[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 117 (Monday, June 20, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-14018]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: June 20, 1994]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. 93-NM-142-AD; Amendment 39-8938; AD 94-12-10]
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 767 Series Airplanes
Equipped With Pratt & Whitney PW4000 Series Engines
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive
(AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 767 series airplanes, that
currently requires repetitive inspections, tests, adjustments, and
functional checks of the thrust reverser system and of selected engine
wiring. This amendment adds a requirement for installation of a
terminating modification, repetitive operational checks of that
installation, and repair of any discrepancy found. This amendment is
prompted by the identification of a modification that ensures that the
level of safety inherent in the original type design of the thrust
reverser system is further enhanced. The actions specified by this AD
are intended to prevent deployment of a thrust reverser in flight and
subsequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
DATES: Effective July 20, 1994.
The incorporation by reference of Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-
0062, Revision 2, dated June 3, 1993; and Revision 3, dated February
24, 1994; as listed in the regulations, is approved by the Director of
the Federal Register as of July 20, 1994.
The incorporation by reference of Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-
0046, Revision 1, dated September 17, 1992, as listed in the
regulations, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal
Register as of November 24, 1992 (57 FR 53258, November 9, 1992).
The incorporation by reference of Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-
0051, dated October 9, 1991, and Boeing Document D630T002, ``Boeing 767
Dispatch Deviation Guide,'' Revision 9, dated May 1, 1991, as listed in
the regulations, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal
Register as of November 8, 1991 (56 FR 55066, October 24, 1991).
ADDRESSES: The service information referenced in this AD may be
obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle,
Washington 98124-2207. This information may be examined at the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules
Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of
the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700,
Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Richard Simonson, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton,
Washington 98055-4056; telephone (206) 227-2683; fax (206) 227-1181.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations by superseding AD 92-24-03, amendment 39-8408 (57
FR 53258, November 9, 1992), which is applicable to certain Boeing
Model 767 series airplanes, was published in the Federal Register on
October 7, 1993 (58 FR 52243). The action proposed to continue to
require repetitive inspections, tests, adjustments, and functional
checks of the thrust reverser system and of selected engine wiring; and
to add a requirement for installation of a terminating modification,
repetitive operational checks of that installation, and repair of any
discrepancy found.
Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate
in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to
the comments received.
-One commenter supports the proposed rule.
-Two commenters request that specific references to page numbers
and revision dates of the Boeing 767 Airplane Maintenance Manual (AMM),
which are specified in paragraph (f) of the proposal, be removed from
the proposed rule. Boeing recommends that the proposed AD specify only
the ATA Chapter-Section-Subject, pageblock title, and task title.
Boeing explains that the AMM's are customized for each operator to
reflect all of the equipment in that operator's fleet. Therefore, the
number of pages for any given procedure is variable, depending on the
number of different equipment configurations documented in an
operator's AMM. Boeing also indicates that AMM procedures are revised
periodically for non-technical reasons. Boeing adds that changes to the
structure of the procedures are necessary to accommodate an upgrade of
the publishing system that is currently under way, which, in addition
to repagination, will necessitate the issuance of revised AMM pages.
-Boeing also requests that a reference to a specific Temporary
Revision (TR) number, which is specified in ``NOTE 4'' under paragraph
(c) of the proposal, be eliminated from the proposed rule. Boeing
explains that because of the customization of AMM's for each operator,
multiple TR's may be issued to address a technical concern. While
changes to the procedure can be identical for all operators, the page
layout of each operator's AMM can require a unique TR to allow the
operator to correctly integrate the TR into the AMM. Since each unique
TR has a different number, the specific TR referenced in the proposal
only applies to the AMM's for three operators of a possible 18
operators. Additionally, TR's are removed from an operator's AMM and
destroyed when the data is incorporated in a subsequent regular
revision. The procedural changes in the TR cited in the proposal were
incorporated into the AMM in November 1992, and instructions were
provided in an AMM transmittal letter to remove the TR. Therefore, it
is probable that operators no longer have the TR that was cited in the
proposed rule.
-Boeing concludes that the net effect of specifying AMM page
numbers, AMM revision dates, and TR's in the AD would be that operators
may be unable to use the procedure contained in the AMM to perform
certain tests required by the AD. Each operator would be required to
maintain an obsolete version of the procedure, or to request FAA
approval of an alternative method of compliance with the AD that would
allow the use of the current version of the AMM.
-The FAA concurs partially. In light of the information submitted
by the commenters, the FAA finds that specific reference to the TR
cited in ``NOTE 4'' under paragraph (c) of the proposal should not be
specified in the final rule. Accordingly, ``NOTE 4'' has been removed
from the final rule. Additionally, the FAA's objective in proposing
periodic operational checks of the sync-lock device, as specified in
paragraph (f) of this AD, is to ensure the integrity of the locking
function. However, since the issuance of the proposal and receipt of
Boeing's comments to the proposal, Boeing has submitted to the FAA
separate procedures for accomplishment of the operational checks of the
sync-lock integrity. Therefore, these procedures have been defined in
paragraph (f) of the final rule, and the AMM references specified
previously in paragraph (f) of the proposal have been removed from the
final rule.
-The Air Transport Association (ATA) of America, on behalf of its
members, states that, while ATA members are not opposed to
accomplishing the proposed checks as part of their maintenance
programs, these members are opposed to accomplishing the checks as part
of the requirements of an AD. The commenters believe that the
requirement for operational checks is equivalent to issuing a
Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMR) item by means of an AD.
ATA adds that, if the FAA finds sufficient justification to include
the requirement for operational checks in the AD, an alternative to
accomplishment of the checks should be provided in the final rule. ATA
reasons that an alternative is justified because no data exist to show
that repetitive checks of a modified thrust reverser cannot be handled
adequately through an operator's maintenance program. The suggested
alternative follows: Within 3 months after accomplishing the sync-lock
installation, revise the FAA-approved maintenance inspection program to
include an operational check of the sync-lock. The initial check would
be accomplished within 1,000 hours time-in-service after modification.
The AD would no longer be applicable for operators that have acceptably
revised the maintenance program. Operators choosing this alternative
could use an alternative recordkeeping method in lieu of that required
by Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 91.417 or 121.380. The FAA would
be defined as the cognizant Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI) for
operators electing this alternative.
The FAA recognizes the concerns of the commenter regarding the
requirement for periodic operational checks of the sync-lock following
its installation. However, the FAA finds that the operational checks
are necessary in order to provide an adequate level of safety and to
ensure the integrity of the sync-lock installation. The actions
required by this AD are consistent with actions that have been
identified by an industry-wide task force as necessary to ensure
adequate safety of certain thrust reverser systems installed on
transport category airplanes. Representatives of the Aerospace
Industries Association (AIA) of America, Inc., and the FAA comprise
that task force. Representatives from other organizations, such as ATA,
have participated in various discussions and work activities resulting
from the recommendations of the task force.
The FAA acknowledges that the operational checks specified in this
AD and CMR items are similar in terms of scheduled maintenance and
recordkeeping. This AD addresses an unsafe condition and requires
installation of the sync-lock to correct that unsafe condition. The FAA
has determined that the requirement for operational checks is necessary
in order to ensure the effectiveness of that installation in addressing
the unsafe condition. This determination is based on the fact that the
sync-lock is a new design whose reliability has not been adequately
proven through service experience. In addition, service experience to
date has demonstrated that failures can occur within the sync-lock that
may not be evident during normal operation of the thrust reverser
system and may not result in activation of the sync-lock ``unlock''
indicator. The ATA's suggested alternative to accomplishment of the
operational checks would permit each operator to determine whether and
how often these checks should be conducted. In light of the severity of
the unsafe condition, however, the FAA has determined that allowing
this degree of operator discretion is not appropriate at this time.
Therefore, this AD is necessary to ensure that operators accomplish
checks of the integrity of the sync-lock installation in a common
manner and at common intervals.
The FAA also finds that addressing operational checks of the sync-
lock integrity in a recommended action, such as an MRB report, will not
ensure an acceptable level of safety with regard to the thrust reverser
system. However, the FAA recognizes that an operational check interval
of 4,000 hours time-in-service, which will be recommended by Boeing for
inclusion in the next revision to the MRB report, corresponds more
closely to the interval at which most of the affected operators conduct
regularly scheduled ``C'' checks. The FAA has reconsidered the proposed
interval of 1,000 hours time-in-service for accomplishment of
repetitive operational checks. In light of the safety implications of
the unsafe condition addressed and the practical aspects of
accomplishing orderly operational checks of the fleet during regularly
scheduled maintenance where special equipment and trained maintenance
personnel will be readily available, the FAA finds that accomplishment
of the checks at intervals of 4,000 hours time-in-service will provide
an acceptable level of safety. Paragraph (f) of the final rule has been
revised accordingly.
Since issuance of the notice, the FAA has reviewed and approved
Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0062, Revision 3, dated February 24,
1994. This revised service bulletin is essentially identical to the
previous revision (which was cited in the notice), but contains certain
minor editorial changes. The FAA has revised the final rule to include
this revised service bulletin as an additional source of appropriate
service information.
After careful review of the available data, including the comments
noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public
interest require the adoption of the rule with the changes previously
described. The FAA has determined that these changes will neither
increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of
the AD.
There are approximately 88 Model 767 series airplanes of the
affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 26
airplanes of U.S. registry will be affected by this AD, that it will
take approximately 480 work hours per airplane to accomplish the
required modification, and 1 work hour to accomplish the required
operational checks, at an average labor rate of $55 per work hour.
Required parts will be provided by the manufacturer at no cost to
operators. Based on these figures, the total cost impact of the AD on
U.S. operators is estimated to be $687,830, or $26,455 per airplane.
The total cost impact figure discussed above is based on
assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the
requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish
those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.
The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct
effects on the States, on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in
accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final
rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the
preparation of a Federalism Assessment.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866;
(2) is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a
significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial
number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action
and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained
from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption
ADDRESSES.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment.
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. App. 1354(a), 1421 and 1423; 49 U.S.C.
106(g); and 14 CFR 11.89.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. Section 39.13 is amended by removing amendment 39-8408 (57 FR
53258, November 9, 1992), and by adding a new airworthiness directive
(AD), amendment 39-8938, to read as follows:
94-12-10 Boeing: Amendment 39-8938. Docket 93-NM-142-AD. Supersedes
AD 92-24-03, Amendment 39-8408.
Applicability: Model 767 series airplanes equipped with Pratt &
Whitney PW4000 series engines; certificated in any category.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished
previously.
Note 1: Paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD restate the
requirements of AD 92-24-03, amendment 39-8408, paragraphs (a) and
(b). As allowed by the phrase, ``unless accomplished previously,''
if the requirements of AD 92-24-03 have been accomplished
previously, paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD do not require that
they be repeated.
Note 2: Paragraph (c)(1) of this AD restates the requirement for
an initial and repetitive inspections, tests, adjustments, and
functional checks contained in paragraph (c)(1) of AD 92-24-03.
Therefore, for operators who have previously accomplished at least
the initial inspection in accordance with AD 92-24-03, paragraph
(c)(1) of this AD requires that the next scheduled inspection be
performed within 3,000 flight hours after the last inspection
performed in accordance with paragraph (c)(1) of AD 92-24-03.
Note 3: Paragraph (c)(2) of this AD restates the requirement for
an initial and repetitive checks of the grounding wire contained in
paragraph (c)(2) of AD 92-24-03. Therefore, for operators who have
previously accomplished at least the initial inspection in
accordance with AD 92-24-03, paragraph (c)(2) of this AD requires
that the next scheduled inspection be performed within 1,500 flight
hours after the last inspection performed in accordance with
paragraph (c)(2) of AD 92-24-03.
To ensure the integrity of the fail safe features of the thrust
reverser system, accomplish the following:
(a) Within 7 days after August 23, 1991 (the effective date of
AD 91-18-51, amendment 39-8069), accomplish the following:
(1) Deactivate both left and right thrust reversers in
accordance with Section 78-31-1 of Boeing Document D630T002,
``Boeing 767 Dispatch Deviation Guide,'' Revision 9, dated May 1,
1991.
(2) Add the following to the Limitations Section of the FAA-
approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). This may be accomplished by
placing a copy of this AD in the AFM.
``Reduce by five percent the available accelerate-stop distance
resulting from the Airplane Flight Manual takeoff performance
analysis when the runway is wet or contaminated.''
(b) Within 60 days after November 8, 1991 (the effective date of
AD 91-22-09, amendment 39-8069), modify the thrust reverser system
in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0051, dated
October 9, 1991. Once this modification is accomplished, the thrust
reverser system shall be re-activated and the AFM limitation
required by paragraph (a)(2) of this AD may be removed.
(c) Accomplish the actions specified in paragraphs (c)(1) and
(c)(2) of this AD at the times specified in those paragraphs.
(1) Prior to the accumulation of 3,000 flight hours since
manufacture, or within 30 days after November 24, 1992 (the
effective date of AD 92-24-03, amendment (39-8408), whichever occurs
later, perform all inspections, tests, adjustments, and functional
checks of the thrust reverser control and indication system and
engine wiring specified in Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0046,
Revision 1, dated September 17, 1992, in accordance with the
procedures described in that service bulletin.
(i) Repeat those actions thereafter at intervals not to exceed
3,000 flight hours.
(ii) Whenever maintenance action is taken that could disturb any
portion of the thrust reverser control system, the functional test
or tests relative to the system shall be performed in accordance
with the Boeing 767 Maintenance Manual. After this test(s) is
accomplished, the repetitive inspections, tests, adjustments and
functional tests required by paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this AD shall
continue.
(2) Prior to the accumulation of 1,500 flight hours since
manufacture, or within 30 days after November 24, 1992 (the
effective date of AD 92-24-03), whichever occurs later, perform a
check of the grounding wire for the thrust reverser directional
control valve (DCV) in accordance with Section III, paragraph B., of
Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0046, Revision 1, dated September 17,
1992. Thereafter, repeat this check at the times specified in
paragraph (c)(2)(i) and (c)(2)(ii) of this AD.
(i) At intervals not to exceed 1,500 flight hours; and
(ii) Whenever maintenance action is taken that could disturb the
DCV grounding circuit.
(d) If any of the inspections, tests, adjustments, and/or
functional checks required by paragraph (c) of this AD cannot be
performed successfully as specified in the service bulletin, prior
to further flight, deactivate the associated thrust reverser in
accordance with Section 78-31-1 of Boeing Document D630T002,
``Boeing 767 Dispatch Deviation Guide,'' Revision 9, dated May 1,
1991. The thrust reverser shall remain deactivated until all
inspections, tests, adjustments, and functional tests required by
paragraph (c) of this AD are completed successfully.
(e) Within 3 years after the effective date of this AD, install
an additional thrust reverser system locking feature (sync-lock) in
accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0062, Revision 2,
dated June 3, 1993, or Revision 3, dated February 24, 1994.
Installation of this additional locking feature constitutes
terminating action for the requirements of paragraph (c) of this AD.
(f) Within 4,000 hours time-in-service after accomplishing the
modification required by paragraph (e) of this AD, or within 4,000
hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, whichever
occurs later; and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 4,000 hours
time-in-service: Perform the integrity test of the thrust reverser
synchronous shaft locks specified below to detect latent failures of
the components and to ensure the integrity of the thrust reverser
system. Prior to further flight, repair any discrepancy found in
accordance with procedures described in the Boeing 767 Maintenance
Manual.
THRUST REVERSER SYNC-LOCK--ADJUSTMENT/TEST
1. General
A. There are two sync-locks for each engine thrust reverser. The
sync-lock is installed on the lower non-locking hydraulic actuator
of each thrust reverser sleeve.
B. The Thrust Reverser Sync-Lock Integrity Test has two tasks:
(1) The first task tests the electrical circuit which controls
the operation of the sync-lock on each thrust reverser sleeve.
(2) The second task tests the mechanical function of the sync-
lock on each thrust reverser sleeve.
C. The thrust reverser sync-lock is referred to as the sync-lock
in this procedure.
2. Thrust Reverser Sync-Lock Integrity Test
A. Equipment
(1) Multi-meter, Simpson 260 or equivalent--commerically
available.
B. Prepare to do the Integrity Test for the sync-locks.
(1) Supply electrical power.
(2) For the left engine, make sure these circuit breakers on the
overhead circuit breaker panel, P11, are closed:
(a) L ENG T/R CONT
(b) L ENG T/R IND
(c) L ENG T/R SSL CONT
(3) For the right engine, make sure these circuit breakers on
the overhead circuit breaker panel, P11, are closed:
(a) R ENG T/R CONT
(b) R ENG T/R IND
(c) R ENG T/R SSL CONT
(d) FOR ETOPS AIRPLANES, CLOSE THESE ADDITIONAL CIRCUIT
BREAKERS:
1) R ENG T/R CONT ALTN
2) R ENG T/R IND ALTN
(4) Open the fan cowl panels.
C. Do the Electrical Integrity Test for the sync-locks.
(1) Do these steps to make sure there are no ``hot'' short
circuits in the electrical system that may accidentally supply power
to the sync-locks:
(a) Remove the electrical connector, D20194, from the sync-
locks, V170, on the left sleeve of the thrust reverser.
(b) Remove the electrical connector, D20196, from the sync-lock,
V171, on the right sleeve of the thrust reverser.
(c) Use a multi-meter on the plug end of the applicable
electrical connector to make sure that these conditions are correct:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From Equipment To Equipment Condition
------------------------------------------------------------------------
D20194, PIN 1.......... D20194, PIN 2.......... -3 TO +1 V DC AND
CONTINUITY (LESS THAN
5 OHMS)
D20196, PIN 1.......... D20196, PIN 2.......... -3 TO +1 V DC AND
CONTINUITY (LESS THAN
5 OHMS)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(d) If you did not find these conditions to be correct, you must
do these steps:
(1) Make a careful visual inspection of all the electrical wires
and connectors between the sync-lock and its power circuit breaker.
(2) Repair all the unserviceable electrical wire and connectors
that you find.
(3) Use the multi-meter again to make sure there are no ``hot''
short circuits in the electrical system that can accidentally supply
power to the sync-locks.
(e) If you find the correct conditions, do the Mechanical
Integrity Test for the sync-locks.
D. Do the Mechanical Integrity Test for the sync-locks.
(1) Supply hydraulic power.
WARNING: MAKE SURE ALL PERSONS AND EQUIPMENT ARE CLEAR OF THE
AREA BEHIND EACH THRUST REVERSER. IF YOU DO NOT OBEY THIS
INSTRUCTION, INJURIES TO PERSONS OR DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT CAN OCCUR IF
THE SYNC-LOCKS DO NOT OPERATE CORRECTLY AND THE THRUST REVERSER
EXTENDS.
(2) Move the L(R) reverser thrust lever aft to try to extend the
thrust reverser.
Note: If the thrust reverser sleeves do not extend, the sync-
locks are serviceable. If the thrust reverser sleeve extends, the
applicable sync-lock did not operate correctly.
(3) Replace the sync-lock(s) for the thrust reverser sleeve(s)
that extended.
(4) Make sure the reverse thrust levers are in the fully stowed
position.
(5) Install the electrical connectors, D20194, on the sync-
locks, V170, on the left sleeve of the thrust reverser.
(6) Install the electrical connector, D20196, on the sync-lock,
V171, on the right sleeve of the thrust reverser.
WARNING: MAKE SURE ALL PERSONS AND EQUIPMENT ARE CLEAR OF THE
AREA BEHIND THE THRUST REVERSERS. IF YOU DO NOT OBEY THIS
INSTRUCTION, INJURIES TO PERSONS OR DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT CAN OCCUR
WHEN THE THRUST REVERSERS ARE EXTENDED.
(7) Move the L(R) reverser thrust lever aft to extend the thrust
reverser.
Note: If the thrust reverser sleeves extend, the sync-locks are
serviceable. If the thrust reverser sleeve did not extend, the
applicable sync-lock did not operate correctly.
(8) Replace the sync-lock(s) on the thrust reverser sleeve(s)
that did not extend when you moved the reverse thrust levers.
E. Repeat the Thrust Reverser Sync-Lock Integrity Test for the
opposite engine.
F. Put the airplane back to its usual condition.
(1) Move the reverser thrust levers to fully retract the thrust
reversers on the two engines with hydraulic power.
(2) Remove the hydraulic power if it is not necessary.
(3) Remove the electrical power if it is not necessary.
(4) Close the fan cowl panels.
(g) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the
compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification
Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall
submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal
Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the
Manager, Seattle ACO.
Note 4: Information concerning the existence of approved
alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be
obtained from the Seattle ACO.
(h) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with
sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14
CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where
the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
(i) The installation shall be done in accordance with Boeing
Service Bulletin 767-78-0062, Revision 2, dated June 3, 1993; or
Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0062, Revision 3, dated February 24,
1994. The incorporation by reference of these documents was approved
by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C.
552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. The inspections, tests, adjustments, and
functional checks shall be done in accordance with Boeing Service
Bulletin 767-78-0046, Revision 1, dated September 17, 1992. The
incorporation by reference of this document was approved previously
by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C.
552(a) and 1 CFR part 51 as of November 24, 1992 (57 FR 53258,
November 9, 1992). The modification and deactivation shall be done
in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0051, dated
October 9, 1991; and Boeing Document D630T002, ``Boeing 767 Dispatch
Deviation Guide,'' Revision 9, dated May 1, 1991. The incorporation
by reference of these documents was approved previously by the
Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a)
and 1 CFR part 51 as of November 8, 1991 (56 FR 55066, October 24,
1991). Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group,
P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. Copies may be
inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind
Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal
Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.
(j) This amendment becomes effective on July 20, 1994.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 3, 1994.
Darrell M. Pederson,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 94-14018 Filed 6-17-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-U
