 days of receipt of each initial plan,
and within 60 days in the case of a railroad commencing or hosting
passenger operations after the initial deadline for plan submissions,
FRA will conduct a formal review of the emergency preparedness plan.
FRA will then notify the primary railroad contact person of the results
of the review, whether the emergency preparedness plan has been
approved by FRA, and if not approved, the specific points in which the
plan is deficient. If an emergency preparedness plan is not approved by
FRA, the railroad shall amend its plan to correct all deficiencies (and
provide FRA with a corrected copy) not later than 30 days following
receipt of FRA's written notice that the plan was not approved.
(2) FRA will review each proposed plan amendment within 45 days of
receipt. FRA will then notify the primary railroad contact person of
the results of the review, whether the proposed amendment has been
approved by FRA, and if not approved, the specific points in which the
proposed amendment is deficient. The railroad shall correct any
deficiencies and file the corrected amendment prior to implementing the
amendment.
(3) Following initial approval of a plan or amendment, FRA may
reopen consideration of the plan or amendment for cause stated.
Sec. 239.203 Retention of emergency preparedness plan.
Each railroad to which this part applies shall retain one copy of
its emergency preparedness plan and one copy of each subsequent
amendment to its emergency preparedness plan at its system and division
headquarters, and shall make such records available to representatives
of FRA for inspection and copying during normal business hours.
Subpart D--Operational (Efficiency) Tests; Inspection of Records
and Recordkeeping
Sec. 239.301 Operational (efficiency) tests.
(a) Each railroad to which this part applies shall periodically
conduct operational (efficiency) tests of its on-
[[Page 8359]]
board and control center employees to determine the extent of
compliance with its emergency preparedness plan.
(b) Each railroad to which this part applies shall maintain a
record of the date, time, place, and result of each operational
(efficiency) test that was performed in accordance with paragraph (a)
of this section. Each record shall specify the name of the railroad
officer who administered the test and the name of each employee tested.
The conduct of the test shall be documented in writing and the
documentation shall contain sufficient information to identify the
relevant facts relied on for evaluation purposes.
(c) These records shall be retained at the system headquarters of
the railroad and at the division headquarters for each division where
the tests are conducted for one calendar year after the end of the
calendar year to which they relate. These records shall be made
available to representatives of FRA for inspection and copying during
normal business hours.
Sec. 239.303 Electronic recordkeeping.
(a) Each railroad to which this part applies is authorized to
retain by electronic recordkeeping the information prescribed in
Sec. 239.301, provided that all of the following conditions are met:
(1) The railroad adequately limits and controls accessibility to
such information retained in its database system and identifies those
individuals who have such access;
(2) The railroad has a terminal at the system headquarters and at
each division headquarters;
(3) Each such terminal has a desk-top computer (i.e., monitor,
central processing unit, and keyboard) and either a facsimile machine
or a printer connected to the computer to retrieve and produce
information in a usable format for immediate review by FRA
representatives;
(4) The railroad has a designated representative who is authorized
to authenticate retrieved information from the electronic system as
true and accurate copies of the electronically kept records; and
(5) The railroad provides representatives of FRA with immediate
access to these records for inspection and copying during normal
business hours and provides printouts of such records upon request.
(b) [Reserved]
Appendix A to Part 239--Schedule of Civil Penalties [Reserved]
Issued in Washington, D.C., on February 19, 1997.
Jolene M. Molitoris,
Federal Railroad Administrator.
[FR Doc. 97-4489 Filed 2-21-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
